Frontiers in Question
Introduction1
... th e p r e s e n c e o f f ro n tie r s is in h e re n t to th e political as such ... th e re is o n ly p o litic s w h e re th e r e are fro n tie rs ...2
... it is im p o ssib le to clarify th e c o n c e p tu a l status o f th e fro n tie r w ith
o u t w o rk in g th r o u g h its p o litic a l status ... th e re is a t th e very least an u n e a s y r e la tio n s h i p b e tw e e n th e d e s ire to esta b lish s h a rp conceptual b o u n d a r ie s o n th e o n e h a n d , a n d o n th e o th er, to a b o lish political fro n tie rs th r o u g h c o s m o p o lita n is m ...3
... th e te x t ov erru n s all th e limits assigned to it so far (n o t subm erging o r d ro w n in g th e m in a n u n d iffe re n tia te d hom ogeneity, b u t ra th e r m aking th e m m o re co m p lex , d ividing a n d m ultiplying strokes a n d lines) ...4
These rem arks, extracted from the writings o f Laclau, B ennington and D errida, all to u ch u p o n o n e o f the m ost central problem atics o f o u r times, namely, th e issue o f frontiers. It arises, n o t only in the full immediacy and u rgency o f practical politics, b u t also in politico-philosophical reflection on closure an d lim its.5 T h e problem of frontiers is thus n o t indicative o f a sin-
1 An ea rlier version o f this p a p e r was delivered to th e ‘Interdisciplinary G roup on Race, E thnicity an d N atio n alism ’ o f th e University o f S o utham pton in Jan u ary 1996, as well as a t th e Political Studies Association A nnual C onference, Glasgow 1996. I w ould like to th a n k M ark Devenney, David H ow arth and Kate Nash for com m ents on e a rlie r drafts o f this article.
2 E. Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, Verso, L ondon 1990, p. 160.
3 G. B e n n in g to n , Legislations. The Politics of Deconstruction, Verso, L ondon 1994, p. 262.
4 J. D errida, ‘Living on: b o r d e r lin e s ’, p. 257 in P. Kamuf (ed.), A Derrida Reader. Between the Blinds, H arvester W heatsheaf, L ondon 1991. It is im p o rtan t to note th a t D errida h e re explicitly d enounces th e ‘n o n rea d in g ’ which claims that the text is to be dissolved in to an e x tra te x tu a l realm . R ather, he argues th at he so u g h t to ‘w ork o u t th e th e o re tic al a n d practical systems o f these m argins’.
5 It sh o u ld th u s be clear from th e start th at even w here the s h e er physicality o f borders force them selves o n to us, th e ir significance is essentially a symbolic one. In this respect I w ould argue, follow ing Balibar, th a t every social com m unity rep ro d u ce d by the fu n c tio n in g o f institutions is imaginary, an d th a t the distinction between real and im aginary com m unities is th e re fo re a fallacious one. See, E. Balibar, ’T h e nation form : history a n d ideology’, p. 93, in E. Balibar and I. W allerstein, Race, Nation, Class.
Ambiguous Identities, Verso, L o n d o n 1991.
gular problem . Rather, it signifies a com plex nexus o f irre d u cib le issues which, nevertheless, are difficult to separate from one another. In d eed , what is at stake in the m ultiple ways o f ap p ro ach in g the questio n o f fron tiers, is precisely the problem of separation, distinction, a n d differentiation (ra th er than separateness, distinctness and difference) which sim ultaneously raises questions co ncerning belonging, holding-together, a n d solidarity.6
This pap er addresses the com plex relation betw een the m ore general conceptual, and specifically political questions c o n cern in g limits a n d fro n tiers,7 an d it does so in the context o f co n tem p o rary post-structuralist d e
bates on the n ature of political identity a n d ideology.8 Even a b rie f survey o f literature in this field reveals a strong preo ccu p atio n with questions co n cerning the theorisation o f political identity in term s o f the perm eability o f boundaries betw een an d a ro u n d identities, a n d th e relation o f identities to th e construction an d contestation o f larg e r social im aginaries.9 F o r the purposes of this arücle, I have chosen to concentrate on Laclau and M ouffe’s theorisation o f the idea o f political fro n tie rs.10 This ra th e r specific focus
6 The question of frontiers politically is thus intimately bo u n d u p with the establishm ent o f distinctions, for example, between insiders and th e outsiders, citizens and non-citizens, citizens a n d refugees. F or a discussion o f th e significance o f th e refu g ee in o u r contem porary world, see M. Dillon, ‘T he scandal o f th e refugee: the production o f the abjection the international politics o f sovereign subjectivity, and the advent o f an o th er justice’. P aper presented to the conference: Sovereignty and Subjectivity, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Septem ber 1995. For a discussion o f the question o f boundaries in political theory, see S. Wolin, ‘Fugitive democracy’, pp. 31-45, in S. Benhabib (ed.) Democracy andDifference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996.
7 This very distinction is n o t one which is unproblem atic. W ith regard to a ‘purely’
conceptual clarification, one has to ask with W ittgenstein w hether ‘the engine is idling’?
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, rem ark 88, Basil Blackwell, O xford 1968.
8 The term ‘ideology’ is used here, not as an indicator o f false consciousness o r as a merely superstructural phenom enon, b u t as a necessary an d inescapable elem ent o f any social formation. As Lefort argues, any society in o rd er to be itself, has to forge a representation o f itself, and I take ideology to be a result o f discursive attem pts to forge such an imaginary.
See, C. Lefort, The Political Forms of Modem Society, Polity Press, C am bridge 1986.
9 Two recent collections in which these issues are raised are, I. Grewal and C. Kaplan (eds.), Scattered Hegemonies, University o f M innesota Press, M inneapolis 1994; an d L. Nicholson and S. Seidman (eds.), Social Postmodernism. Beyond Identity Politics, C am bridge University Press, Cambridge 1995.
10 T he idea o f political frontiers was first elaborated in E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso, L o n d o n 1985. L ater works contain reform ulations o f im p o rtan t aspects o f th e theory o f hegem ony, b u t do n o t return to the question o f political frontiers. See, E. Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, Verso, L ondon 1990; an d C. Mouffe, The Return o f the Political, Verso, L ondon 1993; and E. Laclau, Emancipation(s), Verso, L o n d o n 1996.
enables m e to raise som e o f the m ore general, as well as m ore specific prob
lem s allud ed to above, for th e theorisation offered by Laclau and Mouffe is o n e o f a few sy stem atic a tte m p ts to e n g a g e with th e im p lic a tio n s o f deconstruction a n d post-structuralism for the analysis of political identity and ideology.
I. The Genealogy of a Problem
T h e question o f limits an d o f frontiers in Laclau an d M ouffe’s work arises as a result o f the m ovem ent from a Marxist to a post-Marxist fram e
w ork o f analysis. O nce the unity o f society is no longer viewed as a result of the workings o f the necessary laws of history, an d political and social identi
ties are n o lo n g er conceived on the basis o f th eir insertion into relations of p ro d u ctio n , th e question o f the m an n er in which identities are forged and the unity o f the social is p ro d u ced , has to be addressed anew. It is on this terrain th a t the problem atic o f limits an d frontiers first arises.
In this respect, Laclau a n d M ouffe’s work on hegemony, subjectivity a n d radical dem ocracy form s p a rt of a larger p an o ram a of post-M arxist w ritings - in c lu d in g , fo r exam ple, the work o f E tienne Balibar, Jacques R an ciere, C lau de L efort, a n d S tuart Hall — all of w hich o p erate with a w orking assum ption o f th e non-closure o f the social a n d the constitutive ch aracter o f d ifference.11 T h a t is, their starting-point is a negation of deter
m in ism a n d o f any a priori, u n d e rly in g logic as p ro v id in g a necessary unificatory p rin cip le to social an d political identities a n d discursive form a
tions. Laclau puts it in the following m anner:
T h e im p o ssib ility o f th e o b je c t ‘so ciety ’ is fo u n d e d in th e d e -c e n tre d c h a r a c te r o f th e social, in th e u ltim a te ly a rb itra ry c h a ra c te r o f social re la tio n s. B u t social - o r discursive - p ra c tic e can only exist as an effo rt to c o n s titu te th a t im p o ssib le object, to lim it th e arbitrary, to co n stitu te a c e n tr e . A n d th is c e n tr e ... [is] always p re c a rio u s, always th r e a te n e d
12
Likewise, L efort argues that
... a society c a n re la te to itself, ca n exist as a h u m a n society, only o n th e c o n d itio n th a t it fo rg e s a re p re s e n ta tio n o f its u n ity ...13
11 T h a t is n o t to say th a t th e re are n o t considerable differences betw een these writers.
T h e r e are , a n d th e y s h o u ld n o t be n eg lec ted . T hey do, nev erth eless, fo rm a recognisable ‘sc h o o l’ o f th o u g h t.
12 E. Laclau, ‘T ran sfo rm atio n o f Advanced Industrial Societies an d the T heory o f the S u b jec t’, Argument-Sonderband, AS 84, p. 41.
13 L efort, Political Forms o f Modern Society, p. 191.
At stake h e re is clearly the question o f how, in the absence o f e ith e r natural a n d given forms o f identity, o r laws o f history reg ulating society, we are to m ake sense o f an d account for d ifferen t form s o f u n ific atio n .14 In Laclau a n d M ouffe’s writings, the category o f fro ntiers is in tro d u c e d to ad dress this question. T heir argum ent, in brief, is th e following: if any identity and, by extension, society is no lo n g er a given a n d im m utable datum , if its character can not be determ ined in a naturalistic fashion, th e n it can also no longer be individuated on the g rou n d s o f positively a ttrib u te d charac
teristics.15 Consequently, some o th e r way o f delim itation o r individuation has to be found. Laclau an d Mouffe locate this m echanism o f delim itation in the draw ing o f frontiers: it is th ro u g h the consolidation o r dissolution o f political frontiers, they argue, th a t discursive form ation s in g en eral, a n d social an d political identities specifically, are con stru cted o r fra g m e n te d .16 They argue:
... lim its only exist in so far as a system atic e n s e m b le o f d iffe re n c e s ca n b e c u t o u t as totality w ith r e g a r d to s o m e th in g beyond th e m , a n d it is only th ro u g h th is c u ttin g o u t th a t th e to ta lity c o n s titu te s its e lf as f o r m a tio n . ... it is clea r th a t th a t b e y o n d c a n n o t c o n sist in s o m e th in g p o si
tive - in a n ew d iffe re n c e - th e n th e o n ly p o ssibility is th a t it will c o n sist in so m e th in g negative. B ut we a lre a d y k n o w th a t th e logic o f eq u iv a
le n c e ... in tro d u c e s negativity in to th e field o f th e social. T h is im p lies th a t a f o rm a tio n m a n ag e s to signify itself ( th a t is, ... c o n s titu te its e lf as su c h ) only by tra n s fo rm in g th e lim its in to f ro n tie rs , by c o n s titu tin g a c h a in o f equivalences w hich c o n s tru c ts w h at is b e y o n d th e lim its as th a t w h ich it is not. I t is only th r o u g h negativity, d iv isio n a n d a n ta g o n is m th a t a fo rm a tio n can c o n stitu te its e lf as a to ta liz in g h o riz o n . T h e logic o f eq u iv ale n ce ... is ... th e m o st a b s tra c t a n d g e n e r a l c o n d itio n o f exist
e n c e o f every fo rm a tio n .17
14 T he w hole o f Laclau and M ouffe’s w ork may arguably be said to be an en g a g e m e n t with th a t question, in all its m ultifarious dim ensions.
15 Laclau an d M ouffe argue in Hegemony, a n d Laclau in New Reflections th a t to affirm th e essence o f som ething consists in affirm ing its positive identity. See Laclau, New Reflections, p. 187.
16 Laclau, New Reflections, p. 160.
17 Laclau an d Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 144. T h e logic o f equivalence is internally rela ted to the presence of antagonistic relations. Laclau an d Mouffe argue th at ‘certain discursive forms, th ro u g h equivalence, annul all positivity o f th e object an d give a real existence to negativity as such. This impossibility o f th e real - negativity - has attain ed a form o f p resence ... negativity- th at is ,... antagonism ...’ Hegemony, p. 129. Laclau, in his la te r w ritings, in tro d u c e th e co n c e p t o f ‘d is lo c a tio n ’ w hich sig n ific an tly a lte rs th e th eo retical status o f the co n c ep t o f ‘an tag o n ism ’. In New Reflections, an tag o n ism becom es o n e possible response to a dislocation, which has to be articulated politically;
the conception of political frontiers are n ot, however, sim ultaneously rew orked.
Having established the general conditions which may delim it an iden
tity o r discursive form ation, it is now necessary to turn to the political ar
ticulation o f these insights. In this respect it is necessary to trace o ut both the M arxist an d non-M arxist intellectual resources upon which they draw in th e course o f th e elab oratio n o f their argum ent.
T h e m ost im p o rta n t Marxist influences on the em ergence of the prob
lem o f frontiers an d its theorisation, is to be found in the writings of Gramsci and Sorel. Laclau a n d M ouffe’s work on hegem ony and their anti-essential- ist critiq u e o f political identity draws heavily on the legacy of Gramsci. In
d eed , in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, they situate th eir work explicitly in relation to th e G ram scian m om ent, as an attem p t to recover some of the b asic c o n c e p ts o f G ra m sc ian analysis, even w hile th ese c o n c ep ts are radicalised in a d irectio n leading ‘b eyond’ Gramsci.18
It is in G ram sci’s theorisation o f political subjectivity as collective will th a t Laclau a n d M ouffe locate bo th the last traces o f a M arxist determ inism and the first glim m erings o f a non-determ inistic conception of political iden
tity w hich will shape th eir post-M arxist theorisation. Gramsci develops the idea o f a collective will by drawing on insights from both Sorel and L enin.19 From Sorel, G ram sci takes th e em phasis on political agency as anim ated th ro u g h myth. Myth works as ‘a concrete phantasy which acts on a dispersed an d sh a tte re d p eo p le to arouse and organise its collective will’.20 A collec
tive will is thus forged th ro u g h the welding together of a set of elem ents with n o necessary belonging. T h e influence of Lenin in this respect is also clear:
from him Gramsci takes the em phasis on agency as bro ader than particular classes.21 A com bination of b o th o f these elem ents crystallises in the idea of a collective will. Such a will is:
... th e p r e c ip ita te o f a p lu ra lity o f d e m a n d s, p o litical initiatives, tra d i
tio n s a n d c u l tu r a l in s titu tio n s , w h o se always p r e c a r io u s u n ity is th e
18 Laclau a n d M ouffe, Hegemony, p. 136.
19 It is h e re th a t th e in flu e n ce o f Sorel on Gramsci is perhaps at its clearest.
20 A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, Lawrence and W ishart, 1971, p. 126. A myth th u s has to be distin g u ish ed from a utopia, which is an intellectual construction that can be analysed a n d discussed, and th a t can be refuted. Sorel argues th at a utopia leads p eo p le to reform s, w hile ‘o u r p rese n t myth leads p eople to p rep are themselves fo r a b a ttle to d estro y w hat exists.’ Myths, th e re fo re , in S o re l’s words, are n o t descrip tio n s o f things, b u t are expressions o f will an d groups o f images th at ‘can evoke as a to ta lity ... th e m ass o f se n tim e n ts th a t c o rre s p o n d to th e various m anifestations o f th e w ar waged by socialism against m o d ern society’. Q uoted in Z.
S tern h ell, The Birth o f Fascist Ideology, P rinceton University Press, 1994, p. 62.
21 F or L en in , o f course, this h ad m ean t class-alliances which did n o t affect the identity o f th e classes so aligned.
r e s u lt o f th e fu sio n o f th e s e h e te r o g e n e o u s e le m e n ts in to g lo b a l im ages c o n s titu tin g a ‘p o p u la r r e li g io n ’.22
T h e Gramscian theorisation o f political subjects as ‘collective wills’
contains b o th a non-essentialist, non-d eterm in istic dim ension , a n d a last determ inistic core. As is clear from th e characterisation offered by Laclau, collective wills are strictly speaking n o t classes b u t arise from a politico-ideo
logical articulation o f dispersed an d frag m en ted historical forces. G ram sci’s intervention, in this respect, can be read as a discourse o n the genesis an d form ation o f the historical subject, whose n atu re is n o t im m utable a n d fixed, b u t arises in a ‘b eco m in g ’ which is in eradicably ro o te d in th e historical process.23 At the same time, however, G ram sci’s affirm ation o f the final class determ ination of a hegem onic form ation, reaffirms an in n er essentialist core which sets a limit to the logic o f hegem ony.24 Consequently, if o n e is to take the logic o f hegem onic constitution seriously, th e n the identity o f subjects m ust be th o u g h t of as resulting from a m ultiplicity o f practices o f co n tin g ent articulation a n d disarticulation, ra th e r th an having the status o f a p ri
ori ontological givens; the last traces o f essentialism have to be erad icated from the theorisation of political identity.
Following from this, it becom es im perative to theorise the process o f articulation through which identity is contigently b ro u g h t in to being. This, Laclau and Mouffe argue, should take place not on the grounds o f positivities, b u t in term s of negativity or antagonism . T h a t is, individuation has to be theorised n o t on the basis o f one o r a n o th e r positively identifiable charac
teristic, for that would imm ediately lead us back into essentialist form s o f argum entation, but in term s o f that to which an identity is opposed. O n this reading, the unity o f identity is p ro d u ced only in so far as it is op po sed to that which it is not, an d such relations, are always antagonistic.
... in th e case o f an ta g o n is m , ... th e p r e s e n c e o f th e ‘O t h e r ’ p re v e n ts m e fro m b e in g totally m y se lf.... I t is b e c a u s e a p e a s a n t cannot b e a p e a s
a n t th a t an an ta g o n is m exists w ith th e la n d o w n e r e x p e llin g h im fro m his la n d .) In so fa r as th e re is a n ta g o n is m , I c a n n o t b e a fu ll p r e s e n c e fo r myself. B ut n o r is th e fo rc e th a t a n ta g o n iz e s m e su c h a p re s e n c e : its objective b e in g is a sym bol o f m y n o n -b e in g a n d , in th is way, it is over
flow ed by a p lu rality o f m e a n in g s w h ich p re v e n t its b e in g fix e d as full positivity.25
22 E. Laclau, ‘G ram sci’, u n p ublished paper.
23 B. Fontana, Hegemony and Power, University o f M innesota Press, M inneapolis 1993, p.
1
.
24 Laclau an d Mouffe, Hegemony, pp. 67-9.
25 Laclau a n d Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 125.
It is crucial to p ro ce e d carefully h ere, for it is at this p o in t th at an im p o rtan t ethico-theoretical decision can be located in the argum ent.26 The m a n n e r in w hich th e ir critique o f essentialist forms o f argum entatio n is developed lead Laclau a n d Mouffe to a position which privileges the dim en
sion o f negativity in th e individuation of identity.27 In this process, the cri
tique o f essentialist form s o f theorising identity is conflated with the further propositio n th at the only m an n e r in which identity can be thought in a non- essentialist fashion is th ro u g h negativity. I will pursue this argum ent and the consequences o f this shift in m ore detail throughout this article. At this point it is simply necessary to highlight the fact that the way in which their critique o f essentialism is articulated closes off o th er possibilities of thinking about identity which does not, at the outset, privilege th e m om ent o f frontiers and antagonism s.28 As I will argue, what is presen ted as purely formal and ab
stract conditions for the individuation o f identity, in fact, already contains a set o f ra th e r thicker assum ptions concerning the role o f conflict in the proc
ess o f identity fo rm atio n .29
T h e com p lain t against Gramsci is thus m ore com plicated than what is overtly ind icated by th eir reading. Given Laclau and M ouffe’s emphasis on the role o f antagonism and negativity in the constitution of identity, it seem s th a t the pro b lem with Gramsci is not only that he retains a final class
26 D e rrid a d eveloped th e n o tio n o f an ethico-theoretical decision in his work. See, for exam ple, J. D errid a, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory o f Signs, N o rth w estern U niversity Press, Evanston 1973. F or D errida, an ethico-theoretical decision b o th is a n d is n o t a decision. It is a decision insofar as o th e r possibilities were p rese n t; it lacks th e characteristics o f a decision insofar as th e very path chosen is d e te rm in e d by th e tra d itio n o f W estern metaphysics.
2^ It is im p o rta n t to n o te th a t the denial o f the im portance o f difference is one which relates specifically to th e individuation o f identity. It is n ot th a t Laclau and M ouffe do n o t give a tte n tio n to th e logic o f difference, but th a t th e focus on limits forces them to overem phasise th e equivalential dim ension.
28 I have in m in d here, as an alternative, aW ittgenstinian position on family resemblances.
T h is positio n allows o n e to take into account the positive dim ensions o f identity w ith o u t re d u c in g it to an essentialist sameness. A W ittgenstinian position could thus be developed to c o u n te r th e excessive em phasis in Laclau and M ouffe’s work on the fo rm a tio n o f frontiers.
29 In Hegemony a n d elsew here, Laclau an d Mouffe argue th a t w hat they p rese n t are ch a racteristic o f all processes o f individuation o f identity in general. In a recent interview Laclau argues, fo r instance, th a t he has tried to show in different works th at
‘political b o u n d a rie s are n e ith e r th e result o f a co n tin g en t im perfection o f society, n o r even o f an em pirical impossibility o f overcom ing the latter, but, instead, o f the im possibility o f co n stitu tin g any social identity except th ro u g h acts o f exclusion.’ D.
H ow arth a n d A. J. Norval, ‘N egotiation th e paradoxes of contem porary politics. An interview w ith E rn esto L aclau ’, Angelaki, vol. 1, no. 3, 1994, p. 46.
core, but also that he does not break with thinking about identity in positive terms.
Not only does he retain a final class core in his analysis, he also holds onto a conception o f collective wills which on Laclau and Mouffe’s account is ultimately incoherent. Its incoherence results from the fact that while it provides us with a conception o f identity as an articulated ensem ble o f elements, it does n o t p ro vide us with the tools with which to think the unity o f that ensemble.
It is h ere th at th e crucial S o rre lia n /S c h m ittian m o m e n t e n ters the theorisation o f subjectivity. T he sem inal insight from Sorel which, I w ould argue, inform s the em phasis on limits and fron tiers in Laclau a n d M ouffe’s work, is th a t identity is created an d sustained only in oppositional, th a t is, antagon is tic relations. For exam ple, in his Reflections on Violence Sorel argues that the general strike gives reality to the ‘dich otom ous thesis’ o f a society
‘split into two fundam entally antagonistic g ro u p s.’30 Owing to the strike, society is ‘clearly divided into two camps, an d only two, u p o n a battlefield.’31 W hat is im p o rtan t here is n o t the actual victory o f the p ro le taria t against
the bourgeoisie, b u t the very fact o f the o pen confro ntation betw een th e two groups: w ithout confrontation there is no identity.32
It is this centrality of confrontation to the constitution o f identity th at the idea o f political frontiers m ost crucially captures. This is equally evident in M ouffe’s o th er writings, in which it is Schm itt, ra th e r than Sorel who acts as source o f in sp iration in o rd e r to c a p tu re the essence o f th e political m om ent, as the m o m en t o f co n fro n tatio n betw een ‘frie n d ’ a n d ‘en e m y ’.
Drawing on Schmitt, Mouffe argues that:
... every definition of a “we” implies the delimitation of a “frontier” and the designation of a “them.”33
and that:
A radical democratic politics agrees with Schmitt that the frien d /en emy distinction is central to politics. No struggle is possible against relations of subordination without the establishment of a frontier ...34
30 From this it is also evident th a t Laclau a n d M ouffe’s th eo risatio n o f th e fo rm a tio n o f political frontiers in so-called T h ird W orld societies, as fro n tiers w hich divide society into two dichotom ous camps, takes m uch from S o re l’s analysis.
31 Sorel, in Sternhell, The Birth o f Fascist Ideology, p. 64.
32 E. Laclau, ‘G eorge Sorel, Objectivity and th e Logic o fV io len c e’, pp. 3-4, u n p u b lish ed m anuscript. This Sorellian em phasis, I w ould arg u e, also influ en ces L aclau an d M ouffe’s reading o f the constitution o f ‘p o p u la r stru g g les’, w hich I criticise fo r its naturalism below.
33 C. Mouffe, ‘Fem inism , citizenship and radical dem o cratic politics’, in J. B u tler and Jo a n W. Scott, Feminists Theorise the Political, R outledge, 1992, p. 379.
34 C. Mouffe, ‘Radical dem ocracy o r liberal dem ocracy?’, Socialist Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 1990, p. 64.
W hat is ab und an tly clear is that the category of political frontiers, far from bein g a purely ‘fo rm al’ m echanism which may account for the consti
tu tio n o f identity, is intim ately related to a set o f assum ptions concerning th e role of conflict in identity form ation and struggle.35
Two related questions arise from this characterisation of identity in term s o f political frontiers, the im plications o f which I will explore in the final section o f this article. T he first concerns the form of Laclau and Mouffe’s critique of essentialism , a n d th e possible alternative ways in which such a critique may be developed; the second concerns the consequences o f an alternative critique, a n d the d ifferent directions in which it may lead. In developing these points, it has to be em phasised that the aim is n o t simply to look for alternatives, b u t to explore the consequences of an alternative which sim ultaneously addresses the problem of the conflation of the formal a n d political conditions in the theorisation o f identity.
T h e em phasis o n the dim ension of negativity is evident also in Laclau and M ouffe’s acco u n t o f the o rd erin g of political space an d their analysis of the logic o f o p eratio n o f political forces. In o rd er to fu rth e r clarify the de
v elo p m en t o f th e idea o f frontiers an d its relation to the o rdering of politi
cal space, it is necessary to look at the non-Marxist sources on which they drew. In this respect, the relational account of linguistic identity developed by F e rd in an d de Saussure is o f particular significance.36 Laclau and Mouffe transposes Saussure’s acco u n t of syntagmatic and paradigm atic/associative relations to the political terrain, arguing that identity is constituted, and socio
political space o rd e re d th ro u g h the operation o f both systems of difference (syntagm atic relatio n s) a n d systems o f equivalence (paradigm atic rela
tions) ,37 From this basic starting-point concerning the dual axes constitu-
35 It is crucial to questio n th e proclivity towards naturalism in Schm itt, as is particularly ev id en t in his ten d en cy to talk o f opposing groups in concrete term s, as well as the te n d en c y tow ards a valuation o f hom ogeneity over difference. Connolly, in a rec en t review o f M ouffe’s w ork o n th e political, argues th a t Schm itt’s text ‘is governed by a covert aesthetic o f hom o g en eity - an identification o f the beautiful with unity and stren g th a n d the ugly with diversity and weakness - th at exacerbates the political logic o f ex clu sio n .’ W. E. Connolly, ‘Review Essay: Twilight o f th e Idols’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 21, no. 3, p. 130.
36 S au ssu re’s Course in General Linguistics was, of course, sem inal in the theoretical e lab o ratio n o f th e m ovem ent from structuralism to post-structuralism .
37 Saussure sum m arises th e distinction in th e following m anner: ‘From the associative a n d syntagm atic view point a linguistic u n it is like a fixed p art o f a building, e.g., a colum n. O n th e o n e h a n d , th e colum n has a certain relation to th e architrave th a t it s u p p o rts’ th e a rra n g e m e n t o f th e two units in space suggests a syntagm atic relation.
O n th e o th e r h a n d , if th e colum n is Doric, it suggests a m ental com parison o f this style with o th e rs (Ionic, C orin th ian , etc.) although n one o f these elem ents is present
tive o f identity, Laclau and Mouffe develop th eir acco u n t o f th e division o f social space.
In a move which parallels their critique o f attem pts to theorise identity in positive terms, they argue that the logic o f difference never m anages to constitute a fully sutured space since systems o f difference only partially de
fine relational identities. In o rder to p resen t itself as objective an d differen
tial, that is, in order to individuate itself, certain elem ents have to be expelled.
The objectivity o f identity thus requires the expulsion o f a ‘surplus of m ean ing’, m ade possible through the construction o f sets o f equivalences which define that which is radically ‘o th e r’. T h e p rod u ction o f fro n tier effects for Laclau an d Mouffe thus come into existence through the o peradon o f systems of equivalence which construct the beyond as th at which it is not. Identity is thus not individuated through a set o f positive elem ents, b ut through the crea
tion of politicalfrontiers which divide political space into equivalential construc
tions and externalisations.
O n this account, any en u m eratio n o f positive characteristics will be insufficient to individuate identity since there is no principle which can bring to a halt the almost endless possibilities o f elem ents which can be articulated together as merely different from each other. A principle o f articulation is thus need ed to stop the play of differences, delim iting identity from what it is not. T h a t is, the draw ing o f a political fro n tie r is necessary in o r d e r to individuate an identity.38 The consequences o f the ethico-theoretical decision which I located in the nature and character o f Laclau an d M ouffe’s critique o f essentialism is, thus, also evident in th eir utilisation an d elab oration o f Saussure’s insights into the n ature o f individuation o f (linguistic) identity.
Saussure’s theorisation at no point privileges the m o m en t o f the paradigm atic over the syntagm atic.39 T he huge em phasis on the fo rm e r in Laclau a n d Mouffe’s rendering of Saussure follows the same structure o f argum entatio n as the one elaborated above with respect to Gramsci: difference is subordi
nated to equivalence as a precondition for the individuation o f identity.40
in space: th e relation is associative.’ F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, Collins, 1974, pp. 123-4. It is im p o rtan t to note, however, th a t in th e linguistic a rg u m e n t on the relation between paradigm s an d syntagms, th e re is no a prio ri privileging o f th e paradigm atic m om ent.
38 T he construction o f an equivalence betw een th e d iffe ren t g ro u p in g s is possible only on condition th at the focus shifts from th e co n c re te identity o f each g ro u p , to th a t by w hich they are com m only th rea ten e d .
39 In fact, it could be argued th at for Saussure th e syntagm atic is privileged over th e paradigm atic since h e states that, from th e p o in t o f view o f th e o rg an isa tio n o f language, systagmatic solidarities are th e m ost striking. Saussure, Course, p. 127.
40 In this sense, m ore rec en t publications by Laclau, can be a rg u e d to be a reite ra tio n o f an arg u m e n t already im plicit in Hegemony.
H aving established the conceptual roots a nd basic dim ensions o f the logics involved in the draw ing o f political frontiers, it is now necessary to look in m o re detail at several fu rth e r specifications o f this category. The category o f political fron tiers in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is intimately b o u n d u p with a n u m b e r o f o th e r issues. I will concentrate here on how it inform s Laclau an d M ouffe’s account o f variations in the character o f fron
tier form ation in the cases o f advanced industrial societies and so-called Third W orld contexts respectively.
II. The Ordering o f Political Space
Political fro n tiers serve n o t only to individuate identity, b u t also to organise political space th ro u g h the sim ultaneous o peration o f the logics of equivalence a n d difference. T he sim ultaneous operation o f these logics in th e co n stru ction o f political frontiers may be elucidated with reference to the G ram scian idea o f transform ism . Transformism, for Gramsci, is a proc
ess th at involves a gradual b u t continuous absorption o f ‘the active elem ents p ro d u c e d by allied groups - an d even o f those which cam e from antagonis
tic groups a n d seem ed irreconcilably hostile.’41 A transform ist project, ex
pressed in term s o f th e op eratio n of the logics o f equivalence and differ
ence, will consist o f efforts to expand the systems of difference defining a d o m in a n t bloc, a n d if such a project is successful, will result in a lessening o f the antagonistic p o ten tial o f the rem aining excluded elem ents. A failure o f transform ism , o n th e o th e r hand, may lead to the expansion of the logic o f equivalence, the con struction of clear-cut political frontiers and a prolif
eratio n a n d d eep en in g , ra th e r than a lim itation, o f antagonistic relations.
Laclau a n d M ouffe argue that an expansion o f the logic of difference tends to ‘com plexify’ social space, while the opposite situation, where the logics o f equivalence is e x p an d ed , will ten d to a ‘sim plification’ of such space.42 Given this, they elaborate a series of political logics which dem and
41 G ram sci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, pp. 58-9.
42 It has to be p o in te d o u t h e re th a t the logics o f equivalence an d difference stand to o n e a n o th e r in a re la tio n o f reciprocal delim itation. C onsequently, n e ith e r the conditions o f total equivalence, n o r th at o f total difference ever fully obtain. Following D errida, I w ould ad d th a t they are always fo u n d in hierarchical com bination, w here o n e takes p rec ed en c e over a n o th e r in th e o rdering o f political space. O n this reading, th e m o m e n t o f fro n tiers w ould n o t be privileged apriorias it is in th e work o f Laclau a n d M ouffe. R ather, w hich dim ension takes p reced en ce w ould d ep e n d entirely on th e political co n te x t u n d e r discussion.
further attention. These concern the distinction betw een popular an d dem o
cratic struggles in relation to First a n d T h ird w orld contexts; the question o f the complexity of frontiers; the frie n d /e n e m y distinction a n d the central
ity o f antagonistic opposition to Laclau a n d M ouffe’s a c co u n t o f identity form ation.
L et us quote the relevant passage w here the first set o f distinctions are articulated, since m uch depends o n the exact form ulation. Laclau an d Mouffe m aintain that:
... an im p o r ta n t d iffe re n tia l c h a ra c te ristic m ay b e e s ta b lish e d b e tw e e n a d v a n c e d in d u stria l societies a n d th e p e r ip h e ry o f th e c a p ita list w orld:
in th e fo rm e r, th e p r o lif e ra tio n o f p o in ts o f a n ta g o n is m p e r m its th e m u ltip lic a tio n o f d e m o c ra tic stru g g les, b u t th e s e stru g g le s, given th e ir diversity, d o n o t te n d to c o n s titu te a ‘p e o p l e ’, t h a t is, to e n t e r in to e q u iv a le n c e w ith o n e a n o t h e r a n d to d iv id e th e p o litic a l sp a c e in to two an ta g o n istic fields... We shall u se th e te r m popular subject position to r e f e r to th e p o s itio n th a t is c o n s titu te d o n th e b asis o f d iv id in g th e p o litica l space in to two a n ta g o n is tic cam p s: a n d democratic subject posi
tion to re f e r to th e locus o f a clearly d e lim ite d a n ta g o n is m w h ich d o es n o t d ivide society in th a t way.43
O n this reading, political space will be divided in to two antagonistic camps in T h ird world contexts w here centralised form s o f oppression en dow p o p u lar struggles with clearly d efined enem ies. This is in co n trast to political struggles in advanced industrial societies w here a p ro liferatio n o f antagonism s makes the construction o f u n ified chains o f equivalence a n d the division of political space into clearly d efin ed areas, very difficult.
It is im p o rtan t to be precise ab o u t th e claims advanced h ere. Firstly, starting from the distinction between types of struggle, closely associated with the Gramscian and Sorellian m om ents identified earlier, Laclau and Mouffe posit a coincidence between types o f struggle an d o f society. T hus, they ar
gue that political struggle in T h ird w orld contexts w ould ten d to take the form o f a war o f m ovem ent, while in advanced in dustrial societies it m ore closely resem bles war o f position. In th e latte r case, it is difficult to foster unified chains o f equivalence, while th a t is typical o f division o f political space in T hird world societies. This claim is based u p o n the idea that in T h ird world contexts centralised forms of oppression ten d to endow po p u lar strug
gle with clearly defined enemies:
... in c o u n trie s o f th e T h ir d W o rld , im p e r ia lis t e x p lo ita tio n a n d th e p r e d o m in a n c e o f b ru ta l a n d c e n tra lis e d fo rm s o f d o m in a tio n te n d from the beginning to endow the popular struggle with a centre, with a single and,
43 Laclau a n d Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 131.
clearly defined enemy ... H e r e th e division o f th e p o litical space in to two field s is present fro m the outset...44
Secondly, this p icture is fu rth e r overlaid with the claim that the divi
sion o f political space in T h ird world contexts is less com plex than that in advanced industrial societies. T he reason for this is, once again, closely bound up with th eir naturalised characterisation o f T hird world struggles. As Laclau a n d M ouffe argue:
... in th e c o u n trie s o f a d v a n c e d capitalism since th e m id d le o f th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry , th e m u ltip lic a tio n a n d ‘u n ev e n d e v e lo p m e n t’ o f d e m o c ra tic p o s itio n s hav e in c re a sin g ly d ilu te d th e ir sim p le a n d a u to m a tic u n ity a r o u n d a p o p u la r p o le . ... T h e c o n d itio n s o f p o litical struggle in m a tu r e c a p ita lis m a re in c re a s in g ly d is ta n t fro m th e n in e te e n th - c e n - tu ry m o d e l o f a c le a r-c u t ‘p o litic s o f f r o n tie r s ’ ... T h e p r o d u c tio n o f
‘f r o n t i e r e f f e c ts ’ ... c e a s e s th u s to b e g r o u n d e d u p o n a n evident and given separation, in a r e f e r e n tia l fra m ew o rk a c q u ire d o n c e a n d fo r all.45
Each o f the claims advanced also marks the site o f a problem . I will c o ncentrate on the following: firstly, that there are two types of society which correspo n d to different kinds of political struggle; secondly, that these strug
gles can be characterised as ‘p o p u lar’ and ‘dem ocratic’; thirdly, that there are m ark ed differences in th e degrees of ‘com plexity’ displayed by differ
e n t kinds o f political struggle. Let us take each on e in turn.
It co u ld plausibly be arg ued that the distinction betw een the First and T h ird world is an u n th o u g h t leftover from debates on the relation between capitalist ce n tre and p erip h e ry and, as within that problem atic, the opera
tion o f the distinction in Laclau and M ouffe’s work leaves open the possibil
ity of a developm ental logic from one to the other. This problem can n o t be skim m ed over, for the consequences of this simplistic distinction for theo
rising political struggles are far-reaching. In fact, what is called for here is a reth in k in g o f the n a tu re o f the T h ird /F irst world distinction itself. Several considerations have to play a role in its recasting. It is, firstly, im p ortant n o t simply to do away with the distinction, since it captures som ething of the unevenness o f relations a n d asymmetrical distribution of power and wealth which no post-M arxist analysis of political struggle can afford to ignore. It is, secondly, im p o rta n t to consider the exten t to which a binary opposition succeeds in cap tu rin g th e com plexity o f forms o f social division at stake in o u r co n tem p o rary world.
Against th e b ackdrop o f these considerations, m ost recent attem pts to reth in k the First-Third w orld relation fail to provide a viable alternative.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., pp. 133-4. E m phasis in th e original.
The global-local distinction, for instance, has th e advantage o f n o t b ein g elaborated u p o n pre-given geographical regions, an d is capable o f address
ing the issue of un equal distribution w ithin as well as betw een n atio n al a n d regional entities. However, like o th er binarism s (First-Third world, cen tre- periphery), it tends to overlook the com plex, m ultiple co n stitu ted id en ti
ties that cannot be accounted for by binary oppositions.46 Moreover, as Stuart Hall notes, in focusing on the local o n e run s the risk o f rom anticising it as a site o f p u re difference, opposed to a globalising h o m o g en isatio n .47
T he substitution o f the term ‘postco lon ial’ for ‘T h ird w orld ’ is also n o t w ithout its problem s. A part from the som etim es overly literary a p p ro priation o f the term , which ten d to em pty o u t its political a n d critical im port, it has becom e so general th at it is difficult to see how it m ay be d e
ployed to overcom e the problem s o u tlin ed above. N evertheless, a re c e n t attem pt by Grewal and Kaplan to resituate the term poin ts in a directio n which may be of use. They argue th at to keep th e id ea o f the ‘p o stco lo n ial’
subversive o ne would have to resist the c e n tre /m a rg in dichotom y th a t situ
ates the ‘postcolonial’ as geographically a n d culturally ‘o th e r ’; o n e w ould have to refuse the construction o f ‘exotic au th o rs an d subjects’.48 In o th e r words, b oth the geographic an d cultural specificities o f the term would have to be em p tied out, so as to keep in view the com plex interw eaving o f id e n tity and locality which no longer are subsum able u n d e r easy binary divisions.
The thrust o f this argum ent coincides with the suggestion by H ow arth that we need to shift our attention away from concerns with space as bounded, an d as linked to territoriality, since such conception s valorise trad itio n an d particularism. Instead, attention should be given to the elaboration o f a non- hypostatised space which ‘can actively accom m odate a n d foster differences an d plurality within it.’49 In o rd er to do so, we n e e d to:
b lu r a n d w eaken th e d raw in g o f c le a r b o u n d a r ie s a n d sp a ce s so as to facilitate m u ltiplicity a n d o p e n n e ss to o th e rn e s s . Sim ilarly, we n e e d to 46 For an insightful discussion o f these issues, see I. Grewal an d C. Kaplan, ‘In tro d u ctio n :
T ransnational fem inist practices and questions o f p o stm o d ern ity ’, pp. 1-33, in Grewal and K aplan, Scattered Hegemonies.
47 Stuart Hall, ‘T he local an d th e global. G lobalisation a n d eth n icity ’, in A. D. King, Culture, Globalization and the World System, 1991. H all argues th a t a re tu rn to th e local as a response to globalization will only be productive for social ch an g e if it does n o t becom e rooted in exclusivist and defensive enclaves. F or an in-depth discussion o f th e ‘politics of locatio n ’, see, C. Kaplan, ‘T h e politics o f location as tran sn a tio n a l fem inist p rac tice’, pp. 137-52, in Grewal a n d K aplan, Scattered Hegemonies.
48 Grewal a n d Kaplan, ‘In tro d u c tio n ’, p. 15.
49 D. H ow arth, ‘Reflections on th e politics o f space an d tim e ’, in Aneelaki, vol. l . ,n o . 1, pp. 53-4.
d e c o n s tr u c t o u r n o tio n o f id e n tity so as to fac ilita te th e p e rm e a b ility a n d o v e r d e te r m in a tio n o f id e n tity c o n s tru c tio n .50
Even if th e se su g g e stio n s are follow ed th ro u g h - if c o n te x tu a l dif
f e r e n c e is n o lo n g e r th o u g h t in te rrito ria lly b o u n d e d term s, a n d if it is, c o n s e q u e n tly , re c o g n is e d th a t th e u n e v en n esses a n d asym m etries a sso c ia te d w ith th e o rig in a l d istin c tio n can n o lo n g e r be assum ed to c o in c id e w ith g e o g ra p h ic a lly d iscrete spaces - it still seem s necessary to r e ta in d istin c tio n s b e tw e e n d iffe re n t f ro n tie r fo rm a tio n s in d iffe re n t con texts.
B efore th is can be e x p lo re d m o re fully, it is necessary to deal with th e m a n n e r in w hich Laclau a n d Mouffe theorise the distinction betw een k in d s o f p o litic a l stru g g le a n d th e carving u p o f p o litic a l space. They a rg u e th a t, c o in c id in g w ith th e T h ird w o rld /a d v a n c e d in d u stria l soci
ety d is tin c tio n , th e r e is a d istin c tio n in th e m a n n e r in w hich fro n tie rs a re fo rm e d . T h is lead s th e m to establish th e d istin c tio n b etw een popu
lar a n d democratic su b je c t p o sitio n s. P o p u la r su b je c t p o sitio n s c o rre s p o n d to cases w h e re th e social is d iv id ed p a ra tac tic a lly in to two a n tag o n istic cam ps, a n d d e m o c ra tic su b ject positions to cases w here soci
ety is n o t d iv id e d in th a t way.51
T h is c h a ra c te ris a tio n , however, gives rise to a possible co nfusion . In n a m in g th e s e f ro n tie rs ‘d e m o c ra tic ’ a n d ‘p o p u la r ’, an illeg itim ate content is a ttr ib u te d to a form o f social division. T h a t is, w hat can only b e constituted in the process o f struggle a n d w hat has to be re s u lt o f a po
litical articulation, is tr e a te d as so m e th in g w hich c a n be re a d off from th e fo rm o f social division. T h e p ro b le m th a t arises h e re is th e follow ing: w h at is te rm e d ‘p o p u la r stru g g les’, may have a d em o cratic c o n te n t, w hile w h a t is c a lle d ‘d e m o c ra tic stru g g le s’ are n o t always a rtic u la te d w ith in d e m o c r a tic h o riz o n s . For e x a m p le, m any ‘p o p u la r s tru g g le s ’ have b e e n fo u g h t in th e n a m e o f dem ocracy; o n e only n e e d s to th in k h e re o f th e various anti-co lo n ial struggles o f the tw entieth century. Many
‘d e m o c r a tic ’ stru g g le s, o n th e o th e r h a n d , b e a r no re la tio n to d e m o c racy a t all.
A c le a re r s e p a ra tio n b etw een th e form o f division o f social space, a n d th e substantive c o n te n t in term s o f which th at division is discursively c o n s titu te d , th u s n e e d s to be m a in ta in e d . In this re s p e c t it m ay be use
ful to reserve th e term ‘paratactical fro n tie r’ for situations in w hich rela
tively c le a r-c u t f ro n tie rs a re a rtic u la te d in a process o f struggle; a n d
H ow arth, ‘R eflections on th e politics o f space an d tim e’, p. 54.
51 Laclau an d M ouffe, Hegemony, p. 131.
th e term ‘fra g m e n te d fro n tie rs ’ m ay be in tr o d u c e d to c h a ra c te ris e c o n texts w h ere th a t is n o t th e case.52 T h a t w ould allow o n e to r e ta in th e sense o f d iffe re n c e in th e m a n n e r in which fro ntiers are co n stru cted p o
litically, while avoiding ascribing a (political) c o n te n t to the form in which social division is articulated.
But, if the distinction between d ifferent ways o f dividing social space cannot be m ade in terms o f the c o n te n t o f struggles, th e n how is it possible to m aintain the distinction, which intuitively seems a relevant an d useful one?
O ne way in which the thought inform ing the d istinction may be m aintained, I would argue, is by em phasising the context in which struggles occur, ra th e r than their content. In the case o f a co n ju n ctu ral crisis, for exam ple, w here structural dislocation is lim ited, an articulation o f frontiers w hich divides the social paratactically, is unlikely to occur. Rather, o ne w ould ex p ect to see an articulation of struggles a ro u n d very precise issues, w hich may p re vent struggles their being ‘linked u p ’ with one another. O n the o th e r h an d , should there be a large degree of dislocation, such as th at fo u n d in co n d i
tions o f organic crisis, the dom ain o f elem ents available for rearticulation is vastly expanded, and the likelihood o f th e form ation o f frontiers a ro u n d a wide set of equivalences, is en h anced. If the p roblem is addressed in these terms, it is n o longer a question of m aking a distinction betw een ‘types o f society’. Rather, Laclau and M ouffe’s crucial insight into the d ifferen t pro c
esses o f fro n tier form ation is retain ed , b u t is now rela te d to the deg ree o f sedim entation of social forms. In addition, the distinction betw een frontiers - one I have argued should be designate by the term s paratactical an d frag
mented frontiers - is no longer conceived o f as a distinction in kind, b u t as one of degree.
If political frontiers, w h eth er they are p aratactical o r fra g m en te d , always resu lt from processes o f political articulating an d struggle an d if dif
ferent ways o f dividing social space c a n n o t be distinguished from o n e an o th er on the basis o f a given geographical division, they also c a n n o t be dis
tinguished with reference to the p resu m ed deg ree o f ‘com plexity’ o f their modes o f constitution. Laclau and M ouffe argue that in co ntrast to the case of ‘popu lar struggles’, political struggles in m atu re capitalist societies ten d to exhibit a far greater complexity, which increasingly moves away from the
‘n in ete en th century’ m odel o f a clear-cut politics o f frontiers. H e re two re lated problem s are present. First, the crucial insight into the frag m en ted
52 I am em phasising the elem en t o f political articu latio n a n d struggle h e re , since in Laclau a n d M ouffe’s theorisation, they arg u e repeatedly th a t in T h ird w orld contexts there is a ‘given and evident’ form o f separation w hich precedes political articulation.
n a tu re o f (m o d ern ) identity is ‘reserved’ for advanced industrial societies.
C onsequently, th e co n stru c tio n o f paratactical fro ntiers is reg ard ed as a som ehow less com plex o p eratio n than in the case of fragm ented frontiers.
This m isconstrual o f the com plex construction o f paratactical frontiers oc
curs because the m odel for paratactical fro n tie rs/p o p u la r struggles is that o f th e ‘n in e te e n th c e n tu ry ’ where, on Laclau and M ouffe’s reading, lines of division are ‘evident an d given’. T he assum ption that the n in eteen th cen
tury m odel o f clear-cut frontiers co rresponded to some ‘evident and given form o f division’, and th at this is transposable to the th o ug ht of contem po
rary paratactical divisions, is simply unten ab le. In politics, no naturalism exists, n o t for the ‘T hird w orld’ and also n o t for the nineteenth century. While it may be the case th a t th e non-naturalness o f identity has becom e increas
ingly visible over tim e, it does n o t m ean th at earlier lines of division were based u p o n n a tu ra l a n d given forms o f identity as Laclau and Mouffe seem to assum e.53 O nce this is clarified, it is possible to show that the construc
tion o f paratactical frontiers which tend to divide the social into two camps, is every bit as ‘co m p lex’ as the articulation of m ore fragm ented frontiers.54 T h a t is, the exp erien ce o f a fragm entation an d m ultiplication of forms of identification, c a n n o t be lim ited to advanced capitalist societies. T he pro
d u ctio n o f political fron tiers - regardless o f w hether they are fragm ented o r paratactical - always p ro ce e d as a result o f a com plex articulation o f di
vision betw een the logics o f inclusion and difference on the one hand, and th at o f exclusion a n d negativity on the other.
It is precisely the complexity o f this process of identity formation which is sacrificed in the over-emphasis on the m om ent o f antagonism in the theo
risation o ffered by Laclau a n d Mouffe. This is particularly evident in the utilisation o f the ‘frie n d /e n e m y ’ distinction as exem plary of the n ature of identity construction. Laclau an d Mouffe argue that the u s /th e m , frie n d / enem y distinction is necessary to the process o f individuation of identity. In ad d itio n to th e foregoing, several issues are condensed into this claim, and it is my c o n te n tio n th a t they n eed to be treated separately if the p ro p er political n a tu re o f frontiers is to be und ersto o d in its full complexity.
53 It is in te re stin g to n o te in this respect, th at Laclau and Mouffe, in th e ir discussion of th e c o n c e p t o f w ar o f po sitio n , criticise Gramsci fo r p resupposing a division of political space into two cam ps. Yet, they go on to im pute a sim ilar p h en o m en o n to th e ‘T h ird W orld’. See, Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 139.
54 I have analysed th e com plexity o f the processes involved in constructing paratactical fro n tiers in a p a rth e id discourse, in Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse, Verso, L ondon 1996.
III. General and Political Logics: From Limits to Frontiers
Instead of a single claim that th e individuation o f identity necessarily requires the construction o f a frie n d /e n e m y distinction o r an antagonistic relation, there are in fact several d ifferen t argum entative strains p re se n t in Laclau an d M ouffe’s basic thesis. They co n cern , firstly, the individuation of identity; secondly, the relation o f th at process to antagonism a n d frontiers;
and, thirdly, the theorisation of frontiers themselves, specifically in relatio n to the question of complexity and the p ro b lem o f hom ogeneity. As I have argued in Part 2, the problem o f th e individuation o f identity, for Laclau and Mouffe, arises from their critique o f essentialism which is dev eloped in such away as to sim ultaneously privilege the m o m e n t o f negativity, an tago nism and frontiers. This is in sharp contrast to the intellectual ‘sources’ up o n which they draw: in both Gramsci a n d Saussure, I have argued, th e re is n o privileging o f the oppositional m o m e n t o r o f paradigm atic relations. For that, one has to tu rn to Sorel and Schm itt, w here the oppositional m o m e n t becomes d o m in an t and defining. Now, it is possible, an d this is the central thesis o f the paper, that identity may be individuated w ithout m aking essen- tialist claims and also w ithout an overem phasis o n th e id ea o f exclusion, opposition, antagonism , and so forth. T h a t is to say, a critique o f essential
ism m ay b e d e v e lo p e d w h ich d o e s not c o n fla te th e general lo g ic o f individuation of identity, and the specific logic o f political frontiers. For such a critique, one could draw on both D errid a an d th e later W ittgenstein. In the case o f the latter, it is quite clear th a t the idea o f ‘family resem b lan ces’
offers an account o f identity form ation which fulfils bo th the stip ulated d e
mands. As W ittgenstein argues with resp ect to th e co n cep t ‘g am e’, th e re is no need for us to be able to give a Merkmal defin itio n o f ‘g a m e ’ to be able to use it. T he dem and for determ inacy o f sense is b u t one d e m a n d am ongst others. This critique of the dem and for determ inacy o f sense, however, does n o t rely on the m o m en t of exclusion to th in k the individuation o f identity.
This is achieved, for W ittgenstein, by th e id ea o f a series o f o verlapp in g resem blances, n one o f which are essential to the concept, a n d w hich makes it into a co n cep t o f ‘gam e’, an d not, for exam ple, ‘w ork’. It is useful to dis
cuss in m ore detail an exam ple o f the deploym ent o f W ittgenstein’s work in fem inist theory which articulates a non-essentialist co n cep tio n o f ‘w om an’.
Linda N icholson outlines it in the following m anner:
I w an t to suggest th a t we th in k o f th e m e a n in g o f ‘w o m a n ’ in th e sa m e way th a t W ittg e n stein su g g ested we th in k a b o u t th e m e a n in g o f ‘g a m e ,’
as a w o rd w hose m e a n in g is n o t f o u n d th r o u g h th e e lu c id a tio n o f so m e sp e cific c h a ra c te ris tic b u t is f o u n d th r o u g h th e e l u c id a tio n o f so m e
n e tw o rk o f c h a ra c te ristic s. ... To give u p o n th e id ea th a t ‘w o m an ’ has o n e c le a rly sp e c ifia b le m e a n in g d o e s n o t e n ta il th a t it h as n o m e a n in g . R a th e r, th is way o f th in k in g a b o u t m e a n in g w orks u p o n th e as
s u m p tio n th a t su c h p a t te r n s a re f o u n d in h isto ry a n d m u s t b e d o c u m e n te d as s u c h .55
It is th e absence o f such a non-essentialist specifiable m eaning or ‘m ini
m al re m a in d e r’ w hich forces Laclau and Mouffe, co ntra W ittgenstein, to conflate the m o m e n t o f individuation o f identity and articulation of politi
cal frontiers. To rep eat, for W ittgenstein it is perfectly possible to think a non-essentialist conception o f identity without arguing th at identity can only be individuated with referen ce to what it excludes. A sim ilar argum ent can be developed from a D erridean perspective. D errida’s discussion of the role o f iterability in th e constitution of identity, proceeds along similar lines to the arg u m e n t sketched o u t above. In the case o f iteration, the repeatability o f a w ord is assured by th e fact that any repetition involves a repetition of the same. Yet this re p e titio n can n o t in any simple m an n er be regarded as rep e titio n o f the same as essentially the same, since every repetition always already involves alteratio n . Thus, an essentialist form o f individuation is avoided, while the m inim al rem ain d er forecloses the n eed to have recourse to p u re exclusio n as th e necessary fo u n d atio n o f any process o f indivi
du atio n .56
O nce this is accepted, it is possible to retheorise the relation between the process o f individuation o f identity and the articulation of political fron
tiers. As I have arg u ed, th e process o f individuation of identity has to be sep arated from th at o f the articulation o f frontiers, o r the m om ent o f an
tagonism . T h a t is, while differentiation is a m om ent in the individuation of identity, the general logic does n o t require that the critique of essentialism has to be conflated with the political logic of antagonism. Thus, contra Laclau a n d Mouffe, w here the co n cep t o f political frontier does both the work of individuating identity, and indicating the po in t at which antagonistic rela
tions are constituted, it is my conten tio n that the general logical argum ent c o n cern in g th e individuation o f identity should n o t be conflated with the specific a rg u m e n t co n cernin g the political logic of antagonism. This confla
ÜÜL. N icholson, ‘In te rp re tin g g e n d e r’, pp. 60-1, in N icholson a n d Seidm an, Social Postmodernism. N icholson develops this approach in o rd e r to avoid a naturalistic red u c tio n ism an d referen c e to a non-historical conception o f ‘the body’ which has te n d e d to g ro u n d m any fem inist argum ents.
56 It could be a rg u e d th a t th e id ea o f th e ‘constitutive outside’ as developed in S tate n ’s rea d in g o f D errida, co u ld act as a c o u n ter to the argum ent p rese n ted above. I retu rn to this at a la te r p o in t in th e argum ent. See, H. Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, University o f N ebraska Press, L o n d o n 1984, pp. 15-9.
