Arto H aapala
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Meaning of Place
I
T h e r e a re m an y re aso n s fo r d istin g u ish in g aesthetics a n d ethics from ea ch o th e r, b u t th e m o st obvious ones are pro b ab ly historical. T h e trad itio n ste m m in g fro m B a u m g a rte n a n d K ant largely u n d e rs to o d aesthetics in th e o rig in al G reek sense o f th e word: aisthanomai, to perceive o r sense. A esthetics is p rim a rily a m a tte r o f th e senses, especially th e ‘h ig h e r sen ses’, see in g a n d hearin g . Ethics is c o n c e rn e d with principles distinguishing m orally acceptable a c tio n s fro m im m o ra l o n es, o r settin g stan d ard s for a g o o d life. A esthetics deals w ith m a tte rs th a t are som ehow m o re vague and in d efin ite th a n ethical p ro b le m s, a n d a e sth e tic s is, in d e e d , based o n so m e th in g less reliab le an d p e r m a n e n t - th e senses - c o m p a re d to ethics w h ere re a so n a n d ra tio n a l ju s tific a tio n s seem to have a g re a te r role. T his has c o n trib u te d , n o d o u b t, to th e ev a lu a tio n a n d ra n k in g o f th em in philosophy: aesthetics has b e e n seen as th e least im p o rta n t field, co m in g well b e h in d th e m o re sop histicated a n d w e ll-g ro u n d ed fields o f epistem ology an d ethics. T h ese d istinction s an d th e i r v a lid ity h a v e b e e n q u e s t i o n e d , 1 a n d th e re h av e b e e n n u m e ro u s a rg u m e n ts a n d a tte m p ts to establish, fo r exam ple, the cognitive fu n c tio n o f a rt, H a n s-G eo rg G a d a m e r’s b e in g o n e o f th e m ost w ell-know n.2 H ow ever, th e ways we th in k a b o u t aesthetics a n d ethics are still strongly m a rk e d by this tra d itio n .
I d o n o t w a n t to q u e stio n th e ra tio n a le o f these divisions; I d o th in k th a t we n e e d a d istin c tio n b etw een aesthetic an d ethical issues to m ake m o re s e n s e o f o u r w o rld . I n th is p a p e r I c o n s id e r an a r e a c r u c ia l to o u r u n d e r s ta n d in g o f o u rs e lv e s a n d o u r p o s itio n in th e w o rld w h e re th e d istin c tio n b e c o m e s n o t only p ro b lem a tic b u t d isap pears alto g eth er. In o u r everyday d e a lin g s w ith th e s u rro u n d in g s we have m a d e o u r ow n we a re w ithin a sp h e re th a t exem plifies how b o th aesthetic a n d ethical issues overlap 1 See Wolfgang Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics (London: Sage Publications, 1997), translated
by Andrew Inkpin, 60-102.
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method ( London: Sheed & Ward, 1989), second, revised edition, translation revised byjoel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 81- 100.
to a significant degree. All this com es to g e th e r in th e c o n c e p t o f p lace. Place u n d e rs to o d in th e sense o f a p e r s o n ’s m e a n in g fu l a n d sig n ific a n t lo c a tio n b rin g s to g e th e r ae sth e tic s a n d ethics. W h e n livin g in a p la c e - o r m o re existentially, w hen living a place - we a re r o o te d to o u r s u rro u n d in g s in su ch a way th a t b o th o u r ae sth etic a n d m o ra l ju d g e m e n ts a re d e te r m in e d by th e d e e p ties th a t we have d e v e lo p e d . I t is b e c a u s e o f th is e x is te n tia l fo u n d a tio n th a t th e d istin c tio n b etw e en a e sth e tic a n d e th ic a l aspects o f life tends to disappear. In certain areas o f life, b u t n o t in all, b ea u ty a n d g o o d n ess com e to g e th e r.
I shall first d elineate a sh o rt existential a c c o u n t o f th e co n cep ts o f ‘p la c e ’ a n d ‘w o rld ’ o r ‘life w o rld ’. I call m y a c c o u n t ‘e x is te n tia l’ b e c a u s e I am in te re ste d in the structures o f th e life w orld, a n d th e life w o rld is d e te r m in e d by h u m a n existence a n d its structures. T h e ‘ex istentials’3 o f h u m a n ex isten c e are also th e stru ctu re s o f o u r life w orld. T h e h e r m e n e u tic circ le o f h u m a n a n d w orld, o r h u m a n a n d history, m ean s th a t we as h u m a n b e in g s a re also d e te rm in e d by th e w orld.4 T h e interw eaving o f h u m a n a n d w orld is o n e o f m y s ta r tin g p o in ts , a n d it c r e a te s th e o n to lo g ic a l f o u n d a t i o n f o r m y u n d e rs ta n d in g o f aesthetics, ethics a n d th e ir ro le in h u m a n e x isten c e.
My em phasis will b e in e n v iro n m e n ta l issues in a b ro a d sense. I am in te re ste d in the h u m a n en v iro n m e n t, in c lu d in g art, th e b u ilt e n v iro n m e n t, a n d to s o m e e x t e n t th e n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t . I s h a ll d is c u s s s o m e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f m y a c c o u n t f o r o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e h u m a n e n v iro n m e n t, b u t I shall n o t go in to issues su ch as ecology, co n se rv atio n a n d re sto ra tio n .
I I
L et m e b egin with th e co n c ep ts o f ‘c u ltu r e ’ a n d ‘tra d itio n ’. T h e s e a re cru cial te rm s in u n d e r s ta n d in g w h a t is m e a n t by w o rld o r by life w o rld . H istoricity a n d tra d itio n are g ro u n d in g ideas in h e rm e n e u tic s a n d fig u re p ro m in e n tly in G a d a m e r’s thinking. F or H e id e g g e r, th e h e r m e n e u tic circle was existen tial in n a tu re in the sense th a t th e h u m a n way o f b ein g , ex isten ce, was ch a rac te rised by a ‘fo re -u n d e rs ta n d in g ’ o f B ein g in g e n e ra l.5 T o g rasp
3 Martin Heidegger introduces the notion of the ‘existential’, ‘ein E x iste n zia l' to distinguish his ideas from Kantian categories. Macquarrie and Robinson translate the term as ‘existentiale’ (pi. ‘existentialia’), B ein g a n d Tim e(Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 70 and 79, but this is somewhat clumsy. See Sein u n d Zeit(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979), 44 and 54.
4 See Heidegger, B e in g a n d Time, 424-449; Gadamer, op. cit.,254-264.
5 See Heidegger, op. cit.,358-364; Gadamer, op. cit.,265-271.
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the M eaning o f Place
B ein g in g e n e ra l we m u st study h u m a n existence, a n d this is w hat H e id e g g er d o e s in Being and Time. F o r G ad am er, th e q u estio n is m o re ‘m u n d a n e ’: th e ro le o f h isto ricity in u n d e r s ta n d in g in th e h u m an itie s, a n d th e im p o rta n c e o f t r a d i t i o n in h u m a n life . G a d a m e r criticize s th e E n lig h te n m e n t fo r n e g le c tin g th e ro le o f h isto ry a n d for o p e ra tin g with th e c o n c e p t o f p u re , n o n -h isto ric a l re a so n , a n d h e goes so far as to m ake m o rals also relative to a tra d itio n :
T h a t w hich has b een san ctio n ed by trad itio n and custom has an authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that the authority of what has been handed down to us - and not ju st what is clearly grounded - always has power over our attitudes and behaviour. ... The real force of morals, for example, is based on tradition. They are freely taken over but by no means created by a free insight o r grounded on reasons. This is precisely what we call tradition:
the ground of their validity. And in fact it is to romanticism that we owe this correction of the Enlightenment: that tradition has a justification that lies beyond rational grounding and in large measure determines our institutions and attitudes.1’
I shall n o t take a stan ce o n th e qu estio n o f w h e th e r all m oral p rin cip les a r e b a s e d o n ly o n tr a d itio n o r w h e th e r they have a m o re fu n d a m e n ta l ju stific a tio n , be it ra tio n a l o r otherw ise. B ut w hen we c o m e to a e sth e tic p ro b le m s , th e n , I th in k , we a re firm ly o n a h is to ric a l f o u n d a tio n . O u r a e s th e tic c u lt u r e - o u r p ra c tic e s w ith in th e arts as w ell as j u d g e m e n ts c o n c e rn in g th e ae sth e tic value o f o u r e n v iro n m e n t — has g a in e d its p re s e n t fo rm d u rin g th e co u rse o f history. T h e re w ould n o t b e any aesth etic cu ltu re w ith o u t its tra d itio n , a n d if its trad itio n h a d b e e n d iffe re n t, o u r ae sth etic c u ltu re w o u ld also b e d iffe ren t. O u r aesthetic culture is stru c tu re d in certain ways a n d q u ite co m p lex , w ith a n u m b e r o f c o n tra stin g ten d en cies.
It is also time th a t m akes a cu ltu ra l p ra ctice possible a n d g u a ra n te e s its ex isten c e. T h e lo n g e r a tra d itio n is, th e stro n g e r it is. A tra d itio n always has th e te n d e n c y to m ultip ly itself by p ro d u c in g objects a n d events o f th e sam e k in d a n d c re a tin g new practices a ro u n d itself. This m eans th a t th e stru ctu res a re fu r th e r s tre n g th e n e d a n d th e ir ex isten ce is tak en m o re a n d m o re fo r g ra n te d . H e re , ‘th e test o f tim e ’ m ean s th a t tim e justifies the ex isten c e o f c e rta in p ra ctices as well as objects a n d events th a t go w ith it; th e re a re n o tim eless c rite ria w hich w ould con stitu te th e test a n d th ro u g h w hich d iffe ren t o b jects a n d events w ould have to pass. T h e re is n o logic b ey o n d tim e th a t w ould p ro v id e an e x p la n a tio n a n d a ra tio n a le for the p re s e n t state o f affairs.
O n c e th e re is a trad itio n its structures are always th e basis for new things to co m e. B u t in th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e W estern a rtw o rld , th e re ca n o cc u r 0 Gadamer, ibid., 280-281.
strands a t certain times in history w hich go very m u ch again st o f th e trad itio n . T his is w h a t m any av ant-garde m o v e m e n ts h av e d o n e . A g e n e r a l th e o ry c a n n o t ex p la in why th ese sorts o f d e v e lo p m e n ts tak e p lace, o r why m an y o th e r d if f e r e n t k in d s o f d e v e lo p m e n ts ta k e p la c e . W e h av e to r e f e r to p a rtic u la r circu m stan ces - ec o n o m ic , re lig io u s, social - a n d to p a r tic u la r individuals living a n d m ak in g decisions in th ese circ u m sta n ces.
T h e H e id e g g e ria n ideas o f th e re la te d n e s s o f B ein g in g e n e ra l a n d h u m a n existence could be applied to clarify th e re la tio n sh ip b etw een c u ltu ra l structures a n d an individual living w ithin them . T h e Sein, b ein g , in o u r Dasein, th ere-b ein g , is fo rm e d by th e d iffe re n t c u ltu ra l stru c tu re s in to w h ich we a re b o rn . O n e o f th e ‘sites’ (das Da) w hich we in h a b it is th e a e s th e tic c u ltu re . T h e way we exist in o u r aesth etic c u ltu re , th a t is, w h a t we as h u m a n b e in g s in th e ex isten tial sense are as far as a e sth e tic m a tte rs a re c o n c e rn e d , is set by c o n stitu e n ts o f th a t cu ltu re. We have an ‘a e sth e tic n a t u r e ’ o f a c e rta in k in d b ecau se we w ere ‘th ro w n in to ’7 an a e sth e tic c u ltu re o f a c e rta in k in d . O n e o f th e existentials o f o u r ex isten c e is th e ‘a e s th e tic e x is te n tia l’. In a H e id e g g e ria n m a n n e r we co u ld also in vestigate th e n a tu re o f o u r a e sth e tic c u ltu re th r o u g h a stu d y o f o u r ‘a e s th e tic e x is te n tia l’; a n d vice versa by exp lo rin g th e aesthetic culture we throw lig h t o n ourselves as en tities existing in this c u ltu re .8
I have b e e n talking a b o u t ‘a e sth e tic c u ltu r e ’. I u n d e r s ta n d th e w o rd
‘c u ltu re ’ as synonym ous with the w ord ‘w o rld ’, so, we ca n use th e ex p ressio n ,
‘aesth etic w o rld ’. T his raises fu rth e r H e id e g g e ria n p o in ts. H e id e g g e r w rites a b o u t th e w orld a n d its re la tio n to e n titie s w ith in it as follows:
The w orld itself is n o t an entity w ithin-the-w orld; an d yet it is so determinative for such entities that only in so far as ‘there is’ a world can they be en c o u n te red and show them selves, in th e ir B eing, as entities which have been discovered. But in what way ‘is th ere’ a world?
If D asein is ontically constituted by B eing-in-the-W orld, an d if an understanding of the Being of its Self belongs ju st as essentially to its Being ... then does not Dasein have an understanding of the world - a pre-ontological understanding, which indeed can and does get along w ithout explicit ontological insights? With those entities which are 7 In Bdngand Time Heidegger defines ‘thrownness’: »This characteristic of Dasein’s Being
- this ‘that it is’ - is veiled in its ‘whence’ and ‘whither’, yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the ‘thrownness' of this entity into its ‘there’; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the ‘there’.« (174)
8 This reciprocity has im portant consequences for many traditional problems in aesthetics, for example interpretation; see Arto Haapala, »Interpretation, Context, and the Ethics of Interpretation - An Essay in Existential Aesthetics«, in Interpretation and Its Boundaries (Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1999), edited by Arto Haapala and Ossi Naukkarinen, 162-176.
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the M eaning of Place
enco u n tered within-the-world - that is to say, with their character as within-the-world - does no t som ething like the world show itself for the concernful Being-in-the-world?'J
H u m a n s as e n titie s ex istin g in the w orld are c o n stitu te d by being-in- th e -a e sth e tic -w o rld . A n d in so far as we have b e e n a c q u a in te d w ith th e a e sth e tic w orld, we have also d ev elo p ed a p re-ontolo gical u n d e rs ta n d in g o f its stru ctu re s. As we are d e a lin g with o r taking care o f th e en tities ex isting in th e a e sth e tic w o rld - w orks o f art, b uildings, design o bjects, n atu ra l objects a n d la n d s c a p e s - we a re a t th e sam e tim e necessarily ta k in g c a re o f th e a e sth e tic w o rld , a lth o u g h th e w orld itself is n o t an o b je c t o r ev e n t in th e sam e sense as e n titie s w ithin-the-w orld. T h e aesth etic w orld is in d e e d th e p re c o n d itio n o f any aesthetic object an d event, b u t at th e sam e tim e the world w o u ld n o t e x ist w ith o u t its o b jects. T h e w orld m akes in d iv id u a l th in g s possible, a n d it ca n exist a n d m anifest itself only th ro u g h these entities. This is also tru e fo r th e s tra n d o f h u m a n existence I have called th e ‘aesth etic e x is te n tia l’: th e re is a m u tu a l d e p e n d e n c e betw een this asp ect o f h u m a n b e in g a n d th e a e sth e tic w orld.
I h ave so fa r d e lib e ra te ly avoided th e expression ‘a r t w o rld ’, a n d u sed in stead th e b ro a d e r ex p ressio n ‘aesthetic w orld’. W orlds o f a r t - m usic, visual arts, lite ra tu re , film, th eatre, etc. - are paradigm atic exam ples o f th e aesthetic w orld. M any o f o u r ae sth e tic practises have b e e n established in o n e a rt form o r a n o th e r , a n d th e p ra ctices vary d e p e n d in g o n the e ra a n d th e a rt form . V isual arts in th e M id d le Ages w ere very d iffe re n t c o m p a re d to now. T h e o b serv atio n s I h ave m a d e o f th e aesth etic w orld apply to th e a r t w orld as well. B ut I w ould like to b ro a d e n the scope because my co n c e rn s in this essay are m ainly a b o u t non-artistic objects. However, I d o n o t d en y the significance a n d in flu e n c e o f a r t o n o u r ae sth etic c u ltu re as a whole.
I l l
I have n o w e sta b lish e d th e fo u n d a tio n o f o u r a e sth e tic c u ltu re , an d show n so m e o f th e c o m p lic a te d relatio n s th e re are b e tw e e n th e aesth etic w orld, aesthetic objects a n d h u m a n existence. L et m e now tu rn to the c o n cep t o f place. T h e c o n c e p t h as b e c o m e co m m o n a n d p o p u la r in re c e n t analysis o f th e h u m a n e n v iro n m e n t. I t is w orth n o tin g th a t H e id e g g e r’s w ritings on
‘d w e llin g ’ h av e in s p ir e d n u m e r o u s w rite rs .10 R a th e r th a n g o in g in to a 9 H eidegger, op. cit.,102.
10See Edw ard R elph, Place a n d Placelessness(London: Pion Lim ited, 1976), 17-18, 37-41;
Edw ard S. Casey, G ettin g Back into Place - Tow ard a Renewed U n derstanding o f the Place-
discussion o f the c o n c e p t o f place, le t m e sim ply stip u la te a m e a n in g fo r th e term . T his will allow m e to clarify its re la tio n s h ip to th e a e s th e tic w o rld a n d o u r e x p e rie n c e o f a e sth e tic ob jects. T h is will in t u r n p ro v id e a p a th to c o n sid e rin g how aesth etic a n d ethics c o in c id e in this co n te x t.
W h e n w riting this essay at my office I have a place. I o cc u p y a p lace in th e stra ig h t forw ard physical sense: I am sittin g in my c h a ir, w h ich is in my office, w h ich is in a b u ild in g , etc. B u t I am n o t in te re s te d in th e C artesia n sense - as H e id e g g er calls it - o f an o b je c t a n d its p lace in th e w orld. n I d o n o t w ant to d efin e place in term s o f a fix ed space so th a t a c e rta in space o r sp a c e s w o u ld b e n e c e s s a ry fo r m y p la c e . I h a v e a p la c e in th e m o r e so p h istic a te d sense o f th e w ord. I have a p lace in th e sen se th a t I h ave a re la tio n sh ip to h u m an s, to d iffe re n t th in g s a n d even ts a r o u n d m e. My p lace is m eaningful and significant for m e b ecau se 1 have c o n stru e d d iffe re n t kinds o f re la tio n s to entities s u rro u n d in g m e. I have fam iliarised m yself w ith th e im m e d ia te su rro u n d in g s o f my office. M ost o f th e th in g s in sid e th e office a re ‘re a d y -to -h a n d ’ — they a re th e r e fo r m e so th a t I c a n u se th e m . T h e co m p u te r, te le p h o n e an d all the books a n d p a p e rs are fam iliar to m e, w ith in my re ach , a n d I see th em as entities w hich exist fo r m y p u rp o s e s .12 B u t also th e view fro m the window, th e c o rrid o r b e h in d my office d o o r, th e d iffe re n t ro u te s I tak e to th e office, th e le c tu r e h alls in w h ic h I te a c h , th e s e also c o n stitu te m y place. I c re a te a p lace fo r m yself w ith in th e stru c tu re s o f a cultural w orld by con necting d ifferen t sorts o f ties to d iffe re n t sorts o f entities.
My place has m ore o r less p e rm a n e n t fe atu res to w hich I re tu r n alm o st every day, like m y h o m e a n d my office.
In th e existential sense th a t I w a n t to d e fin e it, p lace is, th u s, th e for- m e-sign ificant-and-m eaningful-collection-of-entities. I am u s in g th e w o rd
‘entity’ broad ly to cover n o t only physical tilings, b u t also all k in d s o f c u ltu ra l objects a n d events, such as d iffe re n t o rg a n isa tio n s a n d in s titu tio n s, c u ltu ra l practices a n d conventions, b u t also o th e r h u m a n b ein g s w ho a re d e fin e d by th eir relations to entities w hich are significant a n d m ean in g fu l to them . W orld is th e historically stru c tu re d fo u n d a tio n th a t gives us e n titie s w ith m e a n in g a n d value; place is a selection o f d iffe re n t cultu rally m e a n in g fu l en titie s th a t a re sig n ifican t fo r p a rtic u la r individuals b ec au se o f th e ir ac tio n s, in tere sts, o r a n y th in g th a t has an in flu en c e o n th e ir ev a lu atio n s a n d decisio ns.
World. (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 109-145. I have analysed the concept of place in more detail in my ‘On the Aesthetics of the Everyday - Familiarity, Strangeness and the Meaning of Place”, forthcoming in Philosophy and
Geography, Vol. IV: Aesthetics of Everyday Life, 1999.
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the M eaning o f Place
I V
N ow we have a view to th e basic ontolo g ical s tru c tu re o f th e w orld a n d h u m a n s w ith in it in te rm s o f ae sth etic w orld a n d place. W h e re do es th e re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n ae sth e tic s an d ethics com e in? T h e idea o f ae sth etic c u ltu re alre ad y raises th e basic issues in aesthetics, su c h as aesth etic value.
L e t m e lo o k a t th e statu s o f ae sth e tic values w ithin th e ae sth e tic w orld an d p ro c e e d in this way to th e m o re g en e ral p ro b lem s o f values a n d evaluation.
O u r aesth etic c u ltu re is deeply m arked by values; th e structures defin in g o u r a e sth e tic e x isten tial a n d from w hich all aesth etic objects are b o rn are valu e-lad en . T h e ro le o f values is m anifested very clearly in pieces th a t are re g a rd e d as classics - a classic is by d efin itio n valuable in so m e respect. In th e arts in p a rtic u la r, classics are d e fin e d w ithin a p e rio d o r style. J .S. B ach ’s p ieces a re classics w ith in th e co rp u s o f b a ro q u e m usic; T o lsto y’s novels are classics w ith in th e c a n o n o f R ussian lite ratu re . T h e c rite ria o f g o od ness in B a c h ’s m usic a n d in T o lsto y ’s novels differ u n d e rsta n d a b ly to a g re a t e x te n t a lre a d y b e c a u s e m u sic a n d lite ra tu re a p p e a l to d iffe re n t aspects o f o u r e x iste n c e , m usic m o re o fte n to o u r em o tio n s, lite ra tu re to o u r cognitive faculties. T o b e a re al classic, th e piece m ust go b ey o n d its orig in al co n tex t;
B ach is clearly n o t lim ite d to th e B aro q u e, b u t to th e w hole tra d itio n o f W e ste rn m usic. As G a d a m e r p uts it:
...w hen we call so m e th in g classical, th e re is a consciousness of som ething en d u rin g , o f significance that cannot be lost and that is in depend ent of all circumstances of time - a kind of timeless present th at is contem poraneous with every other present.'3
I shall, how ever, c o n c e n tra te h e re o n th e m o re p erso n al side o f o u r a e s th e tic e v a lu a tio n s. J o s e p h M argolis h as m ad e a d is tin c tio n b e tw e e n
‘ap p reciativ e ju d g m e n ts ’ a n d ‘fin d in g s’. W hen talking a b o u t ‘fin d in g s’ th e re is a w idely a c c e p te d set o f n o rm s to w hich o n e refers in justify in g a claim , w hereas in a p p re c ia tiv e ju d g m e n ts p erso n al p referen ces, o r ‘taste’ as h e calls it, have a ro le to play. H e writes:
... findings obtain where some set of the actual properties of an object are, on a theory, taken to be sufficient for the ascription of a certain value; the informality with which such properties may be specified does n o t affect the logical status of findings. But appreciativejudgm ents o b ta in w h ere, precisely, th e actual (th e m inim ally d escrib ab le) properties o f an object are ‘filtered’ through the personal tastes and
“ Heidegger, ibid.,122-134.
12This is Heidegger’s ‘ U m sicht’, Sein u n d Zeit,69; in English translation, ‘circumspection’, B e in g a n d Time,98.
13Gadamer, op. cit.,288.
sensib ilities o f th e ag en t of ju d g in g ; th e re , n o set o f th e ac tu al properties of an object are sufficient to justify the ascription of the relevant value. Hence, on an appropriate theory, we say that an object has a certain value (findings) or one is justified only in ascribing a certain value to that object (appreciativejudgm ents).14
I am in terested in ap p reciativejudgm ents ra th e r th a n findings. A fin d in g is a ju d g m e n t a b o u t a constitutive fe a tu re w ith in th e a e sth e tic w o rld - like
»B ach’s ‘M atth ew P a ss io n ’ h as g re a t a rtis tic (o r a e s th e tic ) m e rit« - an appreciativ e ju d g m e n t says m o re a b o u t th e sp e a k e r — » F in n ish lan d sca p es in th e w in te r are very c a lm in g a n d b e a u tif u l« . B u t b o t h fin d in g s a n d a p p r e c i a t i v e j u d g m e n t s p lay a r o le in a e s th e tic s ; in M a r g o lis ’s view
»appreciative m atters d o m in a te ... in th e a e s th e tic d o m a in « .15
W h at is it th at m akes som e aesthetic objects m o re sig nifican t fo r us th a n others? W hy is it th a t ce rtain w orks sp ea k to us m o re th a n o th e rs? T h e r e are cases in which we acknow ledge th e value o f a piece, it m ay ev en b e a classic, a n d still we c a n n o t enjoy it. This d oes n o t have to b e a case o f ‘aesthetic acrasia’, i.e. th a t we c a n n o t enjoy th e a e sth e tic value o f a p ie c e b e c a u se o f som e k in d o f p erso n al d e fe c t in us. I w ant to lo o k a t cases w h e re we a re able to c reate a particularly d e e p re la tio n to an a e sth e tic o b ject. T h e s e k in d s o f b o n d s a re , I think, o ften based in p a rtic u la r ch a ra c te ristic s o f o u r place.
I can develop a taste fo r ce rtain k in d s o f a r t by system atically stu d y in g a p a rtic u la r style an d g ettin g m o re a n d m o re fa m iliar w ith th e fe a tu re s th a t co n stitu te it. O r I m ay develop a taste u nknow ingly, fo r e x a m p le w h e n living in a p a r tic u la r e n v ir o n m e n t, b e it r u r a l o r u r b a n , a n d I m ay s t a r t to appreciate th a t p articular en v iro n m e n t o r th a t k in d o f m ilieu m o re generally.
I m ig h t b eg in to feel a ttach ed to p articu lar kinds o f aesth etic objects. B ecause o f my p lace an d th e ‘h o riz o n ’ th a t is c re a te d by it, I have an affinity w ith ce rtain k in d s of ae sth etic objects. S om e o f th e se affinities a re b ase d o n very fu n d a m e n tal h u m an existentials: to b e a m an o r to b e a w om an clearly shapes differen t kinds o f affinities. T hese prim ary divisions are, how ever, m a d e m o re c o m p licated by n u m e ro u s o th e r factors th a t d e fin e h u m a n e x isten c e - all th e c u ltu ra l aspects th a t are essential fo r th e h u m a n way o f b e in g , as well as the p e rso n a l aspects o f individuals living a n d a c tin g in a c u ltu re .
P lace is, in d e e d , th e h o riz o n th a t d e te r m in e s o u r p e r c e p tio n s a n d p re fere n ces. G a d am er defines ‘h o riz o n ’ in this way:
Every finite p resen t has its lim itations. We d efin e th e co n c e p t o f
‘situ a tio n ’ by saying th at it rep resen ts a sta n d p o in t th a t lim its the possibility of vision. H ence the essential co n cep t of situation is the 14 Joseph Margolis, Art and Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989),
223-224.
15 Margolis, ibid., 224.
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the M eaning o f Place
concept of ‘horizon’. T he horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. Applying this to the thinking m ind, we speak of the narrowness of horizon, of the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening of new horizons, and so fo rth .1'’
O u r places a n d h o riz o n s are by n o m eans fixed, o n th e co ntrary, th e e x iste n tia l a n d h isto ric ist c o n c e p tio n o f h u m a n existence I have d ev e lo p e d is very e x p lic it a b o u t th e possibility o f ch an g e. B ut it is also an existen tial fact th a t th e ra n g e o f choices dim inishes in the course o f tim e - my existence is by n o w m u c h m o re d e te r m in e d th a n twenty years ago. It is this co n stru a l o f o n e ’s e x isten c e th a t lim its o u r choices a n d decides o u r p referen ces.
T h e c o n n e c tio n b e tw e e n a p lace a n d ae sth e tic s is, how ever, m o re c o m p lic a te d th a n th a t. T h e r e is a te n d e n c y to feel affinity to s o m e th in g fa m iliar th a t is p a r t o f o n e ’s own ex istence, b u t o n e o f th e striving forces b e h in d d iffe re n t d e v e lo p m e n ts in W estern a rt is th e sea rch for so m e th in g new. In th e visual arts this te n d e n c y has b e e n very clear, a n d it reveals th e o th e r side to a e sth e tic s - th e values innovativeness a n d strang eness. In the c o n te m p o ra ry arts, th e u n c a n n y a n d th e sh o ck in g have played a sign ifican t role. By co ntrast, in everyday su rro u n d in g s strangeness has h a d a significantly m in o r ro le, n o t only in th e aesth etics o f n a tu ra l en v iro n m e n ts b u t also in u rb a n setting s. A lth o u g h o n e can p o in t o u t sin g u lar ex am p les o f strik in g b u ild in g s a n d b u ilt areas, as well as sp ec ta cu lar n a tu ra l scenes, it is still tru e to say, th a t g en e rally sp e a k in g stran g en ess does n o t have such im p o rta n c e in e n v iro n m e n ta l aesthetics.
In th e ‘a e sth e tic s o f p la c e ’ I am p u ttin g em phasis o n those aspects o f ae sth e tic s w h e re fam iliarity ra th e r th a n strangeness d o m in a te . My place is d e a r to m e b e c a u se it is p a r t o f my existence. All fe atu res o f o n e ’s place d o n o t have to b e b ea u tifu l in any stron g o r d efin ite sense o f th e w ord, b u t th e re is a te n d e n c y to value th e m positively. T h e re la tio n b etw e en a p e rso n an d e n titie s c o n s titu tin g his o r h e r place is an affection ate o n e; w hen we are in c o n s ta n t c o n ta c t w ith o u r su rro u n d in g s a n d have c r e a te d o u r very own p e r s o n a l ties to it, it b e c o m e s s o m e th in g to w hich we c a n n o t h ave an in d iffe re n t a ttitu d e . O u r p lace is too close to us for us to have any d istan ce fro m it.
As I have trie d to show above, this closeness is o n to lo g ic al in n atu re : is n o t s o m e th in g in d e p e n d e n t fro m us b u t p re cisely th e p e rs o n a l in o u r existence. T his m ean s th a t th e re can b e tensions and c o n trad ictio n s betw een a p e r s o n ’s a e s th e tic p re fe re n c e s a n d m o re g en e rally a c c e p te d a e sth e tic sta n d a rd s. A s u b u rb a n a re a ca n be very d e a r to som eb o d y w ho has lived
"’Gadamer, op. cit., 302.
th e re d u rin g his o r h e r c h ild h o o d even th o u g h an o u ts id e r w o u ld e stim a te its ae sth e tic value to be very low. W e g ain sa tisfa c tio n th r o u g h a k in d o f c o m fo rtin g security: th e aesth etic p le a su re o f p lace is b ase d o n th e fa c t th a t we know it so well; it is so m eth in g we ca n trust; it is n o t th re a te n in g ; it d o es qu estio n o u r p re fere n ces, values o r in d e e d , ex isten c e.
Even th e ugly aspects o f o n e ’s p la c e - ugly a g a in by so m e c u ltu ra lly d efin e d stan d ard s - gain som e ae sth e tic value. T h ey m ay c o n trib u te to th e stability a n d co m fo rt th a t is essential in place. A n old p a ir o f sh o es m ay b e repulsive to som eone w ho does n o t know th e ir history a n d has n o t u sed th em . F or the ow n er, they are b o th fam iliar a n d c o m fo rta b le , a n d it is in this th a t th e ir ae sth e tic value lies. T his does n o t m e a n , how ever, th a t we p re fe r n o changes to o u r su rro u n d in g s. We m ay well b e w illing to allow ev en m a jo r m odifications if the su rro u n d in g s are aesthetically, socially, o r in so m e o th e r respects defective. T h e p o in t I am m aking is th a t b e in g p a r t o f a p lace im b u es every entity with value fo r a p erson.
T his value ca n b e u n d e rs to o d also in eth ica l term s: m y p lace d e fin e s my way o f existing a n d any c h a n g e in th e p lace has so m e c o n se q u e n c e s fo r my ex isten ce. L et m e take an e x tre m e e x a m p le to illu stra te th e s e m o ra l im plications. It is m orally w rong to m ove p e o p le fro m a n a r e a w ith o u t a co m p ellin g reason. A co m p ellin g re a so n c o u ld b e, fo r e x a m p le , th a t th e re is so m eth in g poisonous in the area th a t con stitu tes a h e a lth h a z a rd to p e o p le living th ere . T h ere co u ld be o th e r co m p ellin g reasons, b u t fo r my a r g u m e n t it is n o t necessary to d efin e as w hat co n stitu te s a c o m p e llin g re aso n .
It is cle a r th a t th e re are reasons w hich a re n o t c o m p e llin g fro m th e p o in t o f view o f those living th ere. T o fo rce p e o p le to m ove b ec au se o f th e ir race o r age, is, generally speaking, m orally w ron g, a lth o u g h th e re m ig h t b e sin g u lar cases an d co n tex ts in w hich ev en su ch a c tio n s c o u ld b e ju stifie d . W ith re c e n t sh o ck in g cases o f e th n ic c le a n sin g in Yugoslavia, it b e c o m e s obvious th a t the arg u m e n ts u sed by all p artie s o f th e co n flic t are o f th e fo rm th a t a p artic u la r a re a is an essential p a r t o f a n a tio n ’s identity. T h e re fe re n c e is to larg er cu ltural structures th a t th e n serve as a g ro u n d fo r th e c o n stitu tio n o f individual places, a n d in this way a re also p a rts o f places. So th e r e is a very d e e p existential a n d m o ral d im e n sio n in th e c o n c e p t o f place.
У
T h e existential, th e m oral, a n d th e a e sth e tic aspects a re in te rtw in e d to g e th e r in c o m p lic a te d ways. My j u d g m e n t s a b o u t m y p la c e a r e n o t o b jectiv e, b u t n ec essarily ‘b ia s e d ’. My p la c e h a s a e s th e tic v a lu e sim p ly
Aesthetics, Ethics, and the M eaning o f Place
b e c a u se I am ex isten tially tied to it, a n d th ro u g h this existen tial c o n n e c tio n I am a tta c h e d to it e m o tio n a lly too. I t has eth ical value b ec au se it is a t th e h e a rt o f my ex isten ce a n d a ch a n g in g o f it w ould affect my existence. Entities in my p lace are, in a way, p a r t o f m e, a n d so I ten d see th em as b ea u tifu l a n d w o rth preserv in g . O n c e again I have to stress th a t this is a ten den cy , n o t a g e n e ra l ru le . W e ca n ea ch p o in t o u t things co n stitu tin g o u r place th a t we w o u ld r a th e r re p la c e w ith so m e th in g else. It m ig h t be a b u ild in g style we do n o t like, o r it m ig h t b e s o m e th in g m o re ab stract, like a n in stitu tio n o r a cu sto m th a t goes a g a in st o u r n a tu re .
L e t m e finally draw so m e conclusions re g a rd in g ju d g m en ts a b o u t th e e n v iro n m e n t. If my e x isten tial analysis is o n th e rig h t track , th e re seem to b e two very d iffe re n t sorts o f value ju d g m e n ts. W hen I am talking a b o u t my c lo s e s t e n v i r o n m e n t, a b o u t s o m e th in g th a t c o n s titu te s m y p la c e , m y j u d g m e n t s a r e d e riv e d fro m my very own e x iste n tia l c o n s titu e n ts , a n d ac c o rd in g ly they a re very m u c h a b o u t myself. T hey d o n o t say m u ch a b o u t th e e n v iro n m e n t as su ch , b u t ra th e r a b o u t a possible way o f life. F o r a New Y o rk er th e city o f N ew Y ork is th e fam iliar su rro u n d in g w hich exem plifies n u m e ro u s positive qualities: it is rich a n d exciting, m aybe som etim es even cosy a n d h om ely. F o r an o u ts id e r New York m ay a p p e a r as th re a te n in g a n d h o stile . T h e s e ju d g m e n ts stem from very d iffe re n t g ro u n d s, d iffe re n t ways o f life c o n stitu tin g d iffe re n t h o rizons. T hey are b o th g e n u in e a n d in th e ir ow n c o n te x ts a c c e p ta b le verdicts. B ut b ecau se o f th e ir in c o m p a tib le p o in ts o f d e p a r tu r e , they c a n n o t b e p la c e d o n sam e scale. T h ey ad dress d iffe re n t p la c e s. T h is is M a rg o lis ’s a p p re c ia tiv e ju d g m e n t: ta k in g p le a s u re fro m m a tc h in g o n e ’s way o f life w ith the s u rro u n d in g s o r d isp leasu re fro m th e lack o f su ch m atch in g .
B u t o u r value ju d g m e n ts ab o u t the en v ironm ent are n o t always subjective in this sense. T h e r e a re cu ltu rally ac cep ted values th e validity o f w hich is n o t d e p e n d e n t o n any in d iv id u a l p re fe re n c e s. Classics a re p a ra d ig m a tic e x a m p le s o f this, a n d th e re a re classics in all fields o f cu ltu re . Also, m any n a tu ra l scen es have g a in e d th e status o f a classic, for ex a m p le N iag ara Falls o r th e Rocky M o untains. Classics exem plify certain values a n d they m ain tain th ese values. V alue ju d g m e n ts in this sense are in a c u ltu ra l sp h ere. C u ltural en titie s exist w ithin a cu ltu re , a n d this goes fo r cultural values too. S o m eo n e m ay n o t like B a c h ’s m usic, b u t this does n o t d en y its c u ltu ra l value. T o do th e la tte r w o u ld only show ig n o ra n c e o f o u r m usic cu ltu re .
B o th c u ltu ra l values a n d o u r p e rso n a l p re fe re n c e s , b o th w orld a n d p lace, a re r o o te d in o u r existence. T hey d e te rm in e w h a t we are a n d how we view th in g s a ro u n d . T h is also m ean s th a t g o o dn ess a n d beau ty go h a n d in h a n d : th e way I am in th e w orld is b o th an eth ical a n d ae sth etic issue.
T h e d eterm in in g grounds an d character o f my place are o f u tm o st im p o rta n c e fo r m e in every sense o f th e w ord b ec au se th ese a re m a tte rs th a t c o n s titu te w hat, as a h u m a n b ein g , I finally am . P lace is n o t an im p e ra tiv e , it is r a th e r an exem p lification o f certain choices a n d d ecisio ns th a t a p a rtic u la r h u m a n b e in g has m ad e, a n d th a t fu r th e r c o n s titu te this p a rtic u la r in d iv id u a l as a h u m a n b ein g . T hese are th e o rigins o f h u m a n ex isten c e as a c u ltu ra l en tity a n d as an individual with distinctive fe atu res d istin g u ish in g h im o r h e r fro m o th e r h u m an s.
