D rifting into Dangerous Waters:
The Separation o f Aesthetic Experience from the Work o f A rt
M o d e r n iz a tio n , ru n s a fa m ilia r story, is typified by th e in c re a sin g d iffe
r e n tia tio n o f v alue sp h e re s, e a c h w ith its ow n im m a n e n t logic a n d relative au to n o m y . Initially e x p re sse d in p h ilo so p h ical term s by Kant, w hose th re e c ritiq u es n eatly divide th e m e n ta l w orld in to cognitive, ethical a n d aesth etic realm s, th e pro cess was given sociological g ro u n d in g in th e writings o f Max W e b e r, w ho e x p lo re d th e in stitu tio n al u n d e rp in n in g s o f th e d ifferen tiatio n b a se d o n sp ec ia liz atio n o f fu n c tio n a n d th e creatio n o f sep a rate cu ltu res o f e x p e rtise . In his m o re r e c e n t d efen se o f th e p ro je c t o f m od ern ity , J ü rg e n H a b e rm a s has sob erly a p p ra is e d th e benefits an d costs o f the splits am o n g th e sp h e re s as well as b e tw e e n th e m a n d an alleg ed ly p rio r lifew orld o f u n re fle c tiv e p ra ctices o u t o f w hich the sp h eres em erg ed . In th e trad itio n b ro a d ly c irc u m sc rib e d by th ese th re e nam es, th e d iffe re n tia tio n o f value sp h e re s is by a n d larg e ack n o w led g ed as a progressive o r a t least irreversible p ro c ess, w h ich has allow ed th e clarificatio n o f th e o re tic a l issues a n d the in c re a s e d efficiency th a t o fte n acco m p an ies a division o f labor. W hile w hat H a b e rm a s has ca lle d th e tro u b lin g »colonization« o f o n e realm by a n o th e r m ay b e p ro b lem a tic, th e solution has b e e n the restoration o f a balance ra th e r th a n a n o v e rc o m in g o f th e d istin ctio n s them selves.
A gain st su ch a re a d in g , a fo rm id ab le array o f critics has b e m o a n e d the loss o f th e alleg ed ly in te g ra te d w orld th a t p re c e d e d th e split in to d istin ct a n d in c o m m e n s u ra b le value spheres. M obilizing th e now fam iliar rh e to ric o f d isso ciatio n o f sensibility, a lie n a tio n o r d ire m p tio n , these critics yearn to d e d iffe re n tia te , o r a t least r e n d e r m o re p erm e ab le th e b o u n d a rie s betw een th e sp h e re s. T h ey have so u g h t ways to re sto re a c o n d itio n o f re co n ciliatio n o r h a rm o n y th a t they believe o n c e existed o r a t least p o sit it as a n o rm ative g o al fo r a fu tu re in w h ich th e putativ e w o u n d s o f m o d e rn life w ou ld be h e a le d . W h a t has b e c o m e tra n s c e n d e n t a n d abstract, they h o p e to re sto re to im m a n e n t c o n c reten e ss, a n d p erh ap s in so d o in g re e n c h a n t a w orld from w h ich m e a n in g seem s to have fled o r re tre a te d in to isolated enclaves. Even th o se critics n o rm a lly p la c e d in th e p o stm o d e rn ist cam p, w ho dismiss such a q u e st as little m o re th a n n o stalg ia for an im aginary p re la p sarian bliss th a t n e v e r o b ta in e d a n d n ev e r will, are n o less hostile to th e alleg ed au to n o m y
a n d self-sufficiency o f th e th re e value sp h e re s, w h ose b o u n d a rie s a n d lim its they eagerly transgress o r ra th e r claim a re always a lre a d y self-tran sgressed.
In w hat follows, I d o n o t w ant to a d d a n o th e r r o u n d to this now fam iliar d eb ate, w hich has tak en m any d iffe re n t fo rm s a n d a t tim es sp ille d o u t o v er th e walls o f th e academ y to in sp ire fe rv e n t m o v em en ts o f c u ltu ra l, relig io u s an d political renew al. Instead, I w ant to h o n e in o n o n e c o rn e r o f it, in w hich a d iffe re n tia tio n w ithin a d iffe re n tia tio n has ta k e n place. T h a t is, I w a n t to ex a m in e th e c o n se q u e n c e s w ithin th e a e sth e tic s p h e r e o f th e d istin c tio n betw een w orks o r objects o f a rt a n d w h a t h as co m e to b e c a lle d » ae sth e tic ex p e rien ce.« I will have to ask yo u r in d u lg e n c e fo r n o t a tte m p tin g a serio u s analysis o f w h at m ig h t c o u n t as an o b je c t o r w ork o f art, itself a d istin c tio n th a t c a n n o t b e en tire ly ig n o red . I sim ply d o n ’t have th e tim e to re h e a rse th e deb ates g e n e ra te d by N elson G o o d m a n ’s p a th -b re a k in g Languages o f Art w ith its o p p o sitio n o f »au to g rap h ic« a n d »allog rap h ic« w orks, th e fo rm e r u n d e r s to o d as s in g u la r, m a te ria l o b je c ts , lik e p a in tin g s , w ith cla im s to au th en ticity based o n th e ir p ro d u c tio n history, th e la tte r as id e a l o bjects, like m usical com p ositions o r works o f lite ra tu re , w ith th e ability to g e n e ra te an infinity o f valid in sta n tia tio n s.1 N o r will I b e ab le to c o n s id e r th e fu r th e r re fin e m e n t betw een im m a n e n t a n d tra n s c e n d e n t w orks recen tly in tro d u c e d by G é rard G e n e tte , th e fo rm e r im p lying id e n tity b e tw e e n th e w o rk a n d its m aterial instantiation (or, if allographic, in s ta n tia tio n s ), th e la tte r sug gesting the ways in w hich works can ex ceed th o se in sta n tia tio n s a n d p ro d u c e p lu ra l aesthetic effects.2 1 will sim ply take as given th e h e u ristic u sefu ln e ss o f th e distinction betw een a rt object, how ever it m ay b e d efin ed , a n d th e e x p e rie n c e it g en erates. In so d o in g , I h o p e to p ro v id e so m e in s ig h t in to th e d a n g e rs involved w h e n e ith e r th e d iffe re n tia tio n s o f m o d e rn ity b e c o m e to o firm ly re if ie d o r c o n v e rse ly w h e n th e d e s ir e to o v e r c o m e th e m r e s u lts in a p ro b lem a tic co nfu sio n o r co n fla tio n o f ca te g o ries, le a d in g to th a t d rift in to d a n g e ro u s w aters suggested by my title.
A lth o u g h an aw areness o f th e specificity o f a v a ria n t o f e x p e rie n c e th a t m ig h t be called ae sth etic has b e e n d is c e rn e d as fa r b ac k as P y th ag o ras, it was p e rh a p s n o t u n til th e 19th c e n tu ry th a t th e c e n te r o f gravity in a e sth e tic discourse decisively sh ifted fro m th e id e a o f b e a u ty assu m e d to re sid e in objects in th e w orld to th e e x p e rie n c e s o f th e h u m a n s w h o re s p o n d e d to them . T h e shift was evidenced, inter alia, by th e asc e n d e n c y o f p sychological accounts o f th at experience in the scientific w ork o f Gustav F e c h n e r a n d o th ers 1 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis,
1968).
2 Gérard Genette, The Work of Art: Immanence and Transcendence, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (Ithaca, 1997).
in th e 1860's a n d th e g e n e ra l c u lt o f ex p erien ce in the so-called »philosophies o f life« la te r in th e ce n tu ry , in w hich intensity o f e x p e rie n c e (in th e sense o f vital Erlebnis, r a th e r th a n cognitive o r dialectical Erfahrung) was th e h ig h est v a lu e .3 T h e g ro u n d , how ever, was already laid in th e 18th c e n tu ry with the d e v e lo p m e n t o f a d is tin c t b ra n c h o f p h ilo so p h ical d isco u rse focusin g on
» art,« a g e n e r ic c a te g o ry u n d e r w h ich all o f th e s e p a ra te M uses w ere su b su m e d .4 T h a t discourse, it is o ften n o te d , em erg ed at a tim e w hen objects th a t h a d previously b e e n re v e re d as sacred a n d played a ro le in religious w o rsh ip o r w ere a p p re c ia te d as em blem s o f social o r p olitical pow er w ere re d e s c rib e d a n d newly le g itim a te d as works possessing p u re ly artistic value.
As H e g e l was a m o n g th e first to p o in t o u t in his Lectures on Aesthetics, th e cadavers o f d e a d cults co u ld be revived th ro u g h red escrip tio n as living works o f art. N o lo n g e r e x p e c te d to im itate an ideal w orld, illustrate a m ythic story, o r re c re a te a h isto rical event, they could be ju stifie d in self-referential term s p riv ileg in g fo rm o ver c o n te n t o r fu n ctio n . T h e re c o n te x tu a liz a tio n o f such o b je c ts in th e h e te r o to p ic , a te m p o r a l sp ac e o f th e p u b lic m u se u m , th e classical e x a m p le b ein g the transform ation o f the palace o f th e Louvre d u rin g th e F re n c h R ev o lu tio n in to a re p o sito ry o f th e n a tio n ’s cu ltu ra l p atrim on y, ac c o m p a n ie d a n d a b e tte d th e new discourse, which also em erg ed in the wake o f a n a c c e le ra te d m a rk e t fo r objects o f beau ty by private collectors ou tside o f th e a risto c ra c y o r c h u rc h . C o n c o m ita n t w ith th e c h a n g e was th e new d istin c tio n b etw een a fin e artist an d m erely skilled artisan, neatly sym bolized by th e d ec isio n to e x c lu d e engravers from the newly c re a te d Royal A cadem y o f th e A rts in L o n d o n in 1768.
T h e se aspects o f th e story have b e e n widely re m ark ed . W h at is p erh ap s less fr e q u e n tly re a liz e d is th a t a t virtually th e sam e m o m e n t th a t freshly re d e fin e d artw orks w ere b e in g fre e d from th e ir e n ta n g le m e n t in religious, p o litic a l o r u tilita ria n c o n te x ts, allow ed to circ u late in a new n etw o rk o f v alu e, a t o n c e c u ltu ra l a n d ec o n o m ic , a n d h o u s e d in sec u la r tem p les o f c u ltu re o p e n to th e p e o p le , they w ere paradoxically losing th e ir in teg rity as self-sufficient e n titie s in th e w orld, d efin a b le in intrinsic term s as objective e x e m p la rs o f u n iv ersal beauty. In th e vocabulary m ad e fam iliar by W alter B en jam in , this loss m e a n t th e progressive dissipation o f th e cultic a u ra th a t 3 See the discussion in Wîadyslaw Tatarkiewicz, »Aesthetic Experience: The Early History
of the Concept,« Dialectics and Humanism, 1 (1973); and »Aesthetic Experience: the Last Stages in the History of a Concept,« Dialectics and Humanism, 1 (1974). The importance of the »philosophy of life« is argued in Richard Shusterman, »The End of Aesthetic Experience,« Journal o f Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 55,1 (1997), p. 29.
4 For a recent discussion of the problematic implications of that generic subsumption, seeJean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, Ca., 1996).
s u rro u n d e d such en tities, an a u ra p re d ic a te d o n th e p re s e n c e o f a u n iq u e o b je c t th a t was d is ta n t a n d d is tin c t fro m th e b e h o l d e r . A lth o u g h it is u n d en iab le th a t som e o f the n u m in o u s atm o sp h e re clin g in g to sac red objects was tra n sfe rre d to certain fetishized w orks o f elite art, w h ose c u ltu ra l cap ital was acco rd in gly h ig h , th e p h ilo so p h ic al leg itim a tio n o f th a t tra n s fe r tacitly a b a n d o n e d the claim th a t such objects possessed an a e sth e tic v ersio n o f th e religious n o tio n o f »real presence,« a n in c a rn a tio n o f u ltim a te v alu e th a t was p rio r to th e b e h o ld e r’s re sp o n se to it. In a c o n te x t o f in c re a se d o p e n n e ss to cu ltu ra l d iffe ren c e, w hich m irro re d th e u n e v e n , b u t w id e n in g to le ra tio n o f religious pluralism a n d a p p re c ia tio n o f g e o g ra p h ic a l diversity, a b so lu te a n d universal h iera rch ies o f b ea u ty w ere h a r d e r to m a in ta in . T h e classical stan d ard s o f a B oileau, con fid en tly g r o u n d e d in an objectivist b e lie f in th e o rd e r o f n a tu re , w ere c h a lle n g e d by th e » sen tim en talism « o f a D u b o s, w ho focused in stead o n th e feelings o f th o se w ho re s p o n d e d to specific w orks.5 Increasingly, in fact, 18th-century a e sth e tic th e o ry s h ifte d a tte n tio n to th e ex p e rien ce o f th at b e h o ld e r o r the co m m u n ity o f b e h o ld e rs. As David H u m e fam ously p u t it in his essay »O f th e S ta n d a rd o f T aste,« » b eau ty is n o q u ality in th e th in g s them selves: It exists m ere ly in th e m in d w h ich c o n te m p la te s them ; a n d each m in d perceives a d iffe re n t b eau ty .« 5
T h e G re e k aiesthesis, th e o rig in o f th e L atin w o rd Aesthetica u s e d by A lex a n d er B au m g arte n fo r his tw o-volum e w ork o f 1750 a n d 1758, im p lie d gratifying c o rp o re a l p e rc e p tio n , th e subjective sen su a l re s p o n s e to ob jects ra th e r th a n objects them selves. O n e o f its a n tith e tic a l term s was noesis, w hich signified p u re co n c e p tu a l th o u g h t s e p a ra te d fro m th e senses. A n o th e r was poiesis, th e active m aking o f objects artistic o r otherw ise. S om e o f th a t activism may have b e e n re ta in e d in th e ancillary n o tio n o f taste, w ith its c o n n o ta tio n
5 For a still useful account of the transition, see Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy o f the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln andjames P. Pettegrove (Boston, 1955), chapter 7.
6 David Hume, »Of the Standard of Taste,« in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, ed.
Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1987), p. 230. Later in the essay, Hume does retreat from the anarchic implications of this statement and asserts the likelihood that »the principles of taste [are] nearly, if not entirely the same in all men,« (p. 241), but adds that few are educated to realize what they are. Here in a nutshell, we have the perennial problem of reconciling Hume’s skeptical side with his naturalist one. For a good short account of his thoughts on aesthetics, see Peterjones, »Hume’s Literary and Aesthetic Theory,« in David Fate Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to H um e (Cambridge, 1992). He underscores the importance of social context and conventions in H um e’s account of judgment. For a defense of his position against Kant’s, see George Dickie, The Century of Taste: The Philosophical Odyssey o f Taste in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1996).
o f t a c t i l e i n t e r v e n t i o n in th e w o r ld ,7 w h ic h im p li e d e x p e r i e n c e as e x p e rim e n ta tio n . B u t even h e r e th e em phasis was o n th e em o tio n al, even irra tio n a l re c e p tio n o f a r t e p ito m iz e d by th e »je n e sais quoi« a ttitu d e o f ineffability th a t b e c a m e e m b lem atic o f th e re tr e a t fro m co n c ep tu alizatio n a n d p r o d u c tio n . As J o h n Dewey was la te r to n o te w ith c h a g rin , th e very c o n c e p t o f th e »aesthetic,« w h en set a p a rt from th e o v erlap p in g , b u t n o t e q u iv a le n t te rm »artistic,« te n d s to r e n d e r e x p e rie n c e as » ap p reciativ e, p erceiv in g a n d enjoying,«8 ra th e r th an p ro du ctive or creative. A lthou gh the d isc o u rse c o n c e rn in g a e sth e tic ju d g m e n t th a t c u lm in a te d in K a n t’s th ird Critique w e n t b e y o n d th e passive a n d co n v e n tio n a list subjectivism o f taste r e p re s e n te d by H u m e a n d so u g h t m o re universal crite ria, it too fo cused o n th e re sp o n se r a th e r th a n th e o b ject per se. K ant did, to b e sure, prov ide an a c c o u n t o f th e g e n iu s w ho c re a te d w ith o u t c rite ria - a p ro d u ctiv e c o rrelate o f th e b e h o ld e r , w ho, as we will see, ju d g e s w ith o u t th e m as well - th e m ain e m p h a sis o f his a e sth e tic s was o n re c e p tio n .1'
T h is is n o t th e p lace to trac e th e co m p lex ways in w hich th e c o n c e p t o f a e s th e tic e x p e r ie n c e was d e v e lo p e d by such E n lig h te n m e n t th eo rists as B a u m g a r te n , S h a fte s b u ry , H u tc h e s o n , H u m e , K am es a n d K an t, o r to u n ta n g le th e w eb o f m e a n in g s su rro u n d in g th e crucial term »taste,« b u t a few c e n tra l p o in ts n e e d to b e m a d e .1'1 First, w h e th e r th e g ro u n d o f aesth etic e x p e rie n c e was assu m ed to be an in n a te capacity, an u n m e d ia te d , non-rule- b o u n d sense o f w h a t was beau tifu l com parable to an in b re d m oral sentim ent, as it was fo r th e n e o -P la to n ist Shaftesbury, o r u n d e rs to o d in stead to derive fro m p u re ly e m p iric a l e n c o u n te rs w ith th e w orld, as th e m o re sk eptical H u m e believed, it was irre d u cib le to a m ere recording o f w hat was intrinsically th e re in objects d e e m e d artistic o r beautiful. T h e sam e conclusion was shared
7 For a discussion of the origins of taste in these terms, see Howard Caygill, A it of Judgment (Oxford 1989), chapter 2.
8 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York, 1934), p. 47.
9 It is true that what Kant called »productive imagination« plays a role in aesthetic appreciation, as it does in normal cognition, albeit under the guidance of the understanding. But what was produced was a mental synthesis, not an active intervention in the world. For a discussion of its importance, see Michael R. Neville,
»Kant’s Characterization of Aesthetic Experience,« Journal ofAesthetics and Art Criticism, 33, 2 (Winter, 1974), p. 197.
10 For useful accounts, see Dabney Townsend, »From Shaftesbury to Kant: The Development of the Concept of Aesthetic Experience,« Journal of the History o f Ideas, 48/2 (April-June, 1987), pp. 287-305; and Hans Robert Jauss, Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis, 1982). For a more general history, foregrounding the questionable political implications of aesthetic discourse, see Terry Eagleton, The Ideology o f the Aesthetic (Oxford, 1990).
by those w ho saw th e so u rce o f th e a e sth e tic sen se in p e rs o n a l psychology, com m un al, intersubjective consensus, o r th e m o re p hilosop hically g ro u n d e d
»reflective ju d g m e n t« th a t h a d b e e n p o s ite d by K a n t as a way to g e t b e y o n d the a p p a re n t antinom y o f taste, at o n ce p erso n al a n d universal. In all o f these cases, th e stress was o n th e o n e o r o n es w ho d id th e e x p e rie n c in g r a th e r th a n o n th e in trin sic q u alitie s o f th e o b je c t th a t was e x p e rie n c e d . » T h e b e a u tifu l,« as K a n t w o u ld a rg u e , a p p e a r e d o n ly as th e p r e d i c a t e o f a ju d g m e n t, n o t as a quality o f an object. In so m e ways r e m in is c e n t o f th e epistem olo gical limits o n know ing o bjects in them selves, w h e th e r c o u c h e d in th e E m p iric ist v o cab u lary o f la c k in g access to p rim a ry as o p p o s e d to secondary qualities o r th e tra n sc e n d e n tal Id ealist v ocabu lary o f u n k n o w a b le n o u m en a, th e object as such was less im p o rta n t th a n its aesth etic a p p re c ia tio n o r en jo y m en t. H e re to o a k in d o f » C o p e rn ic a n re v o lu tio n ,« 11 to c ite th e fam ous m e ta p h o r id en tified w ith K a n t’s first Critique, to o k p la c e in w h ich o n tological o r axiological q uestions w ere s u b o rd in a te d to th o se c o n c e rn in g th e epistem o logical o r, in this case, a e sth e tic subject. O b jects w ere a d m ire d n o t for w h a t they w ere in them selves, b u t fo r w h a t th ey c o u ld d o to us. T h e telos o f this C o p ern ica n reversal was an in cre asin g in d iffe re n c e to th e o b je c t as such, p e rh a p s even e x te n d in g to its very ex isten c e.
B efore th a t e n d p o in t was re a c h e d , a n d this is th e se c o n d p o in t w o rth e m p h a siz in g , th e se n su a l p le a s u re p r o d u c e d by th e o b je c t in a e s th e tic e x p e rie n c e h a d to b e d istin g u ish ed fro m th a t e n jo y e d in o t h e r re la tio n s betw een self an d w orld. As early as J o h a n n e s S cotus E rig e n a ’s 9 th -c e n tu ry
»De d ivisione n a tu ra e ,« th e sp e c ta to ria l, n o n -in s tru m e n ta l n a tu r e o f th e aesth etic a ttitu d e h a d a ttra c te d a tte n tio n .12 A lth o u g h o n e m ig h t also co vet the sam e objects for w hat a later age w ould call th e ir c o m m o d ity o r e x c h a n g e value, they w ere a p p re c ia te d q u a objects o f a r t only fro m a m o re lofty p o in t o f view. R ejecting th e eg o c en tric a n th ro p o lo g y o f a H o b b e s, S h aftesb u ry stressed th e fallacy o f re d u c in g everything to th e q u e stio n o f p riv ate in te re s t o r n ee d . In stea d , a n d this was re la te d to his b e lie f th a t a e sth e tic e x p e rie n c e was in te rtw in e d w ith civic v irtu e a n d m o ra l s e n tim e n t, » d is in te re s te d « b e n e v o le n ce was its crucial c h a ra c te ristic .13
11 Whether or not the metaphor, which in this precise form did not appear in Kant, adequately describes the innovations of the Critique of Pure Reason need not concern us now. For a skeptical account of its applicability, see Robert Hahn, K a n t’s Newtonian Revolution in Philosophy (Carbondale, 1988).
12 See the discussion in Tatarkiewicz, »Aesthetic Experience: The Early History of the Concept,« p. 23. Jauss points to other examples of medieval anticipations of aesthetic experience, which produce anxiety because they are linked with idle curiosity about the world rather than immersion in the word of God. See Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, p. 4.
I t w as, o f c o u r s e , in K a n t’s a e s th e tic th e o ry t h a t th e c o n c e p t o f d is in te r e s te d n e s s was fully a rtic u la te d . In th e Critique o f Judgm ent, K a n t c la im e d th a t o u r ability to e x p e rie n c e p leasu re took th re e form s. T h e first h e c a lle d th e » a g re e a b le « o r » th e p leasan t« (das Angenehme), w hich was c a u s e d d ire c tly by s e n su a l s tim u la tio n . It involved a p u re ly p riv a te a n d su b je c tiv e re s p o n s e o f a ttr a c tio n a n d aversion, w ith o u t any m e a n in g fu l cognitive o r in tersu b jec tiv e d im en sio n . H e re th e individual b o d y w ith all its a p p e tite s a n d a n tip a th ie s was th e arb ite r, n o t a cu ltu ra l o r universal n o rm . P e rs o n a l g ra tific a tio n o r lack th e re o f was all th a t m a tte re d . T h e se c o n d variety c o n n e c te d p le a su re to th e q u estio n o f th e »good.« T h a t is, we can d eriv e » d e lig h t in th e good« (das Wohlgefallen am Guten) th ro u g h w o rking fo r a n d a c h ie v in g a b e n e fic e n t goal, w hich is set by ideas a n d p rin c ip le s e x te rn a l to sen su a l g ra tific atio n . In this case th e re is always a fu n c tio n a l o r u tilita ria n d im e n s io n to o u r p leasu re, w hich is n o t an e n d in itself. T h e real e n d is th e g o o d th a t is re a liz e d , n o t th e p le a su re we have in re alizin g it, a lth o u g h th a t p le a su re m ay be a subsidiary p a r t o f o u r m o tiv atio n as well.
T h e th ird fo rm o f p le a su re (das Wohlgefallen am Schönen), K an t arg u ed , is w h a t we ca n p ro p e rly call aesthetic. As in th e case o f th e »agreeable,« th e senses play a ro le a n d th e b o d y is involved, b u t with a cru cial d iffe ren c e.
W h e re a s in th e fo rm e r th e o b je c t th a t p ro d u c e s the p le a su re m u st actually ex ist - we c a n n o t fin d a m eal p le a sa n t unless th e re is re al fo o d o n th e table - in th e latter, it m ay no t. O r m o re precisely, o u r p e rc e p tio n o f th e ae sth etic o b je c t, a n d its in trin sic p ro p e rtie s o r q u alities n e e d n o t co in cid e , as th ey m u st w ith an a g re e a b le m eal (fo od may look ap p etizin g , b u t it m u st taste g o o d to b rin g us g e n u in e p le a su re ). Because o f this d istin c tio n , we have n o d ire c t in te re s t in th e o b ject, only in its re p re s e n ta tio n o r sem b lan ce. O r to b e still m o re p re cise, since th e m e d ia o f re p re se n ta tio n s ca n them selves b e u n d e r s to o d as ob jects (a gold statu e is, after all, m ade o f a su b stan ce w hose v alu e we fin d d iffic u lt to fo r g e t), w h at is im p o rta n t is a c e rta in k in d o f e x p e rie n c e o f it. O u r p le a su re in beauty, in sh o rt, is d isin te re ste d b ecau se we a re in d iffe r e n t to th e a c tu a l object, w hich is n o t itself an o b ject o f d ire c t s e n s u a l d e sire . W e a re n o lo n g e r im m e rs e d in b e in g - inter-esse, as th e etym ology o f th e w o rd »interest« suggests - b u t ra th e r som eh o w o u tsid e it.
W e en jo y an a e sth e tic m eal, as it w ere, w ith o u t having to taste a n d swallow th e fo o d , as in th e case o f c e rta in variants o f nouvelle cuisine in w hich visual m o re th a n g u sta to ry p le a su re , le t a lo n e actu al n u tritio n , seem s th e m ain p u rp o s e o f w h a t is o n th e plate. It is th e sam e d isin te rested n e ss th a t p erm its 13 For a history of the concept, see Jerome Stolnitz, »On the Origins of ‘Aesthetic
Disinterestedness,’« Journal ofAesthetics and Art Criticism, XX, 2 (Winter, 1961),pp. 131- 143.
th e transfo rm ation o f the lust-arousing n a k e d h u m a n fo rm in to th e idealized, m arm o re al n u d e an d allows us to distinguish b etw een p o rn o g ra p h y a n d h ig h a r t ( b o t h o f w h ic h m ay b e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f r e a l o b j e c t s , b u t a r e d iffe re n tia te d acco rd in g to o u r in te re st o r d is in te re st in th e ir re fe re n ts as objects o f d esire).
A e sth e tic e x p e rie n c e is, h o w e v er, also a k in to th e s e c o n d fo r m o f pleasure in its going beyond pre-conceptual sensual gratification o r re m a in in g o n th e level o f w h at K ant dism issively c a lle d th e m e re »egoism o f taste.«
A esthetic e x p e rie n c e m obilizes cognitive pow ers, sy n th esizin g tra n s fo rm a tions o f p u re sensation evolve in to tru th o r a t least value claim s, w h ic h a re th e n assu m ed to have universal validity. B u t it d o es so w ith o u t su b s u m in g specific cases u n d e r discursive rules, a p rio ri categories o r g e n e ra l p rin cip les, as is th e case with the d ete rm in a n tju d g m e n ts o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g . T h e latter seem to co m e from above, as if th ro u g h th e coercive d ictates o f a ru le r. In c o n tra st, aesth etic ju d g m e n ts, sin g u lar r a th e r th a n ca te g o ric a l, a re allow ed a k in d o f u n h ie ra rc h ic a l, free play in w hich u n iv ersal claim s o f b e a u ty c a n be m a d e by each o f us o n th e basis o f a n a lo g ic a l a n d p a ra d ig m a tic r a th e r th a n su b su m p tiv e o r d e d u c tiv e re a s o n in g . W e m ov e fro m p a r tic u la r to p a rtic u la r ra th e r th a n from universal to p a rtic u la r, as was th e case w ith th e sy n th etic a p rio ri ju d g m e n ts o f c o g n itio n d iscussed in th e first Critique. T h e c o n c e p ts in v o lv e d a r e th u s » in d e te r m in a te « b e c a u s e th e y c a n n o t b e e x p r e s s e d in s c h e m a tic fo r m , as c a n t h e c o g n itiv e c o n c e p t s o f t h e u n d e rsta n d in g . T hey ap p e al to a virtual sensus communis, an in te rsu b je c tiv e co m m u n ity which is to be m ade, n o t sim ply fo u n d , as in n a tis t n eo -P lato n ists like S haftesbury h a d th o u g h t possible. A c ru cial a sp e c t o f d isin te re s te d n e ss fo r K ant - alth o u g h n o t, as we shall see, fo r th e d ev o tees o f l ’art pour l ’art — was precisely this assum ption th a t ae sth e tic ju d g m e n ts evok ed an e n jo y m e n t a n d a p p re c ia tio n th a t was n o t j u s t o n e ’s ow n, b u t th a t c o u ld b e s h a r e d by all. T o th e e x te n t th a t ju d g m e n t was a n in h e r e n t d im e n s io n o f a e s th e tic e x p e rie n c e , an d n o t so m eth in g a d d e d to it a fte r th e in itial re sp o n se o f th e senses, disinterested n ess h a d this crucial co m m u n icativ e im p lic a tio n , w h ich was lack in g in exp ressions o f id iosyncratic taste.
W h a t also d istinguishes ae sth e tic e x p e rie n c e , K ant a rg u e d , fro m th e d e lig h t in th e good, w here practical o u tc o m e s a re so u g h t, is th e in trin s ic n a tu re o f th e p u rp o ses involved, w hich a re a k in to th e im m a n e n t telo s o f play ra th e r th a n w ork, w hose e n d is a tra n s fo rm a tio n o f th e w orld. K a n t’s cele b rate d d efinition o f art as »purposiveness w ith o u t p u rp o se« was d e sig n e d precisely to set it a p a rt fro m th o se activities in w h ich e x trin s ic p u rp o s e s d o m in a te a n d re al objects are th e re to b e p ro d u c e d , c o n su m e d , po ssessed o r ex c h an g ed .
W h e th e r o r n o t th e d istin c tio n b etw een d e te r m in a n t a n d reflective ju d g m e n ts really solves th e rid d le o f the an tinom y o f taste, at on ce subjective a n d objective, o r provides a useful m odel for intersubjective consensus ra th e r th a n m ere ly an id eo lo g ical sim u la cru m o f o n e, are n o t qu estion s I w ant to a d d re ss now . N o r d o I w a n t to re h e a rse th e d e b a te o v er w h e th e r o r n o t a e s th e tic j u d g m e n t a n d e x p e rie n c e a re b ase d o n a p u re ly psychological c o n c e p t o f th e b e h o ld in g self o r a m o re logically g e n e ra te d one, com parable in so m e ways to th e tra n s c e n d e n ta l, synthesizing self in tro d u c e d in th e first Critique to p ro v id e a fo u n d a tio n fo r epistem ology. I am equally re lu c ta n t to tak e sides in th e a r g u m e n t o ver the e x te n t to w hich K a n t’s p ositio n can be re d u c e d to n o th in g b u t a d e fe n se o f an aesthetic a ttitu d e or m en tal state, w hich has e x e rc ise d c o m m e n ta to rs like Je ro m e Stolnitz, G eorge Dickie and M ary M cK losky.14
W h a t I w a n t to d o in s te a d is fo c u s o n th e im p lic a tio n s o f d is in te re ste d n e ss fo r th e a r t o b ject, w hich m u st be d istin g u ish ed from objects in g e n e ra l, a n d th e la rg e r q u e stio n o f the d iffe re n tia tio n o f value sp h eres in m o d e rn ity . F o r a lth o u g h ae sth e tic ju d g m e n ts are n o rm ally m ad e by m eans o f a rh e to ric o f objectivity - »‘T h e M ona L isa’ is a b ea u tifu l p ainting,« n o t
»I think it is a b e a u tifu l p a in tin g « - K ant stresses th a t it is th e subject w ho is re ally th e s o u rc e o f th e ju d g m e n t. O bjectivity, as o n e o f K a n t’s re c e n t in te rp re te rs Eva S c h a p e r has p o in te d o u t, is m erely an »as-if« co n c e p t in his u n d e r s ta n d in g o f a e sth e tic s.15 T h a t is, such ju d g m e n ts act as if they were d ire c te d a t ob jects, b u t th o se objects are n ever analyzable for K ant en tirely in in trin sic term s, a n d b e c o m e im p o rta n t solely fo r w h at they p ro d u c e in th e ir b e h o ld e r . O r as a n o t h e r s tu d e n t o f th e Critique o f Judgment, J o h n Z a m m ito p u ts it, »W hile K a n t stresses th e d e g re e to w hich th e su b ject is affected ( afficiert) in th e ex p e rien ce , nevertheless it is striking how n o t m erely th e o b je c t b u t e v e n th e r e p r e s e n ta tio n o f th e o b je c t shifts fa r in to th e b a c k g ro u n d . Its fo rm serves as th e occasion, b eco m es a t m ost a catalyst, for a c o m p le x su bjective re s p o n se .« 1”
It is o fte n a rg u e d , as we have seen, th a t th e n a tu re o f th a t re sp o n se is in h e re n tly c o n te m p la tiv e , passive a n d sp ectato rial, d istan cin g th e self from 14 See, for example, Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and the Philosophy o f Art Criticism (Boston,
1960); George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic (Ithaca, 1974); Mary A. McClosky, K a n t’s Aesthetics (London, 1987). There were many other issues in the long-running debate between Stolnitz and Dickie. For a useful overview, see PeterJ. McCormick, Modernity, Aesthetics, and the Bounds o f Art (Ithaca, 1990), pp. 147-157.
15 Eva Schaper, Studies in K a n t’s Aesthetics (Edinburgh, 1979), chapter 6. The concept of
»as-if« is, of course, taken from Hans Vaihinger, but Schaper wants to restrict it to aesthetic judgments, not to the cognitive ones discussed in Kant’s first Critique.
"'John H. Zammito, The Genesis o f K ant’s Critique ofJudgment (Chicago, 1992), p. 113.
th e w orld a n d o u r a p p e tite to possess o r co n su m e it. A lth o u g h this p rim arily visual ch a rac te rizatio n m ay seem an o d d way to d esc rib e ways in w h ich som e a rt can seize us a n d invade o u r in te rio rity — an e x p e rie n c e p e r h a p s m o st obviously u n d e rg o n e in au ral term s w h e n liste n in g to m usic — ev en h e r e the subject may n o t always be actively a n d productively en g a g ed in in terv en in g in th e w orld. A ttentive listening, as Ja m e s J o h n s o n h as re c e n tly sh o w n ,17 was an a c q u ir e d skill in th e 18th c e n tu r y b a s e d o n th e s u p p r e s s io n o f th e kinesthetic body an d the co n c en tratio n o f faculties o n only o n e sensory in pu t.
T h e e x p e rie n c e o f passive liste n in g was carefu lly s e g re g a te d fro m th a t o f d ancing o r co m m u n al singing as th e e a r was e d u c a te d to have co n tem p lativ e aesth etic ex p e rien ces. T h e public c o n c e rt h all w o rk e d like th e m u s e u m to deracinate works th a t h a d th eir origins in th e c h u rc h o r aristocratic ch a m b e r, tu rn in g th em into w hat 19th-century aestheticians like E d u a rd H anslick w ould call »absolute m usic.« In lite ra tu re as well, th e h a b it o f lo o k in g fo r ac tu al p erso n al re fere n ces in co n c o c te d n arrativ es h a d to b e lo st a n d w h a t C a th e rin e G a llag h er has called » n o b o d y ’s story,« th e re a liz a tio n o f ackn ow led- gedfictionality, p u t in its place b e fo re th e novel c o u ld c o m e in to its o w n .18
T h e re is, in sh o rt, n o p ractical o r possessive in te n tio n re a liz e d in th e act o f listening, re a d in g o r b e h o ld in g q u a a e sth e tic e x p e rie n c e . W e m ay, to be sure, also w ant to own the object fo r its value in th e m ark e tp la ce o r because o f o u r p assio n to co llec t, b u t this is n o t th e sam e as a p u re ly a e s th e tic response. T h e possibility o f th a t ex p e rien ce m ay be situ ated in an institutio nal co n tex t o r c u ltu ra l field, as p h ilo so p h ers like G e o rg e D ickie a n d sociologists like P ie rre B o u rd ie u have a r g u e d ,19 b u t th e e x p e r ie n c e itse lf c a n n o t b e re d u c e d to a m e re reflex o f th a t e n a b lin g co n te x t. F o r it en ta ils p recisely the distan ce from extrinsic fu n c tio n a lity th a t su ch re d u c tio n is m w ishes to im pose o n it from w ithout. It is for this re a s o n th a t H a b e rm a s c a n claim in The Philosophical Discourse o f M odernity th a t » th e p r o b le m o f g r o u n d i n g m odernity o u t o f itself first com es in to consciousness in th e realm o f aesth etic criticism .«20
17 James H. Johnson, Listening in Paris: A Cultural History (Berkeley, 1995).
18 Catherine Gallagher, Nobody’s Story: The Vanishing Acts of Woman Writers in the Marketplace, 1670-1820 (Berkeley, 1994).
19 George Dickie, Aesthetics (Indianapolis, 1971); and Pierre Bourdieu, TheField of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature, ed., Randal Johnson (New York, 1993). For a critique of Dickie, see Richard Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art (Cambridge, Mass, 1990, pp. 38-41. For a critique of Bourdieu, see Paul Crowther,
»Sociological Imperialism and the Field of Cultural Production: The Case of Bourdieu,« Theory, Culture and Society, 11,1 (1994).
20 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), p. 10.
T h is is n o t, to b e su re , to d en y th a t the b o u n d a rie s o f ae sth etic ex p e
rie n c e them selves m ay n o t b e entirely im perm eable. R ece n t sch olarship has stresse d h o w th e th ird Critique itself stru g g led to find a way to b rid g e th e g ap betw een cognitive a n d m o ralju d g m en ts an d their aesthetic c o u n terp art.21 T h e la rg e r p ro je c t o f th e th ird Critique was, afte r all, to ex p lo re th e ways in w hich n a tu re co u ld b e u n d e rsto o d teleologically ra th e r th an m echanistically, thus g o in g b e y o n d th e rig id lim itations o n know ledge set by the first Critique.
T h e p u rp o s iv e n e s s in a r t c o u ld th u s b e fo u n d in n a tu r e as well, w hich su g g ested a p o ssib le re u n ific a tio n o f th e varieties o f re aso n . »Beauty,« K ant also w e n t o n to claim , c o u ld be u n d e rs to o d as »the sym bol o f m orality,«22 b e c a u se o f its em p h asis o n purposiveness w ith o u t extrinsic purpo ses, which was parallel to th e m o ral ideal o f treating every person as an en d itself im plied by th e categ orical im perative. A lthoug h the link betw een a rt an d ethics could n o t b e e sta b lish e d discursively, draw ing o n ra tio n a l arg u m e n ts, it c o u ld be su g g e ste d sym bolically a n d analogically. In b o th cases, th e self-reflective su b je c t h a d to ach ieve a c e rta in distan ce to a llo w ju d g m e n t to occu r. Even m o r e d ecisiv ely , th a t d im e n s io n o f a e sth e tic e x p e rie n c e K ant follow ed L o n g in u s in calling »the sublim e« provided a link with th e n o u m en al origins o f p ra c tic a l re a so n , b e c a u se it g o t us in to u ch with su p ersen sib le realities th a t c o u ld n o t b e g ra sp e d by synthetic a p rio riju d g m e n ts , h e lp in g p ro d u c e a f e e lin g o f r e s p e c t f o r th e m o ra l law th a t was also b e y o n d c o g n itiv e u n d e r s ta n d in g . H e re th e objective c o rre la te to o u r feelings is even m o re re m o te th a n it is in th e case o f th e b eau tifu l, as th e p arad o x ical a tte m p t to r e p re s e n t th e u n re p re s e n ta b le is the essence o f th e su blim e, w hich registers b o th th e g r a n d e u r a n d th e futility o f th e quest.
H ow successful K a n t’s Critique of Judgment actually was in re in te g ra tin g w h at his e a rlie r w ork h a d se e m e d so pow erfully to split a s u n d e r is, o f course, a m a tte r o f so m e d isp u te; th e e n tire su b se q u e n t history o f G erm an Idealism su g g ests th a t a t le a st his im m e d ia te successors th o u g h t it was a failu re . B e g in n in g as early as S c h ille r’s Letters on Aesthetic Education, they so u g h t to r e u n ite a r t w ith th e o th e r sp h e re s in the h o p e o f re e n c h a n tin g life, a p ro jec t th a t c o n tin u e d well in to th e 2 0 th ce n tu ry with n o t m u ch success to show for it. I t has o fte n b e e n re m a rk e d th a t w hen K an t’s ideas w ere vulgarized in th e 19th century, as they w ere by ce rtain F rench philo so p h ers like V ictor C ousin, th e y c o u ld easily b e ta k e n to c o u n te n a n c e th e o p p o site co n c lu sio n , th e e x tre m e a e sth e tic se p a ra tism th a t b ec am e th e m ark o f th e Vart pour l ’art
21 See in particular, Zammito, The Genesis of K ant’s Critique ofJudgment in which he discusses what he calls the »cognitive and ethical turn« in the third Critique.
22 This was the title of §59 of the third Critique.
m o v e m e n t.23 W ith S c h o p e n h a u e r ’s 1818 World as W ill and Representation, a e sth e tic e x p e rie n c e was r e d u c e d to th e a ttitu d e o f n o n -p r a c tic a l c o n tem p latio n , a way to fe n d off, a t least tem p o ra rily , th e m e a n in g le ssn e ss o f th e w orld.24 P erh a p s o n e o f th e re aso n s fo r this o u tc o m e was th e difficulty o f reconciling the disinterestedness o f aesthetic e x p e rien ce - now u n d e rs to o d w ithout th e public, com m unicative m o m e n t K ant h a d a ttrib u te d to it25 - widi th e in te re ste d qualities o f b o th its cognitive a n d m o ra l c o u n te rp a rts . In th e case o f th e fo rm e r, it was im possible to s u sp e n d fo r very lo n g o u r in te re s te d involvem ent with the world, which gratified o r fru strated o u r c o rp o re a l n eed s a n d desires. In th e case o f th e latter, re a l o b jects o r a t le a st o th e r h u m a n b eings w ere necessary to test o u r will to a c t m orally a n d b e involved in th e w orld o f p ractical co n sequences. As P aul C ro w th er has n o te d , »for K a n t th e b u rd e n o f em phasis in m o ral existence falls o n obstacles a n d respo n sib ilities in relation to the expression o f freedo m . In aesthetic e x p e rie n c e it does not....
H en ce, w hilst the p u re aesth etic ju d g m e n t m ig h t fig u re in a m o ra l im ag e o f th e w orld, it cou ld ju s t as easily, if n o t m o re so, in c lin e us to a life o f self- in d u lg e n t o r in d o le n t c o n te m p la tio n , w h e re in th e d e m a n d s o f m o ra l d u ty w ere th e least o f o u r p re o ccu p a tio n s.« 20 T h e r e was, in o th e r w ords, a c e rta in ten sio n b e tw e e n th e a ris to c ra tic le is u re ly p re m ise s o f a e s th e tic d is in te restedness — th e ability to see a b e a u tifu l la n d sc a p e w h e re p e a sa n ts to ilin g in th e fields co u ld only see re c a lc itra n t soil - a n d th e m o ra l im p e ra tiv e to tre a t everyone as an e n d in h i m /o r herself.
B ut w h e th e r o r n o t a successful re in te g ra tio n o f th e th re e s p h e re s was achieved by K ant o r anyone else, th e tacit u n c o u p lin g o f ae sth etic e x p e rie n c e from th e a r t o b ject w ithin th e s p h e re o f th e a e sth e tic allow ed a p ro b le m a tic slippage betw een sph eres th at is th e real su b ject o f this p a p e r. S chem atically p u t, th e re w ere two im plications th a t c o u ld b e draw n fro m th e w ithdraw al o f e m p h a s is o n b e a u ty in th e o b j e c t i ts e l f in fa v o r o f s u b je c tiv e o r 23 Seejohn Wilcox, »The Beginnings of Гart pour Гart,« Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 11 (June, 1953), and Gene H. Bell-Villada, Art for Art's Sale and Literary Life: How Politics and Markets Helped Shape the Ideology and Culture of Aestheticism, 1790-1990 (Lincoln, Neb., 1996).
24 For an account of the debates concerning the reduction of experience to attitude initiated by Schopenhauer, see Bohdan Dziemidok, »Controversy about Aesthetic Attitude: Does Aesthetic Attitude Condition Aesthetic Experience?,« in Michael H.
Mitias, ed., Possibility of Aesthetic Experience (Amsterdam, 1986).
25 According to Jauss, »as the new ideal of aesthetic pleasure, self-enjoying subjectivity abandoned the sensus communis as the expression of a sociable sympathy at the same moment the aesthetics of genius finally replaced the aesthetics of rhetoric.« Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, p. 26.
26 Paul Crowther, »The Significance of Kant’s Pure Aesthetic Judgment,« British Journal of Aesthetics, 36, 2 (April, 1996), p. 118.
in te rsu b je c tiv e re sp o n se . O n e , to w hich we have already allu d ed , was the p rogressiv e o b lite ra tio n o f th e object, w hich p aralleled th e d isap p ea ran c e o f th e thing-in-itself in post-Kan tian epistemology. N o t only was the real world re f e r e n t o f th e artw o rk b ra c k e te d in th e service o f p u r e fictionality, so too th e m ateriality o f th e re p resen ta tio n itself was often suppressed an d forgotten.
T h e s e c o n d a n d se e m in g ly o p p o s ite im p lic a tio n was th e in d isc rim in a te elev atio n o f all objects in to p o te n tia l works o f art, d e p e n d in g on th e attitu d e o f th e ir b e h o ld e r. In e ith e r case, th e specificity o f th e w ork o f a rt as such was u n d e r m i n e d . L e t m e ta k e e a c h te n d e n c y in tu rn . T e c h n o lo g ie s o f sim u la cra l m e c h a n ic a l re p ro d u c tio n like p h o to g ra p h y a n d th e cin em a may h a v e a b e t t e d th e f ir s t o u tc o m e , le a d in g to w h a t h a s b e e n c a lle d th e
» im m a te rializatio n o f reality,«27 b u t it was already fo resh ado w ed, I w ant to arg u e, in th e privileging o f disinterestedness in aesthetic theory. F or an object th a t was p ro h ib ite d from soliciting any desire o r interest, an object th at could n e v e r b e p o s se sse d o r c o n s u m e d , was an o b je c t th a t w o u ld u ltim a te ly s q u a n d e r its p o w e r to e n g a g e th e very co rp o re a l re sp o n se th a t aisthesis h a d s o u g h t to e x p lo r e . F u r t h e r e r o s io n fo llo w e d fro m th e le v e lin g o f th e d istin c tio n b etw een w orks o f a r t an d th e ir critical re cep tio n , a tendency th at c u lm in a te d in d e c o n s tr u c tio n ’s pan -tex tu alist b re a c h in g o f th e b o u n d a ry b etw e en e rg o n a n d p a re rg o n (w ork a n d fram e). By 1981, the literary critic M u rra y K rie g er c o u ld lo u d ly la m e n t in a w ork called Arts on the Level the
» o b lite r a tio n o f th e re a lm o f a rt, its o b je c ts, its m u s e u m s ...e v e ry th in g im m e rse d w ith in th e indivisible flood o f e x p e rien ce .« 28
In th e visual arts, th e sam e alarm bell was so u n d e d a few years ea rlier in M ichael F rie d ’s c e le b rate d a n d controversial essay »Art a n d O bjecthood.«2<J A c c o rd in g to F ried, th e specificity o f pictures as such was b e in g u n d e rm in e d by a new literalness, w hich fo re g ro u n d e d the anti-illusionist, m aterial su p p o rt o f th e flat canvas, a n d a style o f b eh o ld in g h e called »theatrical,« By th e latter, h e m e a n t an in d iffe re n c e to th e specific m e d ia o f th e sep a rate arts a n d a w illingness to privilege th e e x p e rien ce o f th e b e h o ld e r over tim e ra th e r th an th e a r t o b je c t itself. T h e o fte n cited ex am ple h e gave o f th e new sensibility was an a c c o u n t given by th e a rtist T on y S m ith o f a car rid e h e h a d taken on th e N e w je rse y tu rn p ik e , in w hich he realized th a t trad itio n al a rt was dead.
In F r ie d ’s gloss, th e re s u lt was th a t »the e x p e rie n c e alo n e is w hat m atters.«30 27 Paul Crowther, Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism (Oxford, 1993), p. 18. See also Arthur
Danto, The State of the Art (New York, 1987).
28 Murray Krieger, Arts on the Level: The Fall of the Elite Object (Knoxville, Tenn., 1981), p. 56.
20 Originally published in 1967, it is included with other essays of that period and a long introduction answering subsequent criticism in Fried, Art and Objecthood: Essays and Review (Chicago, 1998).
30 Ibid., p. 158.
F rie d ’s fierce resistance to this tre n d was n o t very successful, as h e w o u ld b e th e first to ad m it. If p o stm o d e rn ism h as m e a n t a n y th in g , it h as m e a n t a fu rth e r e ro sio n o f th e in tegrity o f th e w ork o f art.
W h e n th e M inim alist a rt F ried b e m o a n e d was j o i n e d by a n even less p icto rial C o n c e p tu a l A rt, th e ra d ic a l p o te n tia l o f le v e lin g was still m o re pow erfully realized. Artists like Jo se p h K ossuth o r M ichael A sh er a b a n d o n e d th e m ateriality o f the w ork entirely in favor o f a te x tu a l s u rro g a te (w ith only a re sid u e o f th e ac k n o w le d g m e n t th a t in s c rib e d tex ts c a n th em selv es b e tre a te d as m a te ria l o b je c ts). M arcel D u c h a m p ’s re a d y m a d e s , in w h ic h ra n d o m objects fro m everyday life r a th e r th a n o n e s d e s ig n e d by a rtis tic in te n tio n a n d fash io n e d by artistic ta le n t w ere im b u e d w ith artistic v alu e by th e fiat o f th e artist, was a way-station to this e n d . D u c h a m p ’s fa m o u s visual in d ifferen ce , his disdain fo r m e re »retin al« p le a su re , m e a n t th a t n o t only th e a rt o b je c t was b e in g o b lite ra te d , b u t so to o was th e sen su a l d im e n s io n o f aesthetic ex p e rien ce , w hich b ec am e a m o re c e re b ra l, th eo re tic ally driv en gam e like th e chess h e b eg a n playing seriously in th e 1920's as an alte rn a tiv e to p ro d u c in g - o r ra th e r d esig n atin g - even re a d y m a d e w orks o f art. H e re , ironically, th e e n d o f aesthetics tu r n e d o u t to b e a k in d o f a n a e sth e s ia in w hich n o t only th e o b je c t stim u latin g th e senses h a d v a n ish e d , b u t so to o w ere th e senses it was su p p o se d to e ffe c t. H e g e l’s n o to r io u s claim th a t p h ilo so p h y w ould a n d sh o u ld re p la ce a r t se e m e d fu lfilled by this o u tc o m e .
D u c h a m p ’s elev a tio n o f u rin a ls, snow shovels a n d b o ttle rack s in to objects w orthy o f b e in g in c lu d e d in th e sac red space o f th e m u se u m was, however, m o re th an a p aro d ie g estu re m o ck in g th e p re te n sio n s o f a r t objects to possess in h e r e n t qualities o f beau ty , m o re th a n a d e n ia l o f th e p le a su re o f th e gaze, m o re th a n a victory o f th e c o n c e p t o v er th e im ag e. F ro m a d ifferen t angle, it exem plifies th e sec o n d m ain im p licatio n th a t co u ld b e a n d was draw n from the privileging o f aesthetic e x p e rie n c e over a rt objects, w hich involved th e drifting I have invoked in my dde. T h a t is, ra th e r th a n d e b u n k in g a r t by b rin g in g it dow n to th e level o f o r d in a r y life, u s in g , as D u c h a m p provocatively re co m m en d ed , »The M o n a Lisa« as an iro n in g b o a rd , it c o u ld seek to elevate life by b rin g in g it u p to th e p u tativ e level o f art. In o th e r words, it co u ld p ro m o te the prom iscuous re e n c h a n tm e n t o f th e e n tire world, the »transfiguration o f the com m onplace,«31 as if any o b ject o r event, how ever m ean, w ere a legitim ate occasion for aesthetic ex p e rien ce . As Jauss has n o ted ,
»aesthetic e x p e rie n c e does n o t seem to d ev e lo p ‘o rg a n ic ally ,’ o n a field o f its own, b u t to progressively e x p a n d a n d m a in ta in its a re a o f m e a n in g a t th e ex p en se o f b o rd e rin g e x p e rien ce s o f reality, a n d this by u s u rp a tio n s a n d 31 Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge,
Mass., 1981).
c o m p e n s a t io n s , th e c r o s s in g o f b o u n d a r ie s , th e o f f e r o f c o m p e tin g so lu tio n s.« 32 T h e re s u lt was a leveling u p ra th e r th an dow n, a con flatio n o f re p re s e n ta tio n w ith re fe re n c e , a kind o f im perialism o f aesthetic sublim ation in w h ich every o b je c t c o u ld b e re d e e m e d in ae sth etic term s.
D u c h a m p him self, to b e sure, w ould have scoffed a t so lofty a p ro g ram , b u t by lo w erin g th e th re s h o ld o f w hat co u ld be c o n stru e d as an o b ject o f a e s th e t ic a p p r e c i a t i o n a n d e n jo y m e n t (o r a t le a s t t h e i r c o n c e p t u a l c o u n te r p a r t) , h e was d ra w in g o n , if in som e ways also rev ersing th e valence of, a v e n e ra b le tra d itio n th a t b e g a n as early as the R om antics a n d co n tin u es to o u r day. It c o u ld e m e rg e only w hen th e lo n g sta n d in g disdain fo r n a tu re as a re a lm o f fa lle n a n d d e b a s e d m a tte r in co m p ariso n w ith elevated sp irit was re v e rse d , a tra n s fo rm a tio n th a t was an tic ip a te d by ce rtain h e te ro d o x ph ilo so p h ie s like S p in o z a’s p an th eism in the 17th century. It was also evident, if in slightly d isp la c e d fo rm in social o r cu ltu ra l term s, in th a t in creasin g in c o rp o r a tio n o f fo rm e rly »low« su b ject m a tte r in allegedly »high« art, the d e m o c ra tiz a tio n o f c o n te n t e v id e n t in th e g e n re p ain tin g s o f early m o d e rn D u tch art, th e b ourg eo is, dom estic tragedies o f the E n lig h ten m en t, an d m ost o f all th e ris e o f t h e n o v e l. I t was a p p a r e n t as w ell in th e R o m a n tic in c o rp o r a tio n o f th e fra g m e n t, the sketch, a n d the in c o m p le te o r ru in e d to rso in to th e c a n o n o f g e n u in e art. It cam e in to its own with w hat M. H.
A b ram s has follow ed C arly le’s Sartor Resartus in calling » n atu ral s u p e rn a tu ra lis m ,« 33 th e in fu s in g o f th e n a tu ra l w o rld w ith all o f th e n u m in o u s m e a n in g th a t h a d h ith e rto b e e n reserved fo r tra n s c e n d e n t spirit. Now th e everyday, th e c o m m o n p la c e , co u ld be u n d e rsto o d as glow ing with im m a n en t significance, o r least p o ten tially possessing it th ro u g h p o e tic transfiguration, w h ic h s o u g h t to fill t h e v a c u u m le ft by th e w ith d ra w a l o f r e lig io u s sa c ra liz a tio n .34
In a r e c e n t w ork e n title d Into the Light o f Things, G eo rg e L e o n a rd has trac ed w hat h e calls the »art o f the com m onplace« from W ordsw orth th ro u g h C arlyle a n d R uskin to J o h n C age, w hose ce le b ra te d co m p o sitio n »4'33««
im b u e d even seem in g ly u n m u sical silence o r m o re precisely, th e a m b ie n t noise left w hen n o n o tes w ere so u n d ed , with aesthetic value.35 In visual term s, 32 Jauss, Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, p. 111-112.
33 M.H. Abrams, N atural Supematuralism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New York, 1971).
34 This impulse was later to be rechanneled into the quasi-political project of the avant- garde to imbue life with the energies of art, a project whose problematic implications have been foregrounded by Peter Bürger in Theory of the Avant Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis, 1984).
35 GeorgeJ. Leonard, Into the Light: The Art of the Commonplace from Wordsworth to John Cage (Chicago, 1994).
L e o n a rd d etects a sim ilar tran sitio n a lre a d y ta k in g p la c e b e tw e e n th e tim e o f S ir J o s h u a R e y n o ld s a n d J o h n C o n s ta b le . A lth o u g h h e n o te s t h a t W o rd sw o rth m o re likely g o t his a n ti-h ie r a rc h ic a l id e a s a b o u t a e s th e tic e x p e rie n c e fro m th e E nglish critic A rc h ib a ld A liso n ’s Essays on the N ature and Principles of Taste o f 1790 th a n d ire c tly fro m K ant, w ho se G e rm a n h e could n o t read , th e e n d re su lt was sim ilar. F o r A lison also a r g u e d a g a in st elite a r t o b jects a n d in favor o f th e su b je c tiv e r e a c tio n we c a n h a v e to anything, how ever trivial o r m u n d a n e . Even th e su b lim e , w h ich h a d b e e n reserved fo r aw esom e a n d u n fa th o m a b le e x p e rie n c e s in th e 18th c e n tu ry , co u ld now b e a p p lie d to th e c o m m o n p la c e , j u s t as lo n g as th e a e s th e tic sensibility o f the b e h o ld e r was ca p ab le o f a p p re c ia tin g it in this m a n n e r.
T h e r e was, to b e s u re , an i m p o r t a n t d is tin c tio n b e tw e e n n a t u r a l su p e rn a tu ra lis m a n d th e K an tian n o tio n o f a e s th e tic e x p e rie n c e , w h ich L eo n a rd d oes n o t rem ark. W hereas th e fo rm e r im p lie d a p a n th e istic p ro je c t o f re e n c h a n tin g th e w orld, som ehow im b u in g it w ith a sec u la riz e d relig io u s m ean in g , K ant h a d explicitly d e c rie d su ch a tte m p ts in h is ow n day. In th e fam ous »Pantheism Controversy,« w hich d ivided G e rm an in tellectu als in th e d ec ad e a fte r F.H. J a c o b i’s 1785 a ttac k o n L e ssin g ’s s u p p o s e d e m b ra c e o f S pinozist ath eism , h e was a fe rv e n t critic o f th e ra tio n a lis t im m a n e n tis m im p lie d in th e G re e k slogan hen kai p a n ( th e o n e is th e all) re v iv e d by Lessing.30 K ant vigorously resisted w hat h e saw as dre d e te rm in ist im p lication s o f th a t p o sitio n , w hich u n d e rm in e d th e possibility o f h u m a n fre e d o m a n d m ade p ractical re a s o n ’s exercise o f will m ean in g less. H e th u s n e v e r w e n t as far as th e n a tu ra l su p ern atu ralists in re in v e stin g th e w o rld w ith any k in d o f aesthetic cum religious »real presence,«37 p reserving in stead a m o re o rth o d o x b eliev e r’s faith in a tra n sc e n d e n t G od.
B ut w h a t K ant’s stress o n th e d isin te re ste d n e ss o f a e sth e tic e x p e rie n c e d id allo w , e v e n if u n i n t e n tio n a lly , was th e p o s s ib ility o f h a v in g s u c h ex p e rien ce s in th e face o f objects o r events o r a c tio n s th a t h a d n o t b e e n in te n d e d as works o f a rt o r deliberately c re a te d to p rov id e ae sth etic p leasu re.
In fact, h e h im self distinctly p re fe rr e d n a tu ra l to artifical b ea u ty , th e real th in g to m an -m ad e re p re se n ta tio n s. F o r this re a so n , h e c o u ld b e c o n s tru e d as an u n w ittin g p r e c u r s o r o f n a t u r a l s u p e r n a tu r a lis m . I n s o f a r as th is im plication was a necessary a c c o m p a n im e n t o f th e re d e fin itio n o f previously 36 For a good account of Kant’s role in the debate, see Zammito, The Genesis of the Third
Critique, chapters 11 and 12.
37 The urge to do this is still alive, as evidenced by George Steiner’s recent book, Real Presences (Chicago, 1989), which, to be sure, tries to see art from the point of view of the creator rather than the beholder or critic, and in so doing, stress its links with freedom.
sa c re d o r o rn a m e n ta l o bjects as p u rely artistic ones, it p ro d u c e d a valuable d isarticu latio n o f th e in h e r e n t logic o f the aesthetic sp h ere from its cognitive a n d m o ra l c o u n te rp a rts . T h e sam e m ig h t be said o f th e la te r réév alu atio n o f ritu a l o r u tilita ria n o bjects fro m so-called prim itive cu ltu re s as objects o f fo rm a l b ea u ty , w h ich to o k place d u rin g th e m o d e rn ist era. H e re too th e ex ten sio n o f aesthetic ap p reciatio n to cultural artifacts th a t h ad h ith e rto b ee n dism issed as m e re e x a m p le s o f less ad v an ced p eoples ca n be a c c o u n te d an a d v a n c e in c o s m o p o lita n u n d e r s ta n d in g (h o w e v e r p r o b le m a tic s u c h d e c o n te x tu a liz a tio n m ay seem to d e fe n d e rs o f the in teg rity o f in divid ual c u ltu r e s ) .
B ut w hen c a rrie d to an indiscrim inate extrem e, such an extension could le a d to a p ro m isc u o u s ae sth e tic iz atio n o f th e e n tire w orld, re d u c in g it to a m e re o cc asio n fo r d is in te re ste d subjective p leasu re. All objects o r events, w h e th e r o r n o t th ey w ere ever in te n d e d as works o f art, co u ld b e re d e e m e d in a e sth e tic term s, if they p ro d u c e d an e x p e rie n c e th a t so m eho w m easu red u p to w hatever th e c o m m o n sense o f the tim e called aesthetic. As Jauss notes,
» th e a e sth e tic e x p e rie n c e o f ro le distance can be in ten sified a n d b ec o m e aesth eticism w h en it is tak en u p in a real-life situation w here the conventions o f m orality o r tact d e m a n d a wholly serious involvem ent. W h en , fo r exam ple, a w ork su ch as th e Ise n h e im a lta r is perceived an d in te rp re te d solely as a c a rrie r o f a e sth e tic q u alities a n d ab stractio n is m ad e fro m everything th a t m ak es th e re p re s e n ta tio n o f th e m arty rd o m shocking, cruel, a n d th ere b y ex e m p la ry , it is n o t only a d e v o u t sensibility th a t will b e o ffen d ed . Such an a t t i t u d e is a lso i n a p p r o p r i a t e to th e u n d e r s ta n d in g th e o b je c t its e lf d e m a n d s .« 38
P e rh a p s th e m o s t tro u b lin g im p lica tio n s o f this in d iffe re n c e to th e qualities o f th e o b je c t w ere e v id e n t in w hat W alter B enjam in fam ously called th e »aestheticization o f politics.« This is n o t th e place to laun ch a full-fledged re h e a rsa l o f its d iv e rg e n t im plications, a task I have a tte m p te d elsew here,39 b u t several p o in ts sh o u ld b e m ade. B enjam in’s critique was d irected explicitly a t w hat h e saw as fascist aestheticized politics, in which h u m a n suffering could b e c o m e an o ccasio n fo r ae sth e tic d elec tatio n . M ost clearly ev id en t in th e c e le b ra tio n o f w ar as a sp ectacle in th e w ork o f F uturists like M arin etti, it also a p p e a re d in his ow n day in th e th re n o d ie s to apocalyptic violence in E rn s t J ü n g e r ’s te c h n o lo g ic a l sublim e. P erh a p s the m o st fre q u e n tly cited e x p re s s io n o f th is a ttitu d e was th e re m a rk m a d e by th e S ym bolist p o e t L a u r e n t T a ilh a d e in re a c tio n to a deadly an a rc h ist b o m b th ro w n in to th e 38 Jauss, Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, p. 6.
30 M artinjay, »The A esthetic Ideology as Ideology: O r W hat Does It Mean to Aestheticize Politics,« Force Fields: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique (New York, 1993).
F rench C h am b er o f D eputies in th e 1890's: »N ’im p o rte les victim es, si le geste est beau .« H e re co n te m p la tiv e d is in te re s te d n e s s was given a n esp e cially sinister twist because th e o bject to be »enjoyed« was th e d e stru c tio n o f h u m a n life. T h e rigid distinction betw een aesthetic a n d ethical values, w hich d eriv e d m u ch o f its im p etu s from a re d u ctiv e m is re a d in g o f K a n t’s th ird Critique, c o m b in e d with the u n c o u p lin g o f ae sth e tic e x p e rie n c e fro m w orks o f a rt, to c o u n te n a n c e w h a t in o t h e r s p h e r e s w o u ld b e q u ic k ly u n d e r s t o o d as p ro b lem atic. T h a t is, in th e realm o f c o g n itio n , e p iste m o lo g ic a l ju d g m e n ts a b o u t objects th at d o n o t exist are norm ally called h allu cin atio n s o r fantasies, a n d are s e p a ra te d fro m th o se th a t c a n claim so m e w a rra n t in th e w o rld e x tern al to th e self. If eth ical ju d g m e n ts a re a p p lie d to b e h a v io r o r ev ents th a t have n o t o c c u rre d o r th a t d id n o t involve th e ex e rcise o f h u m a n will, we w orry a b o u t o u r in a p p ro p ria te ly m o ralizin g w h a t s h o u ld b e u n d e r s to o d in differen t term s. T h e sam e cau d o n , it w ould seem , s h o u ld apply w ith re g a rd to aesth etic ex p e rien ce , w hen it seeks its d e ta c h e d p le a su re an y w h ere it can fin d it. H ow ever m u c h we may a p p la u d th e d e m o c ra tic e x p a n s io n o f th e realm o f a rt objects b ey o n d th e lim its o f th e ir elite p re d e c e sso rs, h o w ever m u ch we m ay recognize th e value o f le a rn in g to salvage o b jects th a t have lo st th e ir in itial fu n c tio n a l p u rp o s e in a e s th e tic term s, it m ay b e wise to acknow ledge limits to how far th e ae sth e tic r e e n c h a n tm e n t o f th e w orld can go. T h e n a tu ra l su p e rn a tu ra lis t p ro je c t, like all p a n th e is t a ffirm a tio n s o f im m a n e n c e , com es u p again st th e ra d ic al evil th a t exists in th e w o rld th a t it tries to valorize. A lth o u g h vio len ce ca n b e ae sth e tic a lly tra n s fig u re d a n d re p re s e n te d in w orks o f a rt - how else c o u ld we re a d w ith a d m ira tio n The Illiad o r s ta n d com fortably b e fo re P icasso ’s Guernica?40 - w h e n th e fra m e is b ro k e n , re p re se n ta tio n is co n fu sed w ith re fe re n c e , a n d u n m e d ia te d reality becom es fair gam e for aestheticization, th e effect is very d iffe re n t. A esth etic ex p e rien ce , in sh o rt, c a n n o t b e en tirely fre e d fro m a c o n s id e ra tio n o f w hich objects a n d events m ay ju stifiab le evoke it, o r else it c o u rts th e c h a rg e th a t it p ro d u c es a theodicy o f beauty, w hich is n o less p ro b le m a tic th a n its eth ica l c o u n te rp a rt.
O r ra th e r, it c a n n o t avoid th a t re b u k e if we re m a in w ith in th e term s set by the 18th-century’s version o f th a t ex p e rien ce . B ut w h at if a n o th e r n o tio n o f ae sth etic e x p e rie n c e co u ld b e d e f e n d e d th a t w o u ld avoid th e p riv ileg in g o f su b je c t over o b je c t a n d th u s avoid th e d a n g e rs o f d riftin g ? O n e su c h 40 Kant himself makes this point when he notes that at least in one respect man-made art
is superior to natural beauty: »Where fine art evidences its superiority is in the beautiful description of things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing. The Furies, diseases, devastations of war, and the like, can (as evils) be very beautifully described, nay even represented in pictures.« Critique of Judgment, §48, 5:321.
