Reviewing Last Slovene Endeavours to Strengthen Safe Transport of Radioactive Material and a Quick Look over the Horizon
Janez Češarek
Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) Litostrojska cesta 54, SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
janez.cesarek@gov.si
ABSTRACT
There have not been any traffic accidents during transport of radioactive material in Slovenia in the past years. The total number of such shipments and the number of packages is relatively small, having in mind large European countries. Still, “a few thousands” packages with radioactive material with very different activities annually do require graded approach and precisely chiselling regulatory requirements, vigilance and human resources. It is wise and a matter of course to look globally and have in mind others’ experiences and lessons learnt from accidents with radioactive material which occur from time to time. The best way is to look into such cases and prevent domestic re-occurrences. Both safety and security culture tend to act like a glue also for the issue of transport and its resilience when being challenged.
The backbone of the system (also) in Slovenia is to follow the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) as well the requirements from the other modal regulation. This is enshrined through a direct link in the Act on Transport of Dangerous Goods. In addition, the “Nuclear Act, ZVISJV-1” gives a platform for requirements for transporting certain radioactive sources – to be a radiation practice – with all the consequential requirements and duties, imposed on the carrier. Transport of nuclear (fissile) material is another category which deserves particular attention. On the other hand, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has produced a number of useful, transport- related documents and the current (2018 Edition) of the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, known as “SSR-6”, has been clearly its flagship.
A string of actions in the last couple of years has charted the path ahead. The Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) established an informal group on safe transport of radioactive material back in 2017 – bringing together not only various public/governmental entities but also a handful of carriers and organisers of the carriages. One of such engagements has been the co-operation with the Slovene Police while elaborating annual threat assessment for transports of potentially highly dangerous goods – radioactive material. Another “avenue”
of the awareness raising is also the “Radiation News” – a quarterly type of the leaflet – intended primarily for domestic users of radiation sources – some of them involved also in transport- related topics. On the international parquet, the Slovene decision to join the EACA (European Association of Competent Authorities for safe transport of radioactive material) in 2015-2016 has proven to be a salient gain, having in mind the exchange of experience on different transport-related issues and sharing good practices.
To shortly embrace the best vision for the future, it is understandable for a small country, its regulators and their stakeholders to nurture synergies and continuous improvements. A handful of actions have been in the pipeline – which may spur up further-on the issue of safe transport of radioactive material, having in mind not only sustainable approaches but also
“learning by doing” and taking care of non-unlimited human resources and expertise in the sphere. SNSA will collate and exchange experiences on the lessons learnt from the transport- related events. ADR (2021 Edition) is practically knocking at the door, envisaged to interweave numerous new requirements for dangerous goods – including radioactive material – that will need to be understood and taken into account in the future.
1 INTRODUCTION
In Slovenia, the transport of radioactive and nuclear materials is regulated by the Act on the transport of dangerous goods (abbreviated in Slovene as “ZPNB”). All road transport of such material shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR). Similar goes with other modes of transport and known international instruments are directly applicable (e.g. RID or IMO DG Code). In addition, the “Nuclear Act, ZVISJV-1” gives a platform for requirements for transporting certain radioactive sources (i.e. Category 1 and 2, based upon the Decree on radiation practices, Article 12 and Table 5 in Annex) – to be a radiation practice – with all the consequential requirements and duties, imposed on the carrier.
It is necessary to clearly underline that for transport of sources, used (later on) in medicine and veterinary care, another institution is responsible in Slovenia, namely the Slovenian Radiation Protection Administration (SRPA). The Ministry of Infrastructure is the responsible ministry for drafting the changes to “ZPNB” as well as translation of changes in ADR (biennially) into the Slovene edition. Two strong “stepping stones” are given in “ZPNB”
(Articles 7 and 38) to SNSA, which is responsible for approvals of package design (“packaging”) and to the Police, who conduct the inspection control (of all dangerous goods) on roads.
There are currently two institutions in Slovenia providing the training and certification process for DGSA (Dangerous Goods Safety Adviser/s) and drivers that are involved in carriage of dangerous goods – radioactive material, Class 7.
2 SOME HEADWORDS FROM “ZPNB” AND ADR
It is truly important to list (and delineate) the responsibilities of all stakeholders included in the transport chain. Chapter 1.4 of ADR for example addresses all participants (the main being: consignor, carrier and consignee) and their safety obligations. It may be seen as a certain duplication but their duties are also enshrined in “ZPNB”, e.g. in Articles 12, 18 and 19.
Based upon Subchapter 5.1.5.5 of ADR, only a few transports (i.e. “shipments” and
“packages”) fall within the scope of licensing provisions, including prior notification. One exception is the so-called transport under “special arrangement” – for which occasional licence is issued by SNSA (e.g. transport of orphan sources to the national, recognised installation, Central radwaste storage facility at Brinje).
Rules on the tasks of a safety advisor in transport of dangerous goods (from 2000), together with “ZPNB” (Article 29) and ADR (1.8.3.3) outline multiple tasks imposed upon the DGSA. His/her nomination is mandatory for a vast majority of cases (e.g. there is an exemption for “excepted packages” which present very limited risks). In the future – i.e. after 31 December 2022 – DGSA will be a condition also for the consignors, based upon the recent ADR requirement (1.6.1.44).
ADR has extensively evolved since its inception. This is true also for its parts referred to transport of radioactive material – Class 7. One of the recent changes includes e.g. a derogation for drivers (of “Type A” packages but not all) from the certification process (as determined in 8.2.1). There have been many horizontal changes within ADR’s text affecting all classes, e.g.
the sequence of changes of the 4-page document “Instruction in writing” (5.4.3) or the additional requirement on durability of placarding (5.3.1.1.1). The last revision of transport security thresholds for radioactive material reaches back to ADR’s change in 2013.
3 A HANDFUL OF THE ENDEAVOURS IN THE LAST DECADE
Based upon “ZPNB” (Article 7), SNSA has several times re-validated Type A (AF, fissile radioactive materials package design) – used in the incoming shipments of fresh nuclear fuel for the Krško Nuclear Power Plant. With the change of “ZPNB” in 2015, the transfer of package design approval from the Minister responsible for the environment to SNSA has paved the way to a more efficient procedure – with less bureaucracy.
For a number of years, the legislative approach from then-applied “Nuclear Act”
(ZVISJV) and the 2nd-tier Rules on the use of radiation sources and radiation activities stipulated “transportation as a radiation practice” for all radioactive sources, regardless of their activities or inherent risks (or vulnerabilities or “graded approach”). This approach was challenged in 2018, when the afore-mentioned rules were amended so as to include only those sources which fall either in Category 1 or Category 2 – based upon their activities. A derogation was put in place also for nuclear material and thresholds were created (e.g. up to 350 kg of depleted uranium is exempted from the licensing of “transportation as a radiation practice”).
SNSA established an informal group on safe transport of radioactive material back in 2017 – bringing together not only various public/governmental entities but also a handful of carriers and organisers of carriages. At the moment, the group consists of 13 entities (Ministry of the Interior counted as one with its branches). Regular meetings are held each spring in an established set of the SNSA’s overview and “tour-de-table” where everybody presents their work, achievements and challenges. The entities are also briefed about the international situation regarding safe (and secure) transport of radioactive material.
In Slovenia, there is one company manufacturing “industrial packages” (IP) as well as
“Type A” packages for later transport of radioactive material. SNSA has conducted a few audits so far, having in mind the requirements from ADR (1.7.3, Management system) as well as the IAEA-based benchmarking document, namely “The Management System for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Guide (No. TS-G-1.4), 2008”.
Another SNSA-led effort of the awareness raising is also the “Radiation News” (“Sevalne novice”, in Slovene), a quarterly type of the leaflet, intended primarily for domestic users of radiation sources, some of them involved also in transport-related activities. Step-by-step, some transport-related topics have appeared in the leaflet with the aim of touching upon a number of sub-topics, including different novelties in the legislative framework. Issues with “excepted packages” (e.g. UN 2910 or UN 2911), security provisions (based upon 1.10 ADR) and other issues were elaborated and summed up accordingly.
One of the noteworthy engagements has been the co-operation with the Slovene Police while elaborating annual threat assessment for transports of potentially highly dangerous goods – as certain shipments of radioactive sources are enshrined in the regulatory framework (i.e. in ADR, 1.10.3.1.3). The first such document was prepared and issued in spring 2017 and has been revised annually since then. The note (under 1.10.3.2 ADR) stipulates in a fairly
straightforward manner that “carriers, consignors and consignees should co-operate with each other and with competent authorities to exchange threat information”. ADR also sets out security plans (in 1.10.3.2) and their structure.
Every change in ADR (biennially) brings up a tedious, meticulous and precise endeavours to include all those new changes and corrections into the Slovene edition. Class 7, frequently having a kind of special terminology, used to have rather lots of usually small errors but also a handful of significant discrepancies and wrong translations too. In the last couple of years, a fairly thorough look in certain sessions has been tackled which resulted in the better texts already in 2019 as well as in the forthcoming 2021 Edition of ADR. Some examples include e.g. a revision of terms package (vs packaging), routine (vs normal) conditions, stowage, surface contaminated objects (SCO), placarding, a string of the requirements in ADR under 7.5.11 (CV 33) etc.
Another task was commenced at the beginning of 2020. Namely, a fairly thorough check of concordance between SSR-6 [3] and (in particular) ADR (2019 Edition). Generally, and as anticipated, ADR in its unique, “dispersed” manner resumes most of SSR-6. However, some newer recommendations will need to be included in ADR (2021 Edition).
At the end of 2019, representatives from the Financial Administration (“Customs”) and SNSA visited the premises of the national largest airport to discuss various issues. One of the topics and site visits was also meant to bring up a clear picture of procedures which are followed regarding legal shipment of radioactive material and of premises (rooms, corridors) which are used for temporary storing of the packages with radioactive material (both arriving and departing). The outcome of the peer reviewers was not classified but the results were elucidated and delivered on a “need-to-know” basis.
Going internationally, the Slovene (i.e. SNSA) decision to join the EACA (European Association of Competent Authorities for safe transport of radioactive material) in 2015-2016 was proven to be a positive step. EACA is a recognised and appreciated association that was established back in 2008. It consists of regulatory authorities that are responsible for the safe approach to, as well as understanding of the pertinent legislation in force in Europe. This has been tackled in various ways – particularly by developing a network of competent authorities, sharing knowledge and good practices amongst members, as well as through dedicated working groups and developing a common understanding and efficient co-operation among authorities as regards their working level. During the last few years, EACA has been led by a Dutch representative and the “culmination” of the group has been achieved at its annual/plenary meetings. The last one took place in Greece in 2019 where Slovenia presented its short overview study – addressing transport of radioactive material in winter-like conditions (see further text).
EACA has also published several useful documents, which can be found on its public website – and they are a net-gain for a wider expert community. [1]
Another network with certain Slovene participation is the Mediterranean Transport Safety Network (MedNet). It includes a variety of the “Mediterranean-bound” countries with different
“maturity”. This network was established under a project conducted by the IAEA with funding from the European Union. MedMet has strived for sustainable approaches and co-operation among competent authorities, supportive actions and coordination in normal and emergency transport of radioactive material. MedNet’s activities can be followed on the e-webpage maintained by IAEA. [2] IAEA has also established different, topic-directed Safety Standards Committees. TRANSSC – Transport Safety Standards Committee has been dealing with transport-related issues. A correspondence membership in it has been achieved recently.
Slovenia hosted two IAEA IRRS review missions (Integrated Regulatory Review Service), in 2011 and 2014 – follow up. Among several modules and discussions, certain considerations were also given to transport. A suggestion was given to SNSA in order to take an initiative, together with other concerned authorities, to go through the list of competent authorities’ tasks and clarify which authority is responsible for what task and to find means to communicate this along with relevant contact information to consignors, carriers and consignees. [3] This was done accordingly, with the Ministry of Infrastructure and Spatial Planning (in charge of transport) and the review did find fairly clear assignments of responsibilities as enshrined in “ZPNB”. Nevertheless, some amendments were agreed upon and interwoven, e.g. roles of SNSA and SRPA were emphasized, including in the sphere of package design approvals (SNSA-led administrative procedure since 2015).
Already in 2016, the European Commission launched a study “Comprehensive examination and analyses of the situation of transport of nuclear materials (ENER/D1/2016- 89)”. This task was conveyed by the company ENCO, which distributed a comprehensive questionnaire as well as a follow-up question set. In addition, two dedicated workshops were held 2017 and 2018. The European Commission has pursued two main aims, in a nutshell, to identify actions or improvements at EU or national levels and to underpin the transparency of transport activities, ensuring at the same time public confidence. SNSA took part in the questionnaire with its resources and attention. The study with its annexes shed lights on a number of sub-areas (in the draft report), giving several recommendations which were addressed in 2018. The final report (in time of writing) has not been published openly, so the last European “cross-section” stems from the report “Statistics on the Transport of Radioactive Materials and Statistical Analyses”, published back in 2003. [4]
In September 2018, Slovenia (SNSA) received a quite specific request from a member of the German Bundestag (Parliamentary Group Alliance 90/The Greens). While there was not a clear purpose of that transport-related query, SNSA came to know later on made that this
“circular query” was also received by some other partner European regulators. SNSA provided a fairly extensive answer entitled “Request for environmental information: transport of radioactive and nuclear materials”, also embracing a bit of statistics regarding the transport of radioactive sources outside medicine and veterinary care. It was stated inter alia that road transport represents the lion’s share of all packages, assessed to be above 90%, followed by air transport (< 10%) and maritime transport (app. 1%).
Transport of radioactive material in winter (or winter-like) conditions can be a challenge.
The Slovene (specific) regulation – the Order on road traffic restrictions in the Republic of Slovenia – stipulates certain limitations, namely “…In Slovenia, on all roads, except on highways and motorways, in winter conditions driving is prohibited for: trucks (goods vehicles) with trailers, vehicles transporting dangerous goods and vehicles for extraordinary transports.
Due to winter conditions the operator of highways and motorways may for a limited period of time or spatially limit the transport of afore-mentioned vehicles on these roads…” At the end of 2018, SNSA asked some other foreign regulators and partners about their approaches. Based upon their replies, the following extracted entries could be indicated:
• In certain circumstances, a police escort can be provided, as necessary, assuming the roads are passable; in addition, the drivers can use the bus lanes.
• No such restrictions (as in Slovenia); the problems – they face – are sometimes bad or wrong tyres in combination with heavy loads.
• A piece of a regulation exists, as follows: “If you drive a vehicle with dangerous goods and you have a visibility of less than 50 m, packed snow or ice, you must exclude any danger to others. If necessary, you have to use the nearest suitable place for parking.”
• In general, the carrier has the prime responsibility for a safe and secure transport and should take into consideration the road traffic and weather conditions. For mountainous crossing roads, the truck traffic (more than 7.5 tonnes) may be restricted by police if the conditions are very bad.
At least in a short-term meaning, any domestic change of the regulation is not envisaged.
4 LESSONS LEARNT FROM A SAMPLE OF ACCIDENTS/EVENTS ABROAD Each year, there are approximately 3 million packages containing radioactive material in the European Union which are transported by road, rail, sea and air. [1] Of course, this represents only a small fraction of all packages with dangerous goods. Thematic news reveals that different accidents occur virtually every year. In addition, there are also (occasional, opportunistic) thefts of – in most cases – devices with lower activity, i.e. mobile radioactive sources during transport or temporary halts. [5, 6, 7, 8] This article does not address in details those shipments which should be non-radioactive – but supervisory authorities detect elevated radiation, e.g. due Co-60. In certain cases, such “boxes” (containing e.g. metallic teaspoons) are then returned to the consignor as an “excepted package”. Some interesting cases and statistics could be found e.g. in [9].
Fortunately, there have not been any traffic (road, rail, sea, air) accidents during transport of radioactive material in Slovenia in the past years. Such accidents are addressed in the SNSA’s emergency and response procedures. In 2017, a table-top exercise was conducted and the scenario involved a traffic accident of a van, carrying a high-activity sealed source (Ir-192). To anticipate such rare cases and respond properly, one of the most common events could be: a vehicle carrying a device with (a) radioactive source(s) and being involved in a road accident or such a device – falling from the vehicle. On other occasions, such devices may also be damaged during handling (transport) and subsequently radioactive sources may be dislodged from internal packaging(s) and shielding’s characteristics could be compromised.
Three types of causes could be summed up here. Human errors should be stated first.
They include excessive speed, abuse of alcohol, drugs or certain medicaments, fatigue, carelessness and bypassing established procedures and guidelines. Technological issues could also be listed and explained a bit: package design might be inadequate and e.g. some normal conditions have not been properly designed and approved (consequence could be e.g. even loose fittings/screws and different “geometry” of the shielding); another important sub-issue here is also the maintenance (of both housing/packaging as well as a vehicle). The third bunch of causes are different organisational factors, spanning from poor policies, procedures and guidelines to a lack of (certified) training or oversight and supervision of vehicle crew. [10]
Speaking broader about “events” (not just accidents and incidents – and IAEA INES ratings 1, 2, 3 and higher), a kind of clusters or categories could be formed. This typology would include groups of events and their frequency would vary from a country to country and also through the time. There are, for example: damage of a package during handling; theft (including robberies) or loss or missing of a package; tie-down defects; incomplete documentation, non- conforming labels, markings, placarding, orange tables; radiological event (including excessive contamination levels); traffic accident (collision, overturned vehicles, derailment,
damaged/sunken ship, etc.); inadequate content of a package; infringements, regarding a transport means, driver and vehicle crew, DGSA and similar; others. [6, 11]
Most of the transport-related events that occur world-wide have resulted in no radiological consequences. There have been a small share of events that might have resulted in radiation doses but these were considered to be extremely low or below 1 mSv. Only a tiny fraction of the events are those, where (calculated) dose rates and radiation doses (effective) have exceeded 1 mSv. [9] A few exemplary events and accidents in the last ten years, world- wide (some of them are fairly known and echoed) could be referenced:
• Shipment of Ir-192 from Sweden through a French airport to the United States (2001/2002, INES 3 – a handler could have received a dose of up to 100 mSv); [12, 13]
• France (2012) – loss of a package with F-18 during transport (INES 2); [14]
• Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015) – a collision with a fatality during transport of Ir-192;
[15]
• Canada (2016) – transport accident involving uranium yellowcake (minimal/contained spill onsite); [16]
• Shipment of Ir-192 from Egypt through a Swiss airport to Belgium (2017, several passengers could have received excessive doses); [17]
• Stolen device with radioactive sources from a parked vehicle (e.g. Slovakia – 2019). [18]
Some conclusions, common patterns and lessons learnt could be, among others:
• Incidents during transport of radioactive material with the IAEA INES rating of 3 are very rare events.
• Non-compliances do occur regularly, spanning from excessive radiation levels (dose rates), incomplete documentation (e.g. obsolete instructions in writing, wrong UN numbers, errors in the transport documents) to tie-down defects or placards, not being weather resistant (see Figure 1) or modified in a wrong way.
• While there has not been any theft (or missing or loss) of radioactive material in Slovenia during transport, such events occur regularly in the world. Necessary awareness, vigilance and security-related measures shall always be in place. Thefts and similar events span from “stolen at gunpoint” to devices with radioactive sources, (opportunistically) stolen in/with vehicles during night time and near private residences or (m-)/hotels.
• Even small collisions and traffic incidents with radioactive material could cause a blockage of roads for several hours and public (media) attention. Similar is also true for the airports (cases with damaged packages, “warm(er)” packages or spills).
• Not all airports are adequately equipped (and trained) in detecting high(er) dose rates (radiation levels) of packages, e.g. in transit. In some cases, packages with very high dose rates were only detected on the arrival or even at the user’s premises.
• Excessive contamination levels on package’s surfaces are also plausible events, e.g. in case of unsealed sources.
• “Sudden changes and surprises” (e.g. harsh drop of temperatures, wild animals, fires, protesters with their “spraying intentions”, etc) could affect road conditions or pose extra challenges during carriage. In addition, accidents, events and also “near misses” may show a certain set of circumstances that direct the regulators to re-visit their approaches or legislative framework.
• Transport-related companies, having a number of drivers, should be aware of possible anomalies and self-willed “short cuts” of their (individual) drivers.
Figure 1: A foreign case, where the placarding was not weather-resistant [19]
Such international cases are extremely valuable for sharing good practices (and bad ones too) and lessons learnt – with an “echo” of not repeating others’ mistakes. In Slovenia, such audience could be DGSAs, drivers, various participants from the Police and Financial Administration (“Customs”), other entities with their interest (e.g. Krško Nuclear Power Plant).
A handful of case studies (see Figure 2) packed together with some images and structured data have been seen not only as an “eye opener” but also as real practical examples and true stories that may sit down firmly and go along the requirements from ADR (1.8.3.9 and 8.2.2.3).
Figure 2: A practical slide, an introduction into a case study, during outreach activities
5 A QUICK LOOK OVER THE HORIZON
Some actions mentioned afore have charted the path ahead. Some of them tend to be
“low-hanging fruit” but the others are more complex. SNSA will continue to work as a custodian and co-ordinator of the established informal group on safe transport of radioactive material. It is precious and a “win-win” situation, too to have in this group not only various public/governmental entities but also a handful of very experienced carriers and organisers of the carriages.
Safety – security interface and its importance has been steadily growing for a number of years. SNSA will be further engaged with the Slovene Police (and others, as appropriate) to yearly review and update the (general) annual threat assessment for transports of potentially highly dangerous goods – radioactive material. For such a recurring task, international
benchmarking, “open source” information and guiding documents (e.g. from IAEA, Nuclear Security Series) are really valuable.
ADR (2021 Edition) is practically knocking at the door, envisaged to interweave numerous new requirements for dangerous goods – including radioactive material – that will need to be understood and taken into account in the future. Internationally, it is a Geneva-based organization – UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) that keeps watching over ADR. Two of the most important changes are the future use of dose rate (previously as radiation level) and the introduction of SCO-III for those large solid objects which, because of its size, cannot be transported in other type(s) of package(s). As agreed, the title of ADR (currently as “the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road”) will be shortened by the omission of the “European” prefix. [20]
From the UNECE’s webpage and knowing what will be mirrored from the documents SSR-6, some noteworthy changes – in addition to those mentioned above – will include:
• Addition of several new radionuclides and their value (e.g. Ba-135m, Ge-69, etc);
• Restructuring and amendment of the requirements from 8.5 (S21) to include in a more precise way the need to supervising (at all times) those goods when subjected to the provision from 1.10.3 (a link to the security plan);
• Updated references, e.g. IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3 or INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. [21]
SNSA – similarly to a number of other European regulators for safe and secure transport of radioactive material – is planning to organise a one-day seminar for the pertinent stakeholders: DGSAs, companies and their drivers that are involved in carriage of radioactive material (Class 7), selected participants from the Police and Financial Administration (“Customs”) to highlight and share good practices and experience from case studies. This “tool”
could become a traditional gathering in the future, e.g. to be convened every fifth year. The event, originally planned for April 2020, has been postponed due to COVID-19.
Right now, the legislative approach stipulates “transportation as a radiation practice” only for those sources which fall either in Category 1 or Category 2 – based upon their activities. As said above, such an approach has been in place since 2018 (before there were no exemption or derogation in this vein). Having under licenses only the most active sources may not be the best (most optimal) approach because some transportations – not being negligible from radiation protection – may ultimately pose greater challenges – e.g. through doses received by drivers, transporting those packages with larger (sums) of transport indexes or “frequent travellers”. In addition, “a 2-person rule” is envisaged in the current Article 35 of the Rules on the use of radiation sources and radiation activities but only for transporting those devices with sealed sources that are (exclusively) used in industrial radiography.
Slovenia will again host the IAEA IRRS review (Integrated Regulatory Review Service) in 2022. Among several modules and discussions, certain considerations will be also given to transport.
On the international parquet, SNSA will have a liking for the co-operation within the EACA community. This may encompass the participation in annual/plenary meetings, taking part in distinct question(naire)s or sharing good transport-related practices. Any future hosting of EACA’s annual/plenary meeting in Slovenia – which will be clearly our duty (and a privilege) once in the future – would entail quite a lot of preparation and resources. SNSA will also continue to follow the future work of the IAEA’s Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC). Other appreciations are occasional international conferences on transport,
organised by IAEA, as well as (unfortunately rather rarely placed) training courses. It is of utmost importance to attentively take care of human resources and expertise in the sphere – utilising also e-learning platforms. Some focused, topic-related scientific visits to more advanced EACA’s members in this regard might also be outlined. Relevant carriers as well as organisers of transport would benefit from the further “products” (e.g. good practice guides) of the reputable World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI).
6 CONCLUSIONS
Not only SNSA but also other counterparts and different organisations have gained tangible experiences regarding transport of radioactive material, including nuclear (fissile) material. It is worthwhile to add that Slovenia – as many other countries – has also witnessed various transits, spanning from low-activity sources in excepted packages to “Type B” packages with radioactive sources or spent nuclear fuel. SNSA tends to raise awareness in this regard (primarily) through the established channels or means, e.g. through annual reports, Radiation News (“Sevalne novice”, in Slovene), also through occasional seminars for the Police officers, etc. Certain changes in the Slovene legislation (including ADR and other modal agreements) which address different aspects of transport have occurred in the past few years. It is very much necessary to review all those (sometimes subtle) implications and particularities, as appropriate, and rectify those chunks of legislation which have become obsolete, having embedded errors or need to be adjusted, e.g. bearing “graded approach” in mind.
Already a quick look through several accidents and incidents during carriage of radioactive material in Europe and overseas does offer a palette of reasons (human, technical, organisational). All of us can learn a lot from foreign good practices as well as bad ones. This could be an excellent input into a number of national “streams”, such as trainings, new or amended regulatory requirements, vigilance, inspections and audits, etc. In the past decades, mainly safety-related aspects were in the limelight of efforts. This has been gradually changed in the last decade and a half. Security-related aspects have gained a remarkable foothill and the future impetus will probably bring even more requirements (or refinements of the current ones).
It is both visionary and pro-actively to pursue sustainability in transport of radioactive material. A number of subsets may be touched upon here (e.g. resources, culture, quality management systems, training and evaluation, using good practices and lessons learnt, conducting outreach and assurance activities, etc.). It is understandable for the Slovenian stakeholders to aim at harnessing synergies, where possible, and strive for continuous improvements and challenge the status quo – where possible.
REFERENCES (LITERATURE, ADDITIONAL USEFUL LINKS)
[1] European Association of Competent Authorities for safe transport of radioactive material – EACA, https://www.euraca.eu/
[2] Mediterranean Region Transport Network – MEDNET, https://gnssn.iaea.org/main/Med- Net/Pages/default.aspx
[3] http://ursjv.arhiv-
spletisc.gov.si/fileadmin/ujv.gov.si/pageuploads/Info_sredisce/Tecaji_konference_semi narji/tecaji_MAAE/IRRS_SLOVENIA_FOLLOW_UP_MISSION_REPORT_2014.pdf [4] Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2018 Edition), No. SSR-6
(Rev. 1), IAEA; https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/PUB1798_web.pdf
[5] Statistics on the Transport of Radioactive Materials and Statistical Analyses (Final Report), March 2003 (NRPB as project co-ordinator);
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20131018_trm_statistics.pdfR.
[6] Safety of the Transport of Radioactive Materials for Civilian Use in France, Lessons Learned by IRSN from Analysis of Significant Events, Reported in 2014 and 2015;
http://www.irsn.fr/EN/publications/technical-
publications/Documents/IRSN_Transport2014-2015_EN.pdf [7] ASN, 2018, Déclaration de vol d’un détecteur de plomb;
https://www.asn.fr/Controler/Actualites-du-controle/Avis-d-incident-hors-installations- nucleaires/Declaration-de-vol-d-un-detecteur-de-plomb3
[8] Regulatory Oversight Report on the Use of Nuclear Substances in Canada: 2017, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), 2019;
http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca/pubs_catalogue/uploads/DNSR-Report-Use-of-Nuclear- Substances-2017-eng.pdf
[9] Radiological Consequences Resulting from Accidents and Incidents Involving the Transport of Radioactive Materials in the UK – 2012, Public Health England, 2014;
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment _data/file/345814/PHE-CRCE-014.pdf
[10] Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency – ARPANSA, Incidents related to transport of radiation instruments; https://www.arpansa.gov.au/regulation- and-licensing/safety-security-transport/australian-radiation-incidents-register/reported- radiation-incidents/transport
[11] IRSN, Safety of the Transport of Radioactive Materials for Civilian Use in France, Lessons Learned by IRSN from Analysis of Significant Events Reported in 2014 and 2015; published in 2016; http://www.irsn.fr/EN/publications/technical-
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[12] Radioactive Materials Transported by Plane, The FedEx Package Accident:
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https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/transport/transport- matiere-radioactive/Documents/irsn_livret_transport_matieres_radioactives.pdf [13] R. W. Boyle: Lessons Learned from the Studsvik Ir-192 Transport Incident, 14th
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publications/Documents/IRSN-Report_Transports-events-France-2012-2013.pdf [15] UNFCR, refworld, 2015; Van carrying radioactive material crashes in Bosnia;
https://www.refworld.org/docid/552f9d6453.html
[16] Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission – CNSC, Events Reporting: Transport / In Transit events, 2018; https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/acts-and-regulations/event-reports- for-major-nuclear-facilities/event-reporting/transport-intransit-
events.cfm?pedisable=true
[17] IAEA, posted 29 July 2017, Exposure of airplane passengers due to inadequate use of type B transport package, https://www-
news.iaea.org/PrintPreview.aspx?mId=ac2db99c-adac-4789-a373-3c03fe254a72 [18] IAEA, posted 4 October 2019, Theft and recovery of a moisture/density gauge;
https://www-news.iaea.org/ErfView.aspx?mId=4ca9ea79-ef71-4eb3-924a-eca784fbc9f1 [19] www.energysolutionstraining.com/core/files/energysolutionstraining/uploads/files/ES%
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[20] http://www.unece.org/ru/trans/danger/publi/adr/adr_protocol_2019.html
[21] https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2020/dgwp15/ECE-TRANS-WP15- 249e.pdf
