(1)Prosojnice s predavanj pri predmetu Prvoosebno raziskovanje &Scaron;tudijsko gradivo za &scaron;tudente 1

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(1)Prosojnice s predavanj pri predmetu Prvoosebno raziskovanje Študijsko gradivo za študente 1. letnika študijskega programa Kognitivna znanost Izr. prof. dr. Urban Kordeš Asist. Ema Demšar 2020.

(2) Kazalo predavanj • • • • • • • •. 1. Uvodno predavanje (str. 3) 2. Fenomenologija: Od naravne k fenomenološki naravnanosti (str. 34) 3. Fenomenologija: Relevantnost za kognitivno znanost in nekaj sodobnih študij (str. 59) 4. Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik (str. 130) 5. Združevanje prvoosebnih in tretjeosebnih pristopov v raziskovanju duševnosti: Nevrofenomenologija (str. 169) 6. Problemi v raziskovanju doživljanja (str. 216) 7. Kratek zgodovinski pregled raziskovanja doživljanja (str. 245) 8. Ponovitev osnovnih konceptov (str. 305). Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 2.

(3) Uvodno predavanje 1. predavanje. Prvoosebno raziskovanje Marec 2020. Urban Kordeš Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 3.

(4) Kaj je duševnost? Kako lahko kaj zvemo o njej? 4 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(5) Kaj je duševnost? Vedenje? 5 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(6) Kaj je duševnost? Vedenje? 6 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(7) Kaj je duševnost? Možgani? Nevronska aktivnost? 7 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(8) Kaj je duševnost? Možgani? Nevronska aktivnost? 8 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(9) “Kako doživljamo mišljenje, vemo vsi, zdaj pa znanost počasi odkriva možgansko podstat tega procesa” –M. Gazzaniga. 9 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(10) “Human beings talk to themselves every moment of the waking day. Most readers of this sentence are doing it now. It becomes a little clearer with difficult-to-say words, like infundibulum' or methylparabine'. In fact, we talk to ourselves during dreams, and there is even evidence for inner speech during deep sleep, the most unconscious state we normally encounter. Overt speech takes up perhaps a tenth of the waking day; but inner speech goes on all the time.”. –Bernard Baars (kognitivni znanstvnik, avtor teorije Global Work Space) (Povzeto iz: Hurlburt, Psychology Today) 10 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(11) “When we utter a word, we cannot help but mentally see an image of its written version. In our heads, what we have said is that sequence of written symbols. When we say 'dog,' a little picture of that word flashes through our minds, Sesame Street-style.. Imagine saying 'dog' and only thinking of a canine, but not thinking of the written word. If you're reading this book, it follows that you couldn't pull this off even at gunpoint.”. –John McWhorter (jezikoslovec, kognitivni znanstvnik) (Povzeto iz: Hurlburt, Psychology Today) 11 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(12) “I'm pretty sure that Baars and McWhorter are entirely mistaken. Maybe Baars talks to himself all the time, and maybe McWhorter himself sees images of written words while he talks (there's reason to be skeptical of both claims), but I've investigated such things as carefully as I know how and become convinced that most people (let alone all people) do not do such things.”. –R. Hurlburt, Psychology Today. 12 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(13) Richard Feynman. 13 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(14) Richard Feynman. “...while some people see vivid mental pictures, for others the idea is not felt to be mental pictures, but rather symbols of facts. In people with low pictorial imagery, they would remember their breakfast table but they could not see it.’’. Francis Galton, in Inquiries into Human Faculty and Development 14 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(15) MOŽGANI / NEVRONSKA AKTIVNOST. ? DOŽIVLJANJE, ZAVEST. Kaj je duševnost? Kako lahko kaj zvemo o njej?. VEDENJE 15. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(16) PRVA SPOZNANJA O DOŽIVLJANJU •. Predpostavljamo, da vsi doživljajo tako kot jaz. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 16.

(17) PRVA SPOZNANJA O DOŽIVLJANJU •. Predpostavljamo, da vsi doživljajo tako kot jaz. •. Vedenje ne korelira dobro z doživljanjem. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 17.

(18) Kako razmišlja Temple Grandin?. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 18.

(19) Doživljanje v komunikaciji. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 19.

(20) PRVA SPOZNANJA O DOŽIVLJANJU •. Predpostavljamo, da vsi doživljajo tako kot jaz. •. Vedenje ne korelira dobro z doživljanjem. •. Usklajeno vedenje (npr. komuniciranje) ni znak za usklajeno doživljanje. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 20.

(21) KORELATI ČESA? Kognitivna nevroznanost opazi, da ne razume doživljanja. 1996: Francisco Varela Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem The second challenge that my proposal represents is that of a call for transforming the style and values of the research community itself. Unless we accept that at this point in intellectual and scientific history that some radical re-learning is necessary, we cannot hope to move forward in the compulsive history of the ambivalent rejection-fascination with consciousness in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. My proposal implies that every good student of cognitive science who is also interested in issues at the level of mental experience, must inescapably attain a level of mastery in phenomenological examination in order to work seriously with first-person accounts. But this can only happen when the entire community adjusts itself to the corresponding acceptance of arguments, refereeing standards and editorial policies in major scientific journals, that can make this added competence an important dimension of a young researcher. To the long-standing tradition of objectivist science this sounds like anathema, and it is. But this is not a betrayal of science: it is a necessary extension and complement. Science and experience constrain and modify each other as in a dance. This is where the potential for transformation lies. It is also the key for the difficulties this position has found within the scientific community. It requires us to leave behind a certain image of how science is done, and to question a style of training in science which is part of the very fabric of our cultural identity.. 21.

(22) NEREŠLJIVI PROBLEMI RAZISKOVANJA DOŽIVLJANJA? •. Kako je biti netopir…drugi? / Problem nedostopnosti. •. Ko opazujem doživljanje, s tem spreminjam doživljanje / Napaka izkopavanja (excavation fallacy) itd. 22 Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(23) Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(24) Kaj je duševnost? Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(25) Kaj je duševnost? Možgani? Nevronska aktivnost? Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(26) Tavanje misli in mirovna omrežja. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(27) PRVA SPOZNANJA O DOŽIVLJANJU •. Predpostavljamo, da vsi doživljajo tako kot jaz. •. Vedenje ne korelira dobro z doživljanjem. •. Usklajeno vedenje (npr. komuniciranje) ni znak za usklajeno doživljanje. •. Nevronska aktivnost morda predstavlja korelate doživljanja, ampak tega ne moremo zagotovo trditi…dokler ne razumemo doživljanja. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 27.

(28) Doživljanje je povsod (Q Self, biznis, …). Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.





(33) OBVEZNOSTI IN OCENJEVANJE (1). Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 33.

(34) Fenomenologija: Od naravne k fenomenološki naravnanosti 2. predavanje. Prvoosebno raziskovanje April 2020. Ema Demšar Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 34.

(35) Kaj je doživljanje? Kako ga opazovati in opisovati?. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 35.

(36) Doživljajski podatki. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 36.

(37) Doživljajski podatki. •. Doživljajski podatki (ang. phenomenal / phenomenological data) = Odgovori na vprašanje Kako je biti jaz?. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 37.

(38) Nazaj k stvarem samim!. 38.

(39) Fenomenologija •. V sodobni filozofiji duha: Kakršen koli opis doživljanja s prvoosebnega gledišča.. •. Specifično področje znotraj filozofije: Filozofsko preučevanje strukture doživljanja.. •. Filozofska tradicija, ki se začne v Evropi v prvi polovici 20. stoletja z deli Edmunda Husserla.. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 39.

(40) Najvplivnejši predstavniki fenomenološke tradicije Jean-Paul Sartre. Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). (1905–1980). Martin Heidegger. Maurice MerleauPonty. (1889–1976). (1908–1961). Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 40.

(41) Kaj pomeni delati fenomenlogijo?. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20.

(42) Raymond Aron was spending a year at the French Institute in Berlin and studying Husserl simultaneously with preparing a historical thesis. When he came to Paris he spoke of Husserl to Sartre. We spent an evening together at the Bec de Gaz in the Rue Montparnasse. We ordered the speciality of the house, apricot cocktails; Aron said, pointing to his glass: ‘You see, my dear fellow, if you are a phenomenologist, you can talk about this cocktail and make philosophy out of it!’ Sartre turned pale with emotion at this. Here was just the thing he had been longing to achieve for years – to describe objects just as he saw and touched them, and extract philosophy from the process. (De Beauvoir, The Prime of Life) Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 42.

(43) Vaja: Kako doživljam ta paradižnik?. 43.

(44) Kaj opazimo?. 44.

(45) Kaj opazimo? ★ ★ ★ ★. občutek, da je to resničen paradižnik struktura in dinamika vidnega zaznavanja občutek možnosti utelešenostutelešenost, povezanost čutov ★ ★ ★. intersubjektivno, socialno, kulturno praktična in teoretska drža. 45.

(46) Fenomenologija vs. razlaganje doživljanja v kognitivni znanosti. 46.

(47) Fenomenologija vs. introspekcionizem Merleau-Ponty, in Phenomenology of Perception … [declares] that phenomenology is distinguished in all its characteristics from introspective psychology and that the difference in question is a difference in principle. Whereas the introspective psychologist considers consciousness as a mere sector of being, and tries to investigate this sector as the physicist tries to investigate the physical world, the phenomenologist realizes that consciousness ultimately calls for a transcendental clarification that goes beyond commonsense postulates and brings us face to face with the problem concerning the constitution of the world. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 59) v: Gallagher & Zahavi (2012). 47.

(48) Fenomenologija vs. introspekcionizem “[T]he objects of which we are “conscious”, are not simply in consciousness as in a box, so that they can merely be found in it and snatched at in it; … they are first constituted as being, what they are for us, and as what they count as for us, in varying forms of objective intention.” (Husserl, 2001, p. 275). 48.

(49) Naravna naravnanost •. vsakodnevna drža, zaznamovana z realističnimi predpostavkami o obstoju zunanjega sveta. 49.

(50) Naravna naravnanost “More than anything else the being of the world is obvious. It is so very obvious that no one would think of asserting it expressly in a proposition. After all, we have our continuous experience in which this world incessantly stands before our eyes, as existing without question.”. (Husserl: Cartesian Meditations) 50.

(51) Epoché (in fenomenološka redukcija) •. prehod iz naravne naravnanosti v fenomenološko naravnanost •. Kako? Tako, da v oklepaj postavimo sodbe o obstoju in naravi sveta, skupaj s svojim teoretskim znanjem o svetu:. ( naravna naravnanost ). 51.

(52) Epoché (in fenomenološka redukcija) •. prehod iz naravne naravnanosti v fenomenološko naravnanost •. Kako? Tako, da v oklepaj postavimo sodbe o obstoju in naravi sveta, skupaj s svojim teoretskim znanjem o svetu:. ( naravna naravnanost ). … kar pa ne pomeni, da tem sodbam in znanju pritrdimo ali nasprotujemo! ★ namen postavljanja v oklepaj: preučevati strukturo zavesti 52.

(53) Fenomenološka naravnanost “Meanwhile the world experienced in this reflectively grasped life goes on being for me (in a certain manner) ‘experienced’ as before, and with just the content it has at any particular time. It goes on appearing, as it appeared before … … the only difference is that I, as reflecting philosophically, no longer keep in effect (no longer accept) the natural believing in existence involved in experiencing the world – though that believing too is still there and grasped by my noticing regard.". (Husserl: Cartesian Meditations) 53.

(54) Fenomenološka naravnanost “the world … has now become for [the philosopher], in a quite peculiar sense, a phenomenon.”. (Husserl: Crisis) 54.

(55) Epoché (in fenomenološka redukcija) •. Kako ju izvesti v praksi?. 55.

(56) Epoché (in fenomenološka redukcija) “Perhaps the best formulation of the reduction is the one offered by Husserl’s assistant Eugen Fink when he spoke of a ‘wonder’ before the world. Reflection does not withdraw from the world toward the unity of consciousness as the foundation of the world; rather, it steps back in order to see transcendences spring forth and it loosens the intentional threads that connect us to the world in order to make them appear; it alone is consciousness of the world because it reveals the world as strange and paradoxical…..The most important lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction.” (Merlau-Ponty: Phenomenology of Perception). 56.

(57) Epoché (in fenomenološka redukcija). Depraz, N., Varela, F. J., & Vermersch, P. (Eds.). (2003). On becoming aware: A pragmatics of experiencing (Vol. 43). John Benjamins Publishing.. 57.

(58) Osnovna literatura in nadaljnje branje Depraz, N. (1999). The phenomenological reduction as praxis. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, 95– 110. Depraz, N., Varela, F. J., & Vermersch, P. (2003). On becoming aware: a pragmatics of experiencing. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Hammond, M., Howarth, J., & Keat, R. (1991). Understanding phenomenology. Oxford: Blackwell. Husserl, E. (2013). Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology. Springer Science & Business Media. Husserl, E. (1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published in 1954.) Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Original work published in 1952.) Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. (2012). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Routledge. 58.

(59) Fenomenologija: Relevantnost za kognitivno znanost in nekaj sodobnih študij 3. predavanje. Prvoosebno raziskovanje April 2020. Ema Demšar Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 59.

(60) … ponovitev osnovnih točk prejšnjega predavanja ….

(61) Najvplivnejši predstavniki fenomenološke tradicije Edmund Husserl. Jean-Paul Sartre. (1859–1938). (1905–1980). Martin Heidegger. Maurice MerleauPonty. (1889–1976). (1908–1961).

(62) Glavna ideja fenomenologije … •. povratek k doživljanju (izkustvu) z namenom opisati in preučiti strukturo zavesti in to, kako se v zavesti razkriva svet.

(63) Nazaj k stvarem samim!.

(64) Osnovni fenomenološki koncepti •. Naravna naravnanost •. •. Epoché •. •. Vsakodnevna drža, zaznamovana z realističnimi predpostavkami o obstoju zunanjega sveta.. V oklepaj postavimo naravno naravnanost — svoje sodbe o obstoju in naravi sveta, skupaj s svojim teoretskim znanjem o svetu.. Fenomenološka redukcija: sprememba drže, ki jo omogoči epoché, iz naravne drže / naravnanosti v fenomenološko naravnanost. •. Obrat fokusa z objekta doživljanja na doživljanje objekta..

(65) “Perhaps the best formulation of the reduction is the one offered by Husserl’s assistant Eugen Fink when he spoke of a ‘wonder’ before the world. Reflection does not withdraw from the world toward the unity of consciousness as the foundation of the world; rather, it steps back in order to see transcendences spring forth and it loosens the intentional threads that connect us to the world in order to make them appear; it alone is consciousness of the world because it reveals the world as strange and paradoxical. … The most important lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction.” (Merleau-Ponty: Phenomenology of Perception).

(66) … različni pristopi k izvedbi fenomenološke redukcije ….

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(74) Introspekcionizem. zavest. Fenomenologija.

(75) Introspekcionizem. Fenomenologija. zavest. zavest. zavest. zavest.

(76) Relevantnost fenomenologije za kognitivno znanost? •. Podroben opis doživljanja preiskovanih pojavov —> fenomenološka in konceptualna razjasnitev. ✴. •. Npr. “front-loading phenomenology“ (Gallagher, 2003, cf. Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012).. Združevanje prvoosebnih opisov doživljanja pojavov s tretjeosebnimi meritvami vedenja in nevrofiziološke aktivnosti. ✴. Nevrofenomenologija (Varela, 1996).. •. Opisovanje doživljanja duševnih motenj —> ustreznejše razumevanje psihopatologije.. •. Filozofija znanosti —> kritika naturalizma & znanstvenega realizma..


(78) Znanost in življenjski svet (nepogost in zelo specifičen) teoretski odnos do stvari v svetu … vs. (bolj vsakdanji in primaren) praktični odnos.

(79) Znanost in življenjski svet “The entire universe of science is constructed upon the lived world, and if we wish to think science rigorously, to appreciate precisely its sense and its scope, we must first awaken that experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression. […] To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is.” (Merleau-Ponty: Phenomenology of Perception).

(80) Življenjski svet. Svet znanosti. • svet, kot ga dejansko in konkretno doživljamo v vsakdanjem življenju. • objektivni znanstveni koncepti in teorije. – vedno izkušen z določenega gledišča: subjektivno in relativno. – skonstruiran skozi idealizacijo in abstrakcijo na podlagi življenjskega sveta. • uporabna orodja za razumevanje in napovedovanje življenjskega sveta (… in ne bolj natančne upodobitve resničnosti) Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology (1970).

(81) Življenjski svet. &. Svet znanosti. “[W]e have two different things: life-world and objective-scientific world, though of course [they are] related to each other. The knowledge of the objective-scientific world is ‘grounded’ in the self-evidence of the life-world. The latter is pregiven to the scientific worker, or the working community, as ground; yet, as they build upon this, what is built is something new, something different.” (Husserl: Crisis). Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology (1970).

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(83) svet, kot ga doživljamo.

(84) znanstveni koncepti. svet, kot ga doživljamo.

(85) Vir: www.lpp.si.

(86) Maja Blesić.

(87) Kje je zavest?!.

(88) “[E]ven when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioural functions in the vicinity of experience … there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?” (Chalmers, 1995).

(89) Fenomenologija + (kognitivna) znanost.

(90) Fenomenologija + (kognitivna) znanost. Francisco Varela. Shaun Gallagher. Dan Zahavi.


(92) Kaj opazimo v epochéju?.

(93) Kaj opazimo v epochéju? •. intencionalnost “Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be conscious of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum.” (Husserl: Cartesian Meditations) • •. noema: objekt, kot ga doživljam noesis: način doživljanja.

(94) Kaj opazimo v epochéju? •. kar doživljamo, vsebuje možnosti nadaljnjega doživljanja.

(95) Kaj opazimo v epochéju?. ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★. občutek, da je to resničen paradižnik struktura in dinamika vidnega zaznavanja občutek možnosti utelešenost, povezanost čutov intersubjektivno, socialno, kulturno praktična in teoretska drža.

(96) Kaj opazimo v epochéju? •. horizonti = možnosti doživljanja (zaznave).

(97) Kaj opazimo v epochéju? •. horizonti = možnosti doživljanja (zaznave) “Everywhere, apprehension includes in itself, by the mediation of a “sense”, empty horizons of “possible perceptions”; thus I can, at any given time, enter into a system of possible and, if I follow them up, actual, perceptual nexuses.” (Husserl: Ideas).

(98) Kaj opazimo v epochéju? •. horizonti = možnosti doživljanja (zaznave) “For example, there belongs to every external perception its reference from the ‘genuinely perceived’ sides of the object to the sides ‘also meant’ – not yet perceived, but only anticipated and, at first, with a non-intuitional emptiness (as the sides that are ‘coming’ now perceptually): a continuous protention, which, with each phase of the perception has a new sense. Furthermore, the perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as perceptions that we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we turned our eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one side, and so forth.” (Husserl: Cartesian Meditations).

(99) Kaj opazimo v epochéju? •. horizonti = možnosti doživljanja (zaznave) (… opazni ob kršenju pričakovanj).

(100) Kaj opazimo v epochéju? •. horizonti = možnosti doživljanja (zaznave) •. intersenzoričnost / transmodalnost. •. povezava z doživljanjem telesa, načinom utelešenosti. •. vsebuje ne le zaznavne, temveč tudi praktične možnosti delovanja. •. vpetost v intersubjektivni svet družbenih in kulturnih norm. •. tesna povezava z doživljanjem časa.

(101) Husserlova analiza časovne zavesti •. protenca: doživljanje, vezano na prihodnost: odprto, do neke mere nedoločeno pričakovanje vidikov zaznavanega objekta, ki bodo / bi lahko sledili temu, kar neposredno zaznavamo “zdaj”. •. retenca: doživljanje, vezano na pravkar minulo preteklost: zavedanje tega, kar je pravkar bilo.

(102) Husserlova analiza časovne zavesti … ko. izgovarjam. tele. besede … čas.

(103) Husserlova analiza časovne zavesti … ko. izgovarjam. tele. besede … čas. zdaj zavedanje tega, kar je pravkar bilo. RETENCA. nedoločeno (oz. delno določeno) pričakovanje tega, kar bo. PRAVTIS. PROTENCA. pasivna sinteza.

(104) Shematizacija časovne zavesti pri “objektih“, ki se odvijajo v času (npr. poslušanje povedi ali melodije).. Gallagher & Zahavi (2012).

(105) Kaj opazimo v epochéju?.

(106) Bivanjska občutja. Matthew Ratcliffe. Ratcliffe, M. (2005). The feeling of being. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12(8-9), 43-60..

(107) Ratcliffe (2005). Bivanjska občutja. Matthew Ratcliffe.

(108) Bivanjska občutja •. Povezava z Heideggrovo analizo razpoloženj / počutij (nem. Stimmung) in načina, na katerega se skozi razpoloženja najdemo v svetu (nem. Befindlichkeit).. “[Existential feelings] are not directed at specific objects or situations but are background orientations through which experience as a whole is structured. … they are all feelings, in the sense that they are bodily states which influence one’s awareness. … they constitute the basic structure of ‘being there’, a ‘hold on things’ that functions as a presupposed context for all intellectual and practical activity …”. (Ratcliffe, 2005).

(109) Bivanjska občutja •. Povezava z Heideggrovo analizo razpoloženj / počutij (nem. Stimmung) in načina, na katerega se skozi razpoloženja najdemo v svetu (nem. Befindlichkeit).. “… Whenever one has a specific experience of oneself, another person or an inanimate object being a certain way, the experience has, as a background, a more general sense of one’s relationship with the world. This relationship does not simply consist in an experience of being an entity that occupies a spatial and temporal location, alongside a host of other entities. Ways of finding oneself in a world are presupposed spaces of experiential possibility, which shape the various ways in which things can be experienced. For example, if one’s sense of the world is tainted by a ‘feeling of unreality’, this will affect how all objects of perception appear. They are distant, removed, not quite ‘there’.”. (Ratcliffe, 2005).

(110) Relevantnost fenomenologije za kognitivno znanost? •. Opisovanje doživljanja duševnih motenj: A. ustreznejše razumevanje psihopatologije B. vpogled v (implicitne) doživljajske strukture, prisotne tudi izven duševne motnje, ki znotraj duševne motnje delujejo drugače.

(111) Fenomenološka psihopatologija •. Alternativa pogledu na duševne bolezni kot “intrapsihične” (ali celo izključno “možganske”) motnje: poudarek na primarnosti utelešenosti in vpetosti posameznika v socialni svet.. •. Razume duševne motnje kot spremenjene načine bivanja v svetu, zaznamovane s spremembami v osnovnih dimenzijah življenjskega sveta, npr. v doživljanju telesa, časa, prostora, intersubjektivnosti in sebstva..

(112) “Phenomenological psychopathology … regards the lived body not only as the primary domain of self-experience, of well-being or ill-being, but also as the medium of our elementary contact to the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Stanghellini, 2004; Fuchs, 2002b; 2005). Background feelings of the body such as ease or unease, relaxation or tension, expansion or constriction, freshness or tiredness provide a tacit evaluation of how ‘things stand’ in our life; they colour and permeate all world-directed experience (Damasio, 1999; Ratcliffe, 2008; Fuchs, 2012). Moreover, the body is always already oriented towards other bodily beings, connected to them from early childhood on through desire, imitation, and empathy.. Thomas Fuchs. The mutual bodily resonance in social encounters, mediated by posture, facial, gestural, and vocal expression, engenders our attunement to others and functions as a carrier of basic interpersonal atmospheres such as warmth, ease, familiarity, and belonging, or in the negative case, coldness, tension, unease, or unfamiliarity. The body is embedded in intercorporeality, and thus becomes the medium of interaffectivity. From this point of view, so-called mental disorders should rather be regarded as alterations of the patient’s lived body, lived space, and being-with-others. ‘The patient is ill; this means, his world is ill’, as van den Berg has put it (1972, p. 46). In this sense, the illness is not in the patient, but the patient is in the illness, as it were; for mental illness is not a state in the head, but an altered way of being in the world.”. (Fuchs, 2013).

(113) Thomas Fuchs.

(114) Fenomenološka psihopatologija •. Alternativa pogledu na duševne bolezni kot “intrapsihične” (ali celo izključno “možganske”) motnje: poudarek na primarnosti utelešenosti in vpetosti posameznika v socialni svet.. •. Razume duševne motnje kot spremenjene načine bivanja v svetu, zaznamovane s spremembami v osnovnih dimenzijah življenjskega sveta, npr. v doživljanju telesa, časa, prostora, intersubjektivnosti in sebstva.. •. Preizpraševanje DSM/ICD* diagnostičnih kriterijev: fenomenološka površnost opisanih psihopatoloških simptomov, zanemarjanje doživljanja telesa in intersubjetivnega okolja, heterogenost doživljanja znotraj posamezne diagnostične kategorije, …. •. Oblikovanje novih orodij za opisovanje in diagnozo duševnih motenj. * DSM =The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychological Association) ICD = International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (World Health Organization).

(115) Doživljanje depresije … prek različnih dimenzij: •. spremembe v čustvovanju, mišljenju, volji,. •. zmanjšan občutek pripadnosti, povezanosti s (socialnim) svetom,. •. moten odnos do drugih, interakcija z drugimi,. •. spremenjeno doživljanje telesa. (. “the illness is not in the patient, but the patient is in the illness … mental illness is not a state in the head, but an altered way of being in the world”. ).

(116) Doživljanje depresije … prek različnih dimenzij: •. spremembe v čustvovanju, mišljenju, volji,. •. zmanjšan občutek pripadnosti, povezanosti s (socialnim) svetom,. •. moten odnos do drugih, interakcija z drugimi,. •. spremenjeno doživljanje telesa,. •. spremenjen prostor možnosti (svet ponuja drugačne, zmanjšane možnosti delovanja, upad občutka, da “lahko” …). Ratcliffe (2014).

(117) Doživljanje depresije … prek različnih dimenzij: •. spremembe v čustvovanju, mišljenju, volji,. •. zmanjšan občutek pripadnosti, povezanosti s (socialnim) svetom,. •. moten odnos do drugih, interakcija z drugimi,. •. spremenjeno doživljanje telesa,. •. spremenjen prostor možnosti (svet ponuja drugačne, zmanjšane možnosti delovanja, upad občutka, da “lahko” …)..

(118) Primeri opisov doživljanja med depresijo, ki v središče postavljajo doživljanje telesa, podobno doživljanju med somatsko boleznijo (Ratcliffe et al., 2013)..

(119) Thomas Fuchs.

(120) Thomas Fuchs.

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(125) Doživljanje shizofrenije •. izguba habitualne, samoumevne (ang. taken-for-granted) vpetosti v svet,. •. izguba zaupanja v svoje okolje,. •. izguba zaupanja v “mojost” (ang. mineness) misli, gibov, ….

(126) Doživljanje shizofrenije •. izguba habitualne, samoumevne (ang. taken-for-granted) vpetosti v svet,. •. izguba zaupanja v svoje okolje,. •. izguba zaupanja v “mojost” (ang. mineness) misli, gibov, …. •. hiperrefleksivnost: oblika pretiranega samozavedanja, pogosto in avtomatično ekspliciranje sicer implicitnih vidikov doživljanja.

(127) Doživljanje shizofrenije - Hiperrefleksivnost Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2003). Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. Schizophrenia bulletin, 29(3), 427-444: • Shizofrenija kot motnja izkustva sebstva ✴ hiperrefleksivnost ✴ zmanjšana samoafektivnost Parnas, J., & Handest, P. (2003). Phenomenology of anomalous self-experience in early schizophrenia. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 44(2), 121-134. Fuchs, T. (2013). Temporality and psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(1), 75-104..

(128) Fuchs (2010).

(129) Viri in nadaljnje branje Husserl, E. (2013). Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology. Springer Science & Business Media. Husserl, E. (1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published in 1954.) Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book (R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Original work published in 1952.) Gallagher, S. (2003). Phenomenology and experimental design. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9–10), 85–99. Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. (2012). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Routledge. Merleau-Ponty, M. (2013). Phenomenology of perception. Routledge. Fuchs, T. (2010). The psychopathology of hyperreflexivity. Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 24(3), 239-255. Fuchs, T. (2013). Temporality and psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12(1), 75-104. Parnas, J., & Handest, P. (2003). Phenomenology of anomalous self-experience in early schizophrenia. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 44(2), 121-134. Ratcliffe, M. (2005). The feeling of being. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12(8-9), 43-60. Ratcliffe, M. (2009). “Existential feeling and psychopathology”. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 16(2), 179–194. Ratcliffe, M., Broome, M., Smith, B., & Bowden, H. (2013). A bad case of the flu? The comparative phenomenology of depression and somatic illness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20(7-8), 198-218. Ratcliffe, M. (2014). Experiences of depression: A study in phenomenology. OUP Oxford. Sass, L. A. (2003). Self-disturbance in schizophrenia: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection. The self in neuroscience and psychiatry, 870539117. Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2003). Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. Schizophrenia bulletin, 29(3), 427-444. Sechehaye, M., & Rubin-Rabson, G. T. (1951). Autobiography of a schizophrenic girl: Reality lost and gained, with analytic interpretation..

(130) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik 4. predavanje. Prvoosebno raziskovanje Maj 2020. Urban Kordeš Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 130.

(131) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik. Arunas Žylis, Dialogue.

(132) Področje raziskovanja: subjektivno. Russ Mead.

(133) Področje raziskovanja: doživljanje. Russ Mead.

(134) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik.

(135) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI.


(137) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. Katero čustvo ponazarja / sproži slika?. IAPS (international affective picture system).

(138) Kako vam je všeč ta slika: 1 (ni mi všeč)…5 (zelo). Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. Pierre-Auguste Renoir: “The Bower in the Garden” 1875. Scala / Art Resource. FENOMENOLOŠKI.

(139) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. Zakaj vam je ta obraz bolj všeč? Johansson, P., Hall, L., Tärning, B., Sikström, S., & Chater, N. (2013). Choice Blindness and Preference Change: You Will Like This Paper Better If You (Believe You) Chose to Read It! Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. DOI: 10.1002/bdm.1807.



(142) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. Fenomenološka naravnanost. FENOMENOLOŠKI.

(143) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. Refleksija.

(144) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. Vrsta podatkov, ki jo poskušamo pridobiti: fenomenološki podatki Idealen fenomenološki podatek je poročilo o doživljanju, ki natančno opiše kako je biti ta oseba v izbranem trenutku. Vsebuje torej opis doživljanja vseh elementov, ki se jih jeoseba zavedala v tem trenutku..

(145) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. KVANTITATIVNI. KVALITATIVNI.

(146) How do you feel: very bad. very good. Killingsworth, 2010.

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(150) -Brain (2007).

(151) -Brain (2007).




(155) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. v sedemdesetih, razcvet fenomenološke psihologije Amadeo Giorgi: opisna fenomenološka metoda …“ensure that the results reflect a careful description of precisely the features of the experienced phenomenon as they present themselves to the consciousness of the researcher" (Giorgi, 2009). Giorgi, Amedeo. (1970). Psychology as a Human Science. New York : Harper & Row. Giorgi, Amedeo. (2009). The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology. Duquesne University Press: Pittsburgh, PA..

(156) Fenomenološki intervju Sodbe…. diagnoze, ocene…. FENOMENOLOŠKI PODATEK Pojasnila. Kontekst, opis Situacije. Namen, cilj. “Sateliti” (Pierre Vermersch).

(157) Fenomenološki intervju.

(158) Dnevniške tehnike •. Zaporedna št., datum. •. Kontekst. •. DOŽIVLJAJSKO POROČILO. •. Opazke, drugo. fenomenološki intervju.


(160) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. RETROSPEKCIJA. POROČILO O DOŽIVLJANJU V SEDANJEM TRENUTKU.

(161) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. POROČILO O DOŽIVLJANJU V SEDANJEM TRENUTKU Ericsson, K., & Simon, H. (May 1980). "Verbal reports as data". Psychological Review. 87 (3): 215–251. (“THINK-ALOUD” PROTOKOL) SROE PRISTOP (meditacija kot instrument za prisotno opazovanje doživljanja).

(162) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. POROČILO O DOŽIVLJANJU V SEDANJEM TRENUTKU Ericsson, K., & Simon, H. (May 1980). "Verbal reports as data". Psychological Review. 87 (3): 215–251 Kordeš, U., Demšar, E. “Being there when it happens A Novel Approach to Sampling Reflectively Observed Experience” New ideas in Psychology. (“THINK-ALOUD” PROTOKOL) SROE PRISTOP (meditacija kot instrument za prisotno opazovanje doživljanja).

(163) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. RETROSPEKCIJA. kultivacija. minimizacija.

(164) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. RETROSPEKCIJA. kultivacija. minimizacija. MIKRO-FENOMENOLOGIJA. Petitmengin, C. (2006). “Describing one’s subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for the science of consciousness”, Phenom Cog Sci, 5:229–269.

(165) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. RETROSPEKCIJA. kultivacija. minimizacija OPISNO VZORČENJE IZKUSTVA. Hurlburt, R. T. (2017). Descriptive Experience Sampling. V:Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

(166) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. RETROSPEKCIJA. kultivacija. minimizacija (OPISNO) VZORČENJE IZKUSTVA.

(167) Zemljevid prvoosebnih raziskovalnih pristopov in tehnik NATURALIZIRANI. FENOMENOLOŠKI. RETROSPEKCIJA. POROČILO O DOŽIVLJANJU V SEDANJEM TRENUTKU (“THINK-ALOUD” PROTOKOL) SROE PRISTOP (meditacija kot instrument za prisotno opazovanje doživljanja). kultivacija MIKRO-FENOMENOLOGIJA. minimizacija OPISNO VZORČENJE IZKUSTVA.

(168) Center za kognitivno znanost, Laboratorij za empirično fenomenologijo. http://observatory.pef.uni-lj.si.

(169) Združevanje prvoosebnih in tretjeosebnih pristopov v raziskovanju duševnosti: Nevrofenomenologija 5. predavanje. Prvoosebno raziskovanje Maj 2020. Prvoosebno raziskovanje, št. leto 2019/20. 169.

(170) Francisco Varela (1946–2001). Intimate Distances - Fragments for a Phenomenology of Organ Transplantation: http://www.oikos.org/varelafragments.htm.

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(172) “The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of informationprocessing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism.”. “... even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioural functions in the vicinity of experience … there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?” – Chalmers (1995).

(173) Težek problem zavesti / ang. hard problem of consciousness /. biološki in fizični procesi v možganih in telesu. subjektivno doživljanje. (predmet naravoslovnih znanosti). razlagalna vrzel.

(174) Varela (1996).

(175) Varelova “rešitev” težkega problema: • kot Chalmers (in v nasprotju z nevroredukcionisti in eliminativisti) prepozna ireducibilno naravo doživljanja • v nasprotju s Chalmersom za rešitev ne predlaga teoretičnega popravka (“extra ingredient”), temveč novo raziskovalno smer “In line with Chalmers’ basic point, I take lived, first-hand experience is a proper field of phenomena, irreducible to anything else. My claim there is no theoretical fix or ‘extra’ ingredient in nature can possibly bridge this gap. Instead, this field of phenomena requires a proper, rigorous method and pragmatics for its exploration and analysis.”.

(176) Varelova “rešitev” težkega problema: • kot Chalmers (in v nasprotju z nevroredukcionisti in eliminativisti) prepozna ireducibilno naravo doživljanja • v nasprotju s Chalmersom za rešitev ne predlaga teoretičnega popravka (“extra ingredient”), temveč novo raziskovalno smer “In line with Chalmers’ basic point, I take lived, first-hand experience is a proper field of phenomena, irreducible to anything else. My claim there is no theoretical fix or ‘extra’ ingredient in nature can possibly bridge this gap. Instead, this field of phenomena requires a proper, rigorous method and pragmatics for its exploration and analysis.”.

(177) Metodološko izhodišče = fenomenologija et al. “My position cannot be ascribed to any particular school or sublineage but represents my own synthesis of phenomenology in the light of modern cognitive science and other traditions focusing on human experience.”.

(178) Štirje prepleteni vidiki / momenti fenomenološke redukcije (1) Postavljanje v oklepaj prepričanj o fenomenu (epoche). (2) Pridobivanje intimnosti / intuitivne evidentnosti z domeno raziskovanja. (3) Opisovanje izkustva na primeren način (preko jezika, skic, formul, ...) in intersubjektivno preverjanje opisov. (4) Učenje, usposabljanje in razvijanje stabilnosti v (1), (2) in (3)..

(179) … instead of finding ‘extra ingredients’ to account for how consciousness emerges from matter and brain, my proposal reframes the question to that of finding meaningful bridges between two irreducible phenomenal domains. [...] What is needed are precisely the connecting structures provided by PhR since they are both immediately pertinent for experience (by their very nature) and at the same time sufficiently intersubjective to serve as constructive counterparts for external analysis..

(180) Delovna hipoteza nevrofenomenologije.

(181) Delovna hipoteza nevrofenomenologije The key point here is that by emphasizing a co-determination of both accounts one can explore the bridges, challenges, insights and contradictions between them. This means that both domains of phenomena have equal status in demanding a full attention and respect for their specificity. It is quite easy to see how scientific accounts illuminate mental experience, but the reciprocal direction, from experience towards science, is what is typically ignored..

(182) Delovna hipoteza nevrofenomenologije Fenomenološki opisi k širši sliki dodajo vsaj dva ključna vidika: (1) Brez njih izgine prvoosebna kakovost izkustva oz. ta postane nerazvozljiva uganka. (2) Strukturni opisi empirične ugotovitve omejujejo..

(183) Vzajemno omejevanje The novelty of my proposal is that disciplined first-person accounts should be an integral element of the validation of a neurobiological proposal, and not merely coincidental or heuristic information. This is why I choose to describe the situation by the hypothesis that both accounts be mutual constraints on each other.. This double constraint would not apply to descriptions that are not directly relevant to the level of experience, for instance for cellular responses or neuro- transmitter diffusion..

(184) Dva izziva Varelovega predloga First, it demands a re-learning and a mastery of the skill of phenomenological description. There is no reason why this should be any different from the acquisition of any know-how, like learning to play an instrument or to speak a new language. Anyone who engages in learning, be it in music, language or thinking, will be bringing forth a change of everyday life..

(185) Dva izziva Varelovega predloga The second challenge that my proposal represents is that of a call for transforming the style and values of the research community itself. Unless we accept that at this point in intellectual and scientific history some radical re-learning is necessary, we cannot hope to move forward and break the historic cycle rejection–fascination with consciousness in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. […] My proposal implies that every good student of cognitive science who is also interested in issues at the level of mental experience, must inescapably attain a level of mastery in phenomenological examination in order to work seriously with first-person accounts..

(186) Povzetek (1) Izkustvo je nereduktibilno, a gola teoretična načela in delne empirične korelacije niso dovolj za premostitev težkega problema zavesti. (2) Potrebujemo rigorozno metodo in jasne prakse za sistematično raziskovanje strukture človeškega izkustva. (3) Predlagana metoda črpa navdih iz fenomenološke tradicije in zahteva usposabljanje v veščini fenomenološkega opisovanja. (4) Vzpostaviti je potrebno raziskovalno skupnost in raziskovalni program, ki bosta po principu vzajemnega omejevanja enakovredno obravnavali tako opise izkustva kot pripadajoče tretjeosebne opise..

(187) Povzetek (1) Izkustvo je nereduktibilno, a gola teoretična načela in delne empirične korelacije niso dovolj za premostitev težkega problema zavesti. (2) Potrebujemo rigorozno metodo in jasne prakse za sistematično raziskovanje strukture človeškega izkustva. (3) Predlagana metoda črpa navdih iz fenomenološke tradicije in zahteva usposabljanje v veščini fenomenološkega opisovanja. (4) Cilj je vzpostaviti raziskovalno skupnost in raziskovalni program, ki bosta po principu vzajemnega omejevanja enakovredno obravnavali tako opise izkustva kot pripadajoče tretjeosebne opise..




(191) Težek problem po Vareli The nature of ‘hard’ becomes reframed in two senses:. (1) it is hard work to train and stabilize new methods to explore experience, (2) it is hard to change the habits of science in order for it to accept that new tools are needed for the transformation of what it means to conduct research on mind and for the training of succeeding generations..

(192) Nevrofenomenologija v praksi.

(193) Nevrofenomenologija v praksi: Lutz et al. (2002).

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(197) Nevrofenomenologija v praksi: Petitmengin et al. (2007).

(198) Neuro-dynamic analysis of seizure anticipation Our present observations suggest that two related processes seem to be involved here.. (1) A state of increased synchronization. This state may reflect recruitment phenomena within the primary epileptogenic area and its surroundings regions.. (2) A state of decreased synchronization. This state may isolate pathologically discharging neuronal populations of the epileptic focus from the influence of activity in wider brain areas, thus facilitating the development of local pathological recruitments. On the other hand, a loss of synchrony might also provide an ‘idle’ population of neurons which may be more easily recruited into the epileptic process. Finally, the preictal loss of synchrony could reflect a depression of synaptic inhibition in areas surrounding the epileptogenic focus, as in certain experimental models of epilepsy..

(199) These results show that the seizure does not arise suddenly, but that there is a transition from the interictal state to the ictal state. They also lead to the conclusion that the seizure does not correspond to the deficient functioning of a precise area of the brain, but to the deficient functioning of neural networks, related by abnormally facilitated connections. But the synchrony analysis does not tell us anything about the way this transition and this deficit are (or are not) felt by the patient. It indicates the structure of the cerebral activity, not the nature of the subjective experience that could correspond to it. Therefore the following question arises:. do the neuro-electric preictal modifications identified among epileptic patients correspond to modifications in their subjective experience, and if that is the case, what are they?.

(200) (Petitmengin et al., 2007).

(201)