View of Between Intellectualism and »Somaesthetics«

Simo Säätelä

Between Intellectualism and »Somaesthetics«

C o n te m p o ra ry p h ilo so p h ic al aesth etics, as well as p h ilo so p h y in g e n ­ eral, is c h a ra c te riz e d by a loss o f faith in various objectivist a n d fo u n d a tio n - alist ideals. H aving increasingly fre e d itself fro m its tra d itio n a l aim to fin d fo u n d a tio n s, essences, a n d necessities, p h ilo so p h y h as b e c o m e «nči-founda- tio n alist, c h a lle n g in g th e tra d itio n a l c o n c e p tio n th a t p h ilo so p h y sh o u ld provide im m u tab le g ro u n d s fo r h u m a n know ledge a n d practices. A nti-foun- d atio n alism says th a t su ch g ro u n d s are n e ith e r available n o r r e q u ir e d (see S h u ste rm a n 1997b, 157). T h e re are, how ever, d iffe re n t o p in io n s as to w h a t form such anti-fo undationalism sh o u ld take. My aim is to take a look a t som e ways to u n d e r s ta n d an ti-fo u n d a tio n a lism w ithin aesthetics, a n d a fo cus fo r my p re se n ta tio n is given by the re c e n t w ork o f R ich ard S h u sterm an , w ho has, in a n u m b e r o f p a p e rs a n d books, discussed these issues as a p a r t o f his ef­

fo rts to c o n stru e a n eo -p rag m atist aesthetics.

Interpretation

P erh a p s th e m o st in flu en tial versio n o f an ti-fo u n d a tio n a lism is associ­

a te d w ith s o m e th in g th a t co u ld be called th e »in terp retiv e tu rn « in c o n te m ­ p o ra ry p h ilo s o p h y (see Hiley, B o h m a n & S h u s te rm a n 19 91). E sp ecially w ith in re c e n t A nglo-A m erican p h ilo so p h y this tu rn to in te rp re ta tio n a n d h e rm e n e u tic s has b e e n w elcom ed as an a n tid o te to various form s o f e m p iri­

cism , a n d it is c h a rac te ristic o f d iffe re n t versions o f »post-analytic« p h ilo so ­ phy. T h is way o f u n d e rs ta n d in g th e lessons o f an ti-fo u n d a tio n a lism is to say th a t in te r p r e ta tio n »goes all th e way«; th e r e a re n o » b ru te facts« o r any im m e d ia te access to reality. Everything we u n d e rs ta n d is, th e a rg u m e n t goes, in o n e way o r a n o th e r m e d ia te d th ro u g h o u r in te rp re ta tio n s o r »cognitive schem es«. C o nsequently, th e id e a is th a t we d o n o t only in te r p r e t th in g s o r texts th a t a re som eh o w o b scu re o r am b ig u o u s, b u t th a t » in te rp re ta tio n b e ­ gins a t ho m e« (to use D o n a ld D av id so n ’s p h ra s e ). T his a m o u n ts to claim ­ in g th a t all in te llig e n t behaviour, even o u r re la tio n to o u r native to n g u e a n d th u s to th e w orld is b ase d o n in te rp re ta tio n .

S h u sterm an has characterised such a view as hermeneutic universalism a n d d efin e s it as follows: it is th e view th a t »simply to perceive, re ad , u n d e rs ta n d , o r b eh a v e in tellig e n tly a t all is already, a n d m u st always be, to in te rp re t«

(S h u ste rm a n 1991, 102).

This k in d o f universalism builds u p o n the idea o f th e h e rm e n e u tic circle in its m o st g e n e ra l sense: all u n d e rs ta n d in g is in te rp re ta tio n , a n d every new in te rp re ta tio n always p resupposes an already in te rp re te d starting p oint. T h u s we have n o re c o u rse to an » u n in te rp re te d reality« o u tsid e th e circle, a n d o u r h o riz o n o r persp ectiv e always already lim its o u r u n d e r s ta n d in g .1 W h a t we sh o u ld insist o n is th e »universality o f th e h e rm e n e u tic p ro b lem « .

T h e c e n tra l a rg u m e n t fo r » h e rm e n e u tic universalism « goes as follows:

1) all u n d e rs ta n d in g is linguistic an d

2) all ling uistic u n d e rs ta n d in g entails in te rp re ta tio n o r » deco d in g « o f signs (see S h u ste rm a n 1991, 115).

I n te rp re ta tio n , in sh o rt, is see n as som e k in d o f e x p la n a tio n o f how we ca n u n d e r s ta n d lan g u ag e (a n d th ere b y o th e r p e o p le , art, etc.). T h e m a jo r p ro b le m w ith this k in d o f view is th a t th e use o f su ch an expansive n o tio n o f in te rp re ta tio n e ith e r

a) m akes » in te rp re ta tio n « an em pty catch-all w ord (by m ak in g it im ­ p ossible to c o n tra st u n d e rs ta n d in g a n d in te rp re ta tio n ) , o r

b) over-intellectualises o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f lan gu age as well as o f a rt by m o d e llin g it o n the in te rp re ta tio n o f difficult texts with h id d e n m eanings.

As S h u ste rm a n (1991, 113) po in ts o u t, such h e rm e n e u tic universalism is a version o f w h a tjo h n Dewey called » intellectualism «, a n d w hich h e c o n ­ s id e re d a m ajo r p ro b le m o f W estern philosophy. In his p a p e r » B en eath In ­ te rp re ta tio n « (1991) S h u ste rm a n shows how so m e o f th e m ain a rg u m e n ts fo r su ch universalism ca n be c o n fro n te d . H e m a in ta in s th a t in te rp re ta tio n is ch aracteristically linguistic, w hereas u n d e rs ta n d in g is o ften tacit: »while u n d e rs ta n d in g is freq u en tly a m a tte r o f [...] u n p ro b le m a tic h a n d lin g o f w hat we e n c o u n te r, in te rp re ta tio n characteristically involves a p ro b le m situation«

(S h u sterm an 1991,126). H e re S husterm an is partly draw ing o n W ittgenstein, w ho insists o n th e in trin sic problem -solving c h a ra c te r o f in te rp re ta tio n by c o n tra stin g it to im m e d ia te u n d e rs ta n d in g .

1 A m ajo r C o n tin en tal b a c k g ro u n d in fluence h e re is o f course N ietzsche, whose perspectivism an d idea o f th e re being »no facts, only interpretations« is frequently cited in sup p o rt o f different form s o f herm eneutic universalism (cf. S husterm an 1991, 103). O n th e analytic side, th e influence o f Q u in e ’s idea o f radical translation is difficult to overestim ate. T his o d d couple should m ake us realise th a t th e re are en o rm o u s differences am ong th e philosophical views S husterm an subsum es u n d e r th e title o f h e rm e n e u tic universalism ; th e re are, however, also in te re stin g a n d su rp risin g sim ilarities betw een them .

Between Intellectualism and »Somaesthetics«

W h a t S h u ste rm a n (1991, 104) arg u es is th a t » in te rp re ta tio n is b e tte r served by letting it leave room for som ething else (b en eath o r befo re it) «. W hat th en , is this »som ething« b e n e a th o r b efo re in te rp re ta tio n ? S h u ste rm a n sug­

gests th a t it can be ch a rac te rised as o u r som atic ex p erien ce. B ut h e also uses th e term »reaction« to characterise a way o f u n d e rsta n d in g th a t is n o t an in­

te rp re ta tio n .2

Experience

S h u ste rm a n w ants to c o u n te r th e claim s o f h e rm e n e u tic universalism by d ev elo p in g a p ra g m a tist an ti-foundationalism : h e wants to em p h asize th e ro le o f s p o n ta n e o u s re a c tio n s a n d in stin c tiv e b e h a v io u r as in d ic a tiv e o f u n d e rs ta n d in g , a n d to c o n tra st this w ith in te rp re ta tio n . So fa r I am in a g re e ­ m e n t w ith S h u sterm an : however, I th in k h e gets in to serious p ro b le m s w h en h e goes o n to eq u a te this idea o f re actio n a n d im m ediate u n d e rs ta n d in g with th a t o f an e x p e rie n c e .

S h u s te rm a n w ishes to m ak e a case fo r » p re refle ctiv e, n o n lin g u is tic e x p e rie n c e a n d u n d e rsta n d in g « (S h u ste rm a n 1991, 119). T h is k in d o f ex­

p erie n c e , S h u ste rm an thinks, is best th em atized in classical p rag m atism , a n d especially in D ew ey’s philosophy. S h u ste rm a n starts his ap o lo g y fo r Dewey in Pragmatist Aesthetics (1992), a n d has c o n tin u e d this re h a b ilita tio n in his m o st re c e n t p u b licatio n s, a p a p e r ca lled (ironically) »T he E n d o f A esth etic E x p erie n ce« (S h u ste rm a n 1997a) a n d his new b o o k Practicing Philosophy:

Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (S h u sterm an 1997b).

D ew ey’s p h ilo s o p h y , S h u s te r m a n (1 9 9 7 b , 171) th in k s , e x p r e s s e s

»pragm atism ’s trad itio n al co n c ern with th e som atic a n d non-discursive«, a n d it is this tra d itio n th a t h e wants to re h a b ilita te . C o n tin u in g o n th e lines o f Dewey, S h u ste rm a n insists th a t w hat is b e n e a th o r b efo re in te rp re ta tio n is, in th e last in sta n c e , o u r som atic ex isten c e, w h a t Dewey calls » an im al life below th e h u m a n scale«, o r th e »live creatu re « th a t in tera cts w ith th e w orld.

T his in te ra c tio n , b o th Dewey a n d S h u ste rm a n th in k , is b e st c h a ra c te rise d as » experience« .

In Dewey’s sp irit S h u ste rm a n claim s th a t th e inv o lv em en t o f th e e m ­ b o d ie d su b ject w ith th e w orld is at its clea rest w hen a rt a n d th e ae sth e tic are c o n c e rn e d . T h u s it is precisely in term s o f th e aesth etic a n d th e so m atic th a t

2 An in te rp re tatio n , S husterm an (1991, 127) says, characteristically expresses itself in a linguistic form ; »understanding, on th e o th e r han d , does n o t req u ire linguistic a rtic u la tio n . A p r o p e r re a c tio n ... may be e n o u g h to in d ic a te th a t o n e has understood.«

th e n o tio n o f e x p e rie n c e sh o u ld be a rtic u la te d (S h u sterm an 1997b, 161).

T h is is b ec au se »the ae sth e tic is c e n tra l to th e re alm o f e x p e rie n c e d value«

as S h u ste rm a n (1997b, 166) p u ts it.

T his, S h u ste rm a n thinks, is so m e th in g th a t especially analytic a e s th e t­

ics has m issed, since it has c o n c e n tra te d alm o st en tire ly o n q u estio n s o f se­

m an tics a n d d e m a rc a tio n (i.e., th e m e a n in g a n d »languages« o f a rt a n d th e d e fin itio n o f a rt). In m o st analytical ae sth e tic s, S h u s te rm a n (1997a, 38) claim s, »felt e x p e rie n c e is virtually ig n o re d a n d en tire ly s u b o rd in a te d to th ird -p e rso n sem an tic th e o rie s o f artistic sym bolization a n d its in te rp re ta ­ tion.«

S h u sterm an , instead, w ants to arg u e fo r w hat h e calls th e » p h e n o m e n o ­ logical« a n d »evaluative« dim en sio n s o f aesthetic e x p e rien ce a n d to c o n n e c t th e m to an em p h asis o n th e som atic, n o n -c o n c e p tu a l d im en sio n s o f n o n - in te rp re ta tiv e u n d e rs ta n d in g . T h u s, it is th e subjectively felt, »satisfyingly h e ig h te n e d , ab so rb in g , m e a n in g fu l a n d affective ex p e rien ce « (1997a, 38) th a t is im p o rta n t a n d th a t we sh o u ld em p h asize in ste a d o f th e physical o b ­ je c ts o f th a t e x p e rie n c e , S h u ste rm a n says. T his, o f co u rse, ech o es D ew ey’s

A rt as Experience.

I am m ainly sym p ath etic with S h u ste rm a n ’s aim s, b u t skeptical o f his a tte m p ts to re h a b ilita te th e n o tio n o f an »experien ce« . I th in k th a t by us­

in g this te rm h e ju s t takes over Dewey’s p h ilo so p h ical p ro b lem s. As we know, it is precisely Dewey’s ap p e al to »experience« th a t has b e e n co n sid ered p ro b ­ lem atic, even am o n g p h ilo so p h e rs sym pathetic to his p ro ject. F o r in sta n c e R ich ard R ortysays th a t Dewey sh o u ld have » d ro p p e d th e term ‘e x p e rie n c e ’«

in ste a d o f m ak in g it th e c e n tre o f his p h ilo so p h y (R orty 1994, 60; c ite d in S h u ste rm a n 1997b, 158). R orty (correctly, I th in k ) co nsid ers Dewey’s a p p e a l to e x p e rie n c e a k in d o f fo u n d a tio n a lism : Dewey claim s fo r e x a m p le th a t im m e d ia te e x p e rie n c e is th e » u n d erly in g quality« w h ich is th e reg u lativ e p rin c ip le in all th in k in g (see S h u sterm an 1997b, 165). S h u ste rm an acknow l­

ed g e s th ese traits o f fo u n d a tio n a lism in Dewey, b u t h e th in k s th a t h e can sh o w h o w to d is e n ta n g le th e id e a o f e x p e rie n c e fro m fo u n d a tio n a lis m . U n fo rtu n ately I d o n o t th in k h e is successful in this attem p t, a n d while I ag ree w ith S h u s te rm a n ’s criticism o f h e rm e n e u tic u n iv ersalism (as a sp ecies o f in telle ctu alism ) I d o also a g re e w ith R orty a n d o th e rs w ho th in k th a t th e n o tio n o f »ex p erien ce« is hopelessly confused.

Especially in his new est b o o k S h u ste rm a n goes to o fa r in his u rg e to c o m b a t th e in tellectu alism o f tra d itio n a l philosophy. S h u ste rm a n says th a t we sh o u ld give u p th e re sistan ce to »non-discursive som a« a n d th em atize, in philosophy, this som atic d im en sio n o f o u r being-in-the-world. So far, I have n o a r g u m e n t with him . I also th in k h e m ig h t have a p o in t w hen h e says th a t

Between Intellectualism and »Somaesthetics«

p h ilo so p h y ca n a n d sh o u ld b e c o m e » tran sfo rm atio n al in ste a d o f fo u n d a ­ tio n al« , th a t is, a k in d o f » cu ltu ral criticism th a t aim s to re c o n s tru c t o u r p ra ctices a n d in stitu tio n s so as to im pro ve th e e x p e rie n c e d qu ality o f o u r lives« (S h u sterm an 1997b, 157). However, S h u ste rm an th e n goes o n to id e n ­ tify this » ex p e rie n c e d quality« w ith som atic ex p e rie n c e , w hich ca n b e im ­ p ro v e d by d if f e r e n t »bodily p ra c tic e s« (h e m e n tio n s , fo r e x a m p le , th e A le x a n d e r te c h n iq u e , bodybu ild in g , aerobics, etc.). T h ese bodily p ractices, h e claim s, aim a t »a b e tte r h arm o n y o f lived ex p e rien ce « . S h u ste rm a n even w ants to » in teg ra te su ch bodily discip lines in to th e very p ra c tic e o f p h ilo so ­ phy« m ak in g p h ilo so p h y »a d iscip lin e o f e m b o d ie d life« as h e p u ts it (ibid., 176). T h u s h e co n c lu d e s th a t »im proved ex p e rie n c e , n o t o rig in a ry tru th , is th e u ltim a te p h ilo so p h ic al goal a n d crite rio n « (ibid., 157). S h u ste rm a n fur­

th e r th in k s th a t su c h bodily, im m e d ia te e x p e r ie n c e is b e s t a r tic u la te d th ro u g h the aesthetic. H e has even fig u re d o u t a n am e fo r this newly som atic, a e sth e tic p h ilo so p h ic a l practice: h e calls it somaesthetics.

W hile I ca n a p p re c ia te S h u s te rm a n ’s m issionary zeal a n d re g a rd his w ritin g as a k in d o f m an ifesto (w hich explains th e rh e to ric a l e x a g g e ra tio n ) I d o n o t th in k h e is p hilosoph ically convincing. Ironically e n o u g h h e is very persuasive w h e n criticizing th e vestiges o f fo u n d a tio n a lism in Dewey, b u t w h e n it co m es to d ev e lo p in g an altern ativ e h e offers his »som aesthetics«

m o re o f less w ith o u t a rg u m e n t. In d e e d , as we shall p re sen tly see, w h e n h e a tte m p ts to p h ilo so p h ic ally e la b o ra te th e n o tio n o f » e x p e rie n c e « h e b e ­ com es deeply e n m e sh e d in th e k in d o f dualism s h e attem p ts to free p h ilo so ­ p h y fro m , a n d is driven dan g ero u sly close to so m e th in g th a t co u ld b e called

» so m atic fo u n d a tio n a lis m « . T h a t is, h e is n o t c o n t e n t w ith w a n tin g to th e m a tiz e th e bo dily d im e n sio n o f o u r life, b u t w ants to m ak e it th e p rim e focus b o th o f p h ilo so p h y a n d o f life. However, h e re h e m akes a m istake: a criticism o f in telle ctu alism d oes n o t m e a n th a t we sh o u ld have to e m b ra c e its d ia m e tr ic o p p o s ite a n d a s s e rt th e p rim a c y o f th e so m a . A c tu a lly , S h u ste rm a n m akes th e sam e k in d o f m istake as th e h e rm e n e u tic universal- ists, only th e o th e r way a ro u n d .

S h u ste rm a n , by a p p e a lin g to th e ae sth e tic e x p e rie n c e , tries to assert so m eth in g th a t R ichard W ollheim has called »the suprem acy o f life over art«.

T h e r e is n o th in g intrinsically w ro n g w ith this view, b u t as W o llh eim n o tes, th e p ro b le m w ith is to » u n d e rsta n d ... th e id ea in such a way as to fall n e i­

th e r in to triviality o r e rro r« (W ollheim 1980, 99-100). However, I th in k th a t so m e o f S h u s te rm a n ’s views are b o th trivial a n d e rro n e o u s ; th e m a in re a ­ son fo r this is th e way h e drives a w edge b etw een th e in te lle c t a n d th e som a, in a very classical d u alist m an n er, in spite o f his lip-service to th e o p p o site.

S h u ste rm a n is rig h t w h en saying th a t we s h o u ld realise th e im p o rta n c e o f th e n o n-discursiv e a n d som atic d im e n sio n o f o u r in te ra c tio n w ith th e w orld, a n d th a t it is especially im p o rta n t w h en we are c o n c e rn e d w ith th e p h ilo so p h y o f a r t a n d aesthetics. N evertheless, I d o n o t th in k we have to follow S h u ste rm a n ’s som atic tu rn an d eq u a te the u n in te rp re te d with som atic e x p e rien ce . T h e reaso n fo r this is th a t th ere is a philosophically viable m idd le ro a d b etw e en h e rm e n e u tic universalism a n d som atic fo u n d a tio n a lism , b e ­ tw een intellectu alism a n d »som aesthetics«, a n d this is, p e rh a p s n o t very su r­

prisingly, to b e fo u n d in th e la te r p h ilo so p h y o f W ittgenstein .

L e t m e, in th e tim e th a t rem ain s, briefly o u tlin e so m e m a in p o in ts o f such an alternative. W ittgenstein is, as we already m e n tio n e d , an a rd e n t critic o f th e k in d o f in tellectu alism th a t is m an ife ste d as h e rm e n e u tic un iv ersal­

ism. B u t I th in k h e can also give an altern ativ e to Dewey’s a n d S h u s te rm a n ’s p rag m atist philoso phy o f ex p erien ce. In this con tex t, this alternative can best be sk e tc h e d o u t by e la b o ra tin g th e term »reaction«.

Reaction

H ow th e n , is this altern ativ e to be u n d e rsto o d ?

L e t us first lo o k a t W ittg e n ste in ’s re la tio n to th e claim s o f h e r m e n e u ­ tic universalism . It is cle a r th a t W ittg en stein is o p p o s e d to th e id e a th a t u n ­ d e rs ta n d in g always is, o r re q u ires, in te rp re ta tio n . E stablishing a c o n tra s t b e­

tw een im m e d ia te u n d e r s ta n d in g a n d in te rp re ta tio n is very im p o rta n t fo r W ittg en stein , since it is c e n tra l fo r in stan ce to w hat h e says a b o u t th e c o n ­ c e p t o f »follow ing a rule«; th e re certain ly is such a th in g as a way o f a c tin g th a t is g ro u n d e d in in te rp re ta tio n , b u t n o t all rule-follow ing can b e u n d e r ­ sto o d in su c h a way - in stead , th e re m u st be cases w h e re we follow th e ru le unhesitantly, w ith o u t any in te rp re ta tio n (see, e.g., W ittgenstein 1958, § 201).

W ittg en stein thus o p p o ses w hat co u ld be called th e m ythology o f in ­ te rp re ta tio n : th e view th a t linguistic u n d e rs ta n d in g m u st always b e a m a tte r o f d e c o d in g o r in te rp re tin g . W ittg e n ste in ’s way o f c o u n te rin g this m y th ol­

ogy is to say th a t la n g u a g e c a n n o t be b a se d o n th in k in g . R a th e r, it is g ro u n d e d in o u r form s o f life, in o u r instinctive b e h a v io u r a n d n a tu ra l re ­ ac tio n s - th a t is, o u r e m b o d ie d ex isten ce as a c e rta in k in d o f c re a tu re . H e says th a t we d o »naturally« u n d e rs ta n d ce rtain ru les j u s t by b e in g given ex­

am ples, ju s t as we naturally u n d e rs ta n d a p o in tin g gesture; »and u n d e rs ta n d ­ in g h e r e m ean s reactin g « (W ittgen stein 1969a, 141). N o a c t o f in n er, lab o ­ rio u s in te rp re ta tio n is involved.

Betiveen Intellectualism and, »Somaesthetics«

W hat is even m o re in teresting from o u r p o in t o f view is th a t W ittgenstein also m akes a sim ilar p o in t in his lectures o n aesthetics, w here h e says: »Per­

hap s th e m ost im p o rta n t th in g in c o n n e c tio n with aesthetics is w hat m ay be called ae sth e tic reactions« (W ittgenstein 1966, 13). T h e re w ou ld b e m u ch to say a b o u t th e id ea o f aesthetic reactions (see fu rth e r S äätelä 1995 8c Säätelä 1998, ch. 3), b u t w hat I w ant to em ph asize h e r e is th a t W ittg e n s te in ’s u se o f this n o tio n m u st b e see n as a way p o in tin g o u t th a t o u r p rim a ry re la tio n to a r t a n d o th e r ae sth e tic p h e n o m e n a c a n n o t be an in te rp re ta tiv e o n e . H ow ­ ever, this does n o t m e a n th a t W ittg en stein is ig n o rin g th e ro le o f re a so n a n d th in k in g in th e arts o r in o u r lives.

Even th o u g h critical o f h e rm e n e u tic universalism , W ittg e n ste in is to larg e e x te n t in a c c o rd with th e c e n tra l insights o f h e rm e n e u tic p hilosophy, fo r in stan ce w hen in sisting o n th e im p o rta n c e o f a c o n te x t o r h o riz o n fo r o u r u n d e r s ta n d in g of, fo r in stan ce, a s e n te n c e o r sign. In fact, W ittg en stein also claim s th a t a rt a n d artistic ap p reciatio n , in a very sim ilar way as lan gu age, ca n only b e m a d e sense o f by p lacin g it in th e c u ltu ra l c o n te x t to w hich it b elo n g s a n d w hich shapes it.

However, W ittg en stein does n o t a c c e p t the id e a o f en d less in te rp re ta ­ tion, im plicit in th e id ea o f th e h e rm e n e u tic circle. In stead , th e c o n te x t p re ­ re q u isite fo r u n d e rs ta n d in g is given to us byways o f b eh a v in g a n d re a c tin g , a n d u ltim ately by a fo rm o f life. T his m ean s th a t n o o b je c t ca n b e p ro p e rly u n d e rs to o d if we c a n n o t in o n e way o r a n o th e r p a rtic ip a te in th e c o m p li­

ca te d set o f activities o r practices to w hich it belongs. In this sen se p ra ctice, o r ways o f re a c tin g a n d acting, give us th e h o riz o n w ithin w hich a n o b je c t b eco m es m ean in g fu l. T his is w hat has b e e n called W ittg e n ste in ’s »one-step h e rm e n e u tic s « .3 In stea d o f a circu larity o f in te rp re ta tio n , we have a circ u ­ larity betw een u n d e rsta n d in g a n d doin g, th a t is, p a rtic ip a tin g in th e re lev an t practices. T h u s the »oscillations o f h erm e n eu tical th eo ry are short-circuited«

(A ck erm an n 1988, 18) w hen we re a c h a way o f g ra sp in g th a t is n o t an in te r­

p re ta tio n , th a t is, w h en we have re a c h e d ac tio n o r re a c tio n . In th e case o f ae sth e tic s a n d a p p re c ia tio n o f art, this s to p p in g p o in t can b e ca lled a n aes­

th e tic re actio n . W h e n we, in a p a rtic u la r case, have re a c h e d a e sth e tic re a c ­ tions, th e q u e stio n o f in te rp re ta tio n d o es n o t arise an y m o re.

W h e n it co m es to a e sth e tic s a n d a r t this d e m a n d fo r p a r tic ip a tio n m ean s a d e m a n d th a t we su b m it ourselves to th e o b je c t a n d re a c t to w h at we perceive. T his d e m a n d fo r a n im m e d ia te re a c tio n also m e a n s th a t th e

3 This term is in tro d u c ed by R obert A ckerm ann, who m aintains th a t »W ittgenstein’s key to p h ilo s o p h ic a l analysis was to d isc o v er a n etw o rk o f c le a r h o riz o n s o f u n d e rsta n d in g th a t are im plicit in o u r language« (A ckerm ann 1988, 9).

sig n ifican ce o f a r t a n d o th e r ae sth e tic p h e n o m e n a c a n n o t b e a p p re c ia te d fro m so m e e x te rn a lise d in te rp re ta tiv e distance.

Experience or Reaction ?

T h is k in d o f view (as W ittg en stein in d e e d h im se lf p o in ts o u t in a dif­

f e r e n t c o n te x t) begins to s o u n d like p ra g m a tism 4, a n d this way o f p u ttin g th e W ittg en stein ian p o sitio n shows th a t it in d e e d has m any affinities w ith S h u ste rm a n ’s criticism o f h e rm e n e u tic universalism . However, a n im p o rta n t d iffe re n c e b etw een this view a n d such a p ra g m a tism is th a t W ittg en stein is very carefu l o f n o t re so rtin g to talk a b o u t » ex p erien ce« in this c o n te x t. A n d this is n o t m erely a v erbal q u ib b le o r a m a tte r o f ch o o sin g d iffe re n t w ords to d esc rib e th e sam e p h e n o m e n o n .

T h e m ain d iffe re n c e s b etw e en S h u s te rm a n ’s a n d Dewey’s a p p e a l to e x p e rie n c e a n d th e W ittg en stein ian ap p e a l to re a c tio n s b e c o m e c le a r if we lo o k clo ser at th e jo b th ese n o tio n s a re s u p p o se d to d o in th e ir a rg u m e n t.

As we m e n tio n e d b efo re, S h u ste rm a n q u ite convincingly b rin g s o u t so m e serio u s p h ilo so p h ic a l p ro b lem s in Dewey’s ap p e a l to e x p e rie n c e . H ow ever, w h e n we lo o k clo ser a t S h u s te rm a n ’s own use o f this term , we fin d th a t h e in fact re p e a ts Dewey’s m istakes. T his is clearly to b e seen in a th o u g h t-ex - p e r im e n t th a t S h u ste rm a n in tro d u c e s in his p a p e r »T he E n d o f A e sth etic E x p erie n ce« . H e re S h u ste rm a n w ants us to im ag in e a science-fiction situa­

tio n , w h e re we a re c o n fro n te d w ith »two visually id e n tic a l a r t viewers w ho o ffe r id e n tic a l in te rp re ta tio n s o f th e very p o w e rfu l p a in tin g s a n d p o e m s b e fo re them «. O n e o f th ese a rt viewers is a h u m a n b ein g , w hile th e o th e r is a »cyborg«,5 a n d th e only d iffe ren c e b etw een th ese two is th a t th e »cyborg«

lacks th e h u m a n capacity to feel (S h u sterm an 1997a, 37). T h is m ean s th a t

»even if th e cy b o rg ’s in te rp re ta tiv e p ro p o sitio n s w ere descriptively m o re a c c u ra te th a n th e h u m a n b e in g ’s, we w ould still say th a t th e h u m a n ’s g e n ­ e ra l re sp o n se to a r t was s u p e rio r a n d th a t th e cyborg, since h e feels abso­

lutely n o th in g , d o es n o t really grasp w hat a r t is all ab o u t« (ibid., 38).

Now, S h u s te rm a n ’s science fictio n story is ra th e r feeble, b u t I th in k h e is a fte r an im p o rta n t p o in t w h en em p h asiz in g th a t w orks o f a r t m ak e d e ­

4 W ittgenstein 1969, § 422. H e does, however, add th e following rem ark: »h ere I am b ein g thw arted by a kind o f Weltanschauung«.

5 S husterm an in fact messes up the science-fiction term inology here. W hat he wants to talk ab o u t is n o t a cyborg, w hich is a cybernetic organism (in this case a h u m a n whose n orm al biological capability is e n h a n ce d by cybernetic devices), b u t ra th e r an an d ro id , a ro b o t which can be th o u g h t o f as a »visually indiscernible« replica o f a h u m a n being.

Between Intellectualism and »Somaesthetics«

m an d s o u r capacities fo r feeling, u n d e r s ta n d in g a n d re sp o n se a n d th a t we m u st su b m it to th ese d e m a n d s in o rd e r to a p p re c ia te a rt. T h e p ro b le m is th a t his p re o c c u p a tio n w ith »experien ce« leads h im astray. In S h u s te rm a n ’s fab le th e only d iffe re n c e b etw e en th ese »indiscernible« a r t view ers is th e capacity to feel, b u t it is precisely this capacity th a t m akes th e h u m a n b e in g ’s re sp o n se to a r t »superior« to th a t o f th e »cyborg’s«. However, this capacity is d e sc rib e d only in term s o f a qualitative d iffe ren c e o f e x p e rie n c e , w hich is fu r th e r u n d e rs to o d as som e s o rt o f introspectiv ely available p riv ate o cc u r­

re n ce.

In d e e d , S h u s te rm a n ’s a tte m p t to e la b o ra te th e id e a o f » aesth etic ex­

perience« by using this story shows th a t h e in h erits all the p h ilo so p h ical p ro b ­ lem s th a t Dewey struggled with: an ex p e rien ce , fo r S h u sterm an , is som e k in d o f ineffable a n d private sen satio n th a t m u st b e c h a ra c te rise d in p u re ly p h e ­ no m en o lo g ical term s (he talks a b o u t »feeling o r savoring a r t ’s q u alia » [ibid., 37]).

S h u s te rm a n ’s m ain p ro b le m is th a t

1 ) h e th in k s th a t th e a p p re c ia tio n o f a w ork o r an o b je c t consists in th e o b je c t’s in d u c in g o r ca u sin g in us a c e rta in e x p e rie n c e ,

2) a n d th e n conceives o f this e x p e rie n c e in a b stra c tio n fro m th e w ork o r o b je c t th a t gives rise to it.

T h e re s u lt is th a t th e value o f a w ork o r o b ject is co n c eiv ed o f as re sid ­ in g in its effects, a n d these effects a re th o u g h t to have a n a tu re in d e p e n d e n t o f th e o b ject th a t causes th e m .“ T h u s S h u ste rm a n th in k s th a t w h a t is valu­

ab le a b o u t th e ae sth e tic e x p e rie n c e is precisely its im m e d ia te p h e n o m e n o ­ logical a n d som atic ch aracteristics, th e » h e ig h te n e d aw areness« , th e »ex­

p e rie n c e o f qu alia«, a n d so on.

B u t this way o f re p re s e n tin g artistic o r ae sth etic v alue is ce rtain ly m is­

taken . T h e re is n o th in g w ro n g in saying th a t th e only way o f a p p re c ia tin g a w ork o f a rt is to e x p e rie n c e it w ith u n d e rs ta n d in g , b u t this d o es not m e a n so m e th in g like » e x p e rie n c in g th e qualia« o f th e work. In ste a d , w h a t is im ­ p o rta n t is th a t we re a c t to th e o b ject in a way th a t shows th a t we u n d e rs ta n d . In fact, W ittg e n ste in ’s criticism o f th e id e a o f »private« lan g u ag e s a n d o b ­ je c ts can be directly a p p lie d to S h u s te rm a n ’s ap p e a l to » ae sth e tic e x p e ri­

ence«. If W ittg en stein is c o rre c t, as I th in k h e is, we sh o u ld n o t e x p e c t p h e ­ n o m e n o lo g ic a l studies o f ex p e rien ce s, w hich are g ro u n d e d o n th e first-per- son case, to b e h e lp fu l h ere; in stead we m u st ask a b o u t th e pu blicly observ­

able c rite ria fo r th e ap p lica tio n o f term s such as » ex p erien ce« . M oreover, th ese c rite ria c a n n o t be fo u n d by an in tro sp ectiv e in vestigatio n o f o u r own 6 This m eans th a t S husterm an is rep e atin g a mistake th a t is characteristic o f classical

expression th eo ries o f art (cf. B udd 1992, 445).

p h e n o m e n a l e x p e rie n c e ; in stead , we n e e d a c o n c e p tu a l in q u iry th a t issues in g ra m m a tica l rem arks. W ittg e n ste in ’s ap p e a l to re actio n s m u st b e u n d e r ­ sto o d as su ch a g ra m m a tica l re m a rk , also in th e c o n te x t o f aesthetics.

A reactio n is s o m e th in g th a t befalls us a n d has ce rtain p h e n o m e n a l a n d som atic qualities; a n d in this re sp e c t it co u ld be d esc rib ed as an ex p e rien ce . However, w h en W ittgenstein talks a b o u t aesth etic reactio ns, h e m akes a very im p o rta n t a d d itio n a l p o in t: h e says th a t su ch re a c tio n s are n o t m erely ex­

p e rie n c e s o r feelings, b u t th a t they are d ire c te d tow ards an o b je c t (i.e., they take o n an in te n tio n a l o b je c t). T his m ean s th a t th e re a c tio n , even if it is an im m e d ia te ex p e rie n c e , ca n noč be c o n sid e re d in a b stra c tio n o f its ob ject. It is n o t m erely a private sen sa tio n o r e x p e rie n c e o f q ualia, b u t m a n ife ste d by w h a t we a re p re p a re d to say o r d o a b o u t the o b ject. C o n seq u en tly , w h a t m akes a re a c tio n an aesthetic re a c tio n is its c o n te x t a n d its d ire c te d n e ss to­

w ard an o b je c t o f a p ec u lia r k in d , n o t, as S h u ste rm an suggests, th e p h e n o m ­ e n a l ch a rac te ristic s o f th e e x p e rie n c e itself.

If we c o n c e n tra te o n e x p e rien ce s, we risk e n d in g u p talking a b o u t th e effects o f objects o n subjects. In c o n tra st, th e n o tio n o f ae sth e tic reactions m akes it possible to take n o te b o th o f th e » p h en o m en o lo g ica l« a n d th e »se­

m antic« (o r th e »som atic« a n d »intellectual«) sides o f o u r re la tio n to w orks o f a r t a n d o th e r objects o f ae sth e tic in tere st. T h u s we c o u ld c o n c lu d e by saying th a t W ittg en stein has b o th a th e ra p e u tic a n d an descrip tiv e e n d in m in d w h e n r e m in d in g us o f th e im p o rta n c e o f o u r re a c tio n s , sin ce this n o tio n (if rig h tly a n d fully e la b o ra te d ) m akes it p o ssib le to d e sc rib e th e im p o rta n t ro le o f th e ae sth e tic in o u r lives w ith o u t re la p sin g e ith e r in to th e in te lle c tu a lis m o f h e r m e n e u tic u n iv ersa lism o r th e fo u n d a tio n a lis m o f som aesthetics.

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