Alvarez, Maria in Hyman, John. (1998). »Agents and Their Actions«. Philosophy 73 (2): 219–
245.
Andrew, James Preston. (2016). Why No One Truly Deserves to Suffer. Magistrsko delo, The University of Texas: Austin.
Apel, Robert in Nagin, Daniel S. (2011). »General Deterrence«. V: Tonri, Michael (ur.). The Oxford Handbook of Crime and Criminal Justice. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 179–
206.
Avguštin. ([387–395] 2003). O svobodni izbiri. Krtina: Ljubljana.
Balaguer, Mark. (2014). Free Will. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Baker, Lynne Rudder. (2006). »Moral Responsibility without Libertarianism«. Noûs 40 (2):
307–330.
Baker, Lynne Rudder. (2007). »Persons and the Natural Order«. V: van Inwagen, Peter in Zimmerman, Dean (ur.). Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 261–278.
Baker, Lynne Rudder. (2013). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Beebee, Helen. (2013). Free Will: An Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan: New York.
Berger, Jacob. (2014). »Mental States, Conscious and Nonconscious«. Philosophy Compass 9 (6): 392–401.
Berofsky, Bernard. (2012). Nature's Challenge to Free Will. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Bricke, John. (2008). »Hume on Liberty and Necessity«. V: Radcliffe, Elizabeth S. (ur.). A Companion to Hume. Blackwell: Oxford, 201–216.
Brogaard, Berit. (2014). »Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings«. Analytic Philosophy 55 (4): 382–
393.
Campbell, Joseph Keim. (2011). Free Will. Polity Press: Cambridge.
Campbell, Joseph Keim, O'Rourke, Michael in Shier, David. (2004). »Freedom and Determinism: A Framework«. V: Campbell, Joseph Keim, O'Rourke, Michael in Shier, David (ur.). Freedom and Determinism. The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1–17.
Caruso, Gregg D. (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books: Lanham, MD.
111
Caruso, Gregg D. (2018). »Skepticism About Moral Responsibility«. V: Zalta, Edward N. (ur.).
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Dostopno na:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/ (pridobljeno 26. 9. 2019).
Caruso, Gregg D. (2020). »Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment«. Neuroethics 13 (1): 13–28.
Caruso, Gregg D. (2021). Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice. Cambridge University Press: New York.
Caruso, Gregg D. in Morris, Stephen G. (2016). »Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance«. Erkenntnis 82 (4): 837–855.
Chisholm, Roderick M. ([1964] 1982). »Human Freedom and the Self«. V: Watson, Gary (ur.).
Free Will. Oxford University Press: New York, 24–35.
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Open Court: La Salle, IL.
Clark, Maudemarie. (2015). Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Clarke, Randolph. (1993). »Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will«. Noûs 27 (2): 191–203.
Clarke, Randolph. (2000). »Libertarianism, Action Theory, and the Loci of Responsibility«.
Philosophical Studies 98 (2): 153–174.
Clarke, Randolph. (2003). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford University Press: New York.
Clarke, Randolph. (2017). »Free Will, Agent Causation, and 'Disappearing Agents'«. Noûs 53 (1): 76–96.
Clarke, Randolph, McKenna, Michael in Smith, Angela M. (2015). »Introduction«. V: Clarke, Randolph, McKenna, Michael in Smith, Angela M. (ur.). The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1–16.
Coates, Justin D. (2013). »In Defense of Love Internalism«. The Journal of Ethics 17 (3): 233–
255.
Coates, Justin D. (2017). »The Basic Argument and Modest Moral Responsibility«. Analytic Philosophy 58 (2): 156–170.
Coates, Justin D. in Tognazzini, Neal A. (2013). »The Contours of Blame«. V: Coates, Justin D. in Tognazzini, Neal A. (ur.). Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press: New York, 3–26.
112
Coffman, E. J. in Warfield, Ted A. (2005). »Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom«. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1): 25–44.
Cuypers, Stefaan E. (2013). »Moral Shallowness, Metaphysical Megalomania, and Compatibilist-Fatalism«. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1): 173–188.
Davidson, Donald. ([1973] 2001). »Freedom to Act«. V: Davidson, Donald. Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 63–81.
Dennett, Daniel C. (1984a). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Clarendon Press: Oxford.
Dennett, Daniel C. (1984b). »I Could Not Have Done Otherwise – So What?«. Journal of Philosophy 81 (10): 553–565.
Dennett, Daniel C. (2003). Freedom Evolves. Penguin Books: London.
Dennett, Daniel C. (2013). Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking. W. W. Norton and Co.: New York.
Dennett, Daniel C. in Caruso, Gregg D. (2021). Just Deserts: Debating Free Will. Polity Press:
Cambridge.
Diderot, Denis. ([1769] 2010). D'Alembertove sanje. V: Diderot, Denis. D'Alembertove sanje in drugi filozofski spisi. Založba ZRC: Ljubljana, 7–131.
Doris, John M. (2015). Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Double, Richard. (1991). The Non-Reality of Free Will. Oxford University Press: New York.
Esktrom, Laura Waddell. (2000). Free Will: A Philosophical Study. Westview Press: Boulder, CO.
Ekstrom, Laura Waddell. (2016). »Event-Causal Libertarianism«. V: Timpe, Kevin, Griffith, Meghan E. in Levy, Neil (ur.). The Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge: New York, 62–71.
Everson, Stephen. (2013). »Motivating Reasons«. V: O'Connor, Timothy in Sandis, Constantine (ur.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell: Oxford, 145–152.
Feinberg, Joel. (1986). Harm to Self. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Fischer, John Martin. (2006). »The Cards That Are Dealt You«. The Journal of Ethics 10 (1–
2): 107–129.
Fischer, John Martin. (2007). »Compatibilism«. V: Fischer, John Martin, Kane, Robert, Pereboom, Derk in Vargus, Manuel. Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell: Malden, MA, 44–
84.
113
Fischer, John Martin. (2012). Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value. Oxford University Press: New York.
Fischer, John Martin in Ravizza, Mark. (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1969). »Alternate Possibilites and Moral Responsibility«. The Journal of Philosophy 66 (23): 829–839.
Frankfurt, Harry G. ([1971] 2007). »Svoboda volje in pojem osebe«. V: Šuster, Danilo (ur.). O svobodni volji: od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 117–131.
Frankfurt, Harry G. ([2004] 2009). Razlogi ljubezni. Krtina: Ljubljana.
Franklin, Christopher Evan. (2011). »Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument«.
Philosophical Studies 156 (2): 199–230.
Franklin, Christopher Evan. (2013). »How Should Libertarians Conceive of the Location and Role of Indeterminism?«. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1): 44–58.
Franklin, Christopher Evan. (2015). »Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy's Hard Luck«. Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4): 753–770.
Franklin, Christopher Evan. (2019). »The Heart of Libertarianism: Fundamentality and the Will«. Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1): 72–92.
Frede, Michael. (2011). A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought. University of California Press: Berkeley.
Ginet, Carl. (2007). »An Action Can Be Both Uncaused and Up to the Agent«. V: Lumer, Christoph in Nannini, Sandro (ur.). Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate: Aldershot, 243–255.
Glock, Hans-Johann. (2013). »Animal Agency«. V: O'Connor, Timothy in Sandis, Constantine (ur.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell: Oxford, 384–392.
Goetz, Stewart. (2008). Freedom, Teleology, and Evil. T&T Clark: London.
Goetz, Stewart in Kane, Robert. (2000). »Excerpts from Robert Kane's Discussion with Members of the Audience«. The Journal of Ethics 4 (4): 343–347.
Gokhale, Sarah. (2019). Who Needs Blame?: Answerability Without Expressed Blame.
Doktorsko delo, City University: New York.
Gorbatova, Yulia. (2012). »Omnipotence as a Perfection of God«. Higher School of Econimics
Research Paper No. BRP 09/HUM/2012. Dostopno na:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185925 (pridobljeno 26. 9. 2020).
Griffith, Meghan E. (2003). Freedom and Responsibility: An Agent-Causal View. Doktorsko delo, University of Massachusetts Amherst: Massachusetts.
114
Griffith, Meghan E. (2010). »Why Agent-Caused Actions are Not Lucky«. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1): 43–56.
Griffith, Meghan E. (2013). Free Will: The Basics. Routledge: London.
Griffith, Meghan E. (2016). »Agent Causation«. V: Timpe, Kevin, Griffith, Meghan E. in Levy, Neil (ur.). The Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge: New York, 72–85.
Guillemette, Steven. (2017). »A Parsimonious Agent Causation«. Aporia 16: 1–10. Dostopno na: https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/aporia/article/view/1441 (pridobljeno 14. 9.
2019).
Haji, Ishtiyaque. (2004). »Active Control, Agent-Causation, and Free Action«. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2): 131–148.
Haji, Ishtiyaque. (2009). Incompatibilism's Allure: Principal Arguments for Incompatibilism.
Broadview Press: Peterborough.
Hall, Matthew. (2009). »Plant Autonomy and Human-Plant Ethics«. Environmental Ethics 31 (2): 169–181.
Hobart, R. E. (1934). »Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It«.
Mind 43 (169): 1–27.
Horgan, Terry. (2007). »Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem«. Erkenntnis 67 (2): 183–200.
Huemer, Michael. (2007). »Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism«. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 30–55.
Hume, David. ([1738] 1896). A Treatise of Human Nature. Clarendon Press: Oxford.
Hume, David. ([1748] 2007). »O svobodi in nujnosti«. V: Šuster, Danilo (ur.). O svobodni volji:
od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 47–62.
Hunt, David P. (2014). »Swinburne on the Conditions for Free Will and Moral Responsibility«.
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2): 39–49.
Istvan, Michael Anthony, jr. (2011). »Concerning the Resilience of Galen Strawson's Basic Argument«. Philosophical Studies 155 (3): 399–420.
Jackson, Frank. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Jeppsson, Sofia. (2015). »A Coherent and Comprehensible Interpretation of Saul Smilansky's Dualism«. Filosofiska Notiser Årgång 2 (1): 39–45.
Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016). »Accountability, Answerability, and Freedom«. Social Theory and Practice 42 (4): 681–705.
115
Kane, Robert. ([1996] 1998). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press: New York.
Kane, Robert. ([2002] 2007). »Svobodna volja: nove smeri starodavnega problema«. V: Šuster, Danilo (ur.). O svobodni volji: od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 265–287.
Kane, Robert. (2005). A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. Oxford University Press:
New York.
Kane, Robert. (2007). »Response to Fischer, Pereboom, and Vargas«. V: Fischer, John Martin, Kane, Robert, Pereboom, Derk in Vargas, Manuel. Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell:
Malden, MA, 166–183.
Kane, Robert. (2011). »Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates (Part 2)«. V: Kane, Robert (ur.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press:
New York, 3–35.
Kane, Robert. (2016). »On the Role of Indeterminism in Libertarian Free Will«. Philosophical Explorations 19 (1): 2–16.
Kershnar, Stephen. (2001). Desert, Retribution, and Torture. University Press of America:
Lenham, MD.
Kim, Jaegwon. (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press:
Princeton.
Kobe, Zdravko. (2009). »Racionalnost ljubezni«. V: Frankfurt, Harry G. Razlogi ljubezni.
Krtina: Ljubljana, 121–137.
Lamont, John. (2011). »The Justice and Goodness of Hell«. Faith and Philosophy 28 (2): 152–
173.
Lemos, John. (2008). Commonsense Darwinism: Evolution, Morality, and the Human Condition. Open Court: La Salle, IL.
Lemos, John. (2018). A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will. Routledge: New York.
Levy, Neil. (2008a). »Bad Luck Once Again«. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 749–754.
Levy, Neil. (2008b). »Restoring Control: Comments on George Sher«. Philosophia 36 (2): 213–
221.
Levy, Neil. (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Levy, Neil. (2012). »Skepticism and Sanction: The Benefits of Rejecting Moral Responsibility«. Law and Philosophy 31 (5): 477–493.
116
Levy, Neil. (2015). »Luck and Agent-Causation: A Response to Franklin«. Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4): 779–784.
Lewis, David. (2007). »Divine Evil«. V: Anthony, Louise M. (ur.). Philosophers Without Gods:
Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 231–242.
Locke, John. ([1689] 1836). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. T. Tegg and Son:
London.
Lowe, E. J. (2008). Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Markosian, Ned. (1999). »A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation«. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3): 257–277.
Markosian, Ned. (2012). »Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist's Problems«. Philosophical Studies 157 (3): 383–398.
Mawson, T. J. (2011). Free Will: A Guide for the Perplexed. Continuum: New York.
McKenna, Michael. (2008). »Ultimacy and Sweet Jane«. V: Trakakis, Nick in Cohen, Daniel (ur.). Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Publishing:
Newcastle, 186–208.
McKenna, Michael. (2009). »Compatibilism and Desert: Critical Comments on Four Views on Free Will«. Philosophical Studies 144 (1): 3–13.
McKenna, Michael. (2010). »Whose Argumentative Burder, which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right«. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3): 429–
443.
McKenna, Michael. (2012). Conversation and Responsibility. Oxford University Press: New York.
McKenna, Michael. (2013). »Directed Blame and Conversation«. V: Coates, Justin D. in Tognazini, Neal A. (ur.). Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 119–140.
McKenna, Michael. (2019). »Basically Deserved Blame and its Value«. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (3): 255–282.
McKenna, Michael in Pereboom, Derk. (2016). Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction.
Routledge: New York.
Mele, Alfred R. (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press: New York.
Mele, Alfred R. (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press: New York.
117
Mickelson, Kristin M. (2012). Free Will Fundamentals: Agency, Determinism, and (In)compatibility. Doktorsko delo, University of Colorado: Boulder, CO.
Mickelson, Kristin M. (2015). »The Zygote Argument is Invalid: Now What?«. Philosophical Studies 172 (11): 2911–2929.
Mickelson, Kristin M. (2019a). »Free Will, Self-Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck«.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1): 224–256.
Mickelson, Kristin M. (2019b). »The Problem of Free Will and Determinism: An Abductive Approach«. Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (4): 154–172.
Miles, James B. (2015). The Free Will Delusion: How We Settled for the Illusion of Morality.
Matador: Leicestershire.
Moore, Michael S. ([1997] 2010). Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law.
Oxford University Press: New York.
Morriston, Wes. (1977). »Freedom, Determinism, and Chance in the Early Philosophy of Sartre«. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3): 236–248.
Murray, Dylan in Nahmias, Eddy. (2014). »Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions«.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2): 434–467.
Nagel, Thomas. ([1979] 2007). »Moralna sreča«. V: Šuster, Danilo (ur.). O svobodni volji: od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 225–237.
Nagin, Daniel S. (2012). »Deterrence: Scaring Offenders Straight«. V: Cullen, Francis T. in Jonson, Cheryl Lero (ur.). Correctional Theory: Context and Consequences. Sage Publications: Los Angeles, CA, 67–98.
Nahmias, Eddy. (2014). »Response to Misirlisoy and Haggard and to Björnsson and Pereboom«. V: Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (ur.). Moral Psychology: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 43–58.
Nahmias, Eddy, Morris, Stephen, Nadelhoffer, Thomas in Turner, Jason. (2004). »The Phenomenology of Free Will«. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7–8): 162–179.
Nichols, Shaun. (2004). »The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts«. Mind and Language 19 (5): 473–502.
Nichols, Shaun. ([2015] 2017). Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility. Oxford University Press: New York.
Nichols, Shaun in Knobe, Joshua. (2007). »Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions«. Noûs 41 (4): 663–685.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. (2007). »Doings and Subject Causation«. Erkenntnis 67 (2): 255–272.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. ([1878] 2005). Človeško, prečloveško. Slovenska matica: Ljubljana.
118
Nietzsche, Friedrich. ([1886] 1988). Onstran dobrega in zlega: predigra k filozofiji prihodnosti.
V: Nietzsche, Friedrich. Onstran dobrega in zlega; H genealogiji morale. Slovenska matica:
Ljubljana, 5–204.
O'Connor, Timothy. (1995). »Agent Causation«. V: O'Connor, Timothy. (ur.). Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press: New York, 173–200.
O'Connor, Timothy. ([1999] 2007). »Dejavnik kot vzrok«. V: Šuster, Danilo (ur.). O svobodni volji: od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 291–298.
O'Connor, Timothy. (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford University Press: New York.
O'Connor, Timothy. (2005). »Freedom With a Human Face«. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1): 207–227.
O'Connor, Timothy. (2009). »Agent-Causal Power«. V: Handfield, Toby (ur.). Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 189–214.
O'Connor, Timothy. (2013). »Reasons and Causes«. V: O'Connor, Timothy in Sandis, Constantine (ur.). A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell: Oxford, 129–138.
O'Connor, Timothy in Franklin, Christopher Evan. (2018). »Free Will«. V: Zalta, Edward N.
(ur.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Dostopno na:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ (pridobljeno 14. 9. 2020).
Ošlaj, Borut. (2012). »O temeljnih pogojih možnosti delovanja pravne države«. Poligrafi 17 (67–68): 3–17.
Parfit, Derek. (2011). On What Matters: Volume One. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Parks, Brian D. (2009). »Ultimate Moral Responsibility is Impossible: A New Defense of the
Basic Argument«. Neobjavljen članek. Dostopno na:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.395.3763 (pridobljeno 1. 1.
2020).
Pereboom, Derk. ([1995] 2007). »Determinizem al dente«. V: Šuster, Danilo (ur.). O svobodni volji: od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 171–199.
Pereboom, Derk. (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Pereboom, Derk. (2009). »Free Will, Love and Anger«. Ideas Y Valores 58 (141): 169–189.
Pereboom, Derk. (2014). Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Oxford University Press:
Oxford.
119
Pereboom, Derk. (2015). »A Notion of Moral Responsibility Immune to the Threat from Causal Determination.« V: Clarke, Randolph, McKenna, Michael in Smith, Angela M. (ur.). The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 281–296.
Pereboom, Derk. (2017). »A Defense of Free Will Skepticism: Replies to Commentaries by Victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Alfred R. Mele on Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life«. Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3): 617–636.
Pink, Thomas. (2004). Free Will: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Plantinga, Alvin. (1967). God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY.
Plantinga, Alvin. (1976). »Actualism and Possible Worlds«. Theoria 42 (1–3): 139–160.
Pust, Joel. (2000). Intuitions as Evidence. Routledge: New York.
Rose, David in Nichols, Shaun. (2013). »The Lesson of Bypassing«. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4): 1–21.
Rosenberg, Alex. (2015). The Girl from Krakow: A Novel. Lake Union Publishing: Seattle.
Roskies, Adina in Nichols, Shaun. (2008). »Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth«.
Journal of Philosophy 105 (7): 371–388.
Rotterdamski, Erazem. ([1524] 2010). O svobodni volji. V: Rotterdamski, Erazem. Hvalnica Norosti; Tožba Mirú; O svobodni volji. Studia humanitatis: Ljubljana, 181–283.
Rudy-Hiller, Fernando. (2018). »The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility«. V: Zalta, Edward N. (ur.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Dostopno na:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility-epistemic/ (pridobljeno 1. 1. 2021).
Sartorio, Carolina. (2007). »Causation and Responsibility«. Philosophy Compass 2 (5): 749–
765.
Sartorio, Carolina. (2016). Causation and Free Will. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Scanlon, T. M. (2015). »Forms and Conditions of Responsibility«. V: Clarke, Randolph, McKenna, Michael in Smith, Angela M. (ur.). The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 89–111.
Shariff, Azim, Greene, Joshua D., Karremans, Johan C., Luguri, Jamie B., Clark, Cory, Schooler, Jonathan, Baumeister, Roy in Vohs, Kathleen. (2014). »Free Will and Punishment:
A Mechanistic View of Human Nature Reduces Retribution«. Psychological Science 25 (8):
1563–1570.
Sher, George. (1987). Desert. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.
Shoemaker, David. (2011). »Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility«. Ethics 121 (3): 602–632.
120
Smart, J. J. C. ([1968] 2007). »Svoboda volje in determinizem«. V: Šuster, Danilo (ur.). O svobodni volji: od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 81–86.
Smilansky, Saul. (1990). Free Will, Justice and Illusion. Doktorsko delo, University of Oxford:
Oxford.
Smilansky, Saul. (2000). Free Will and Illusion. Clarendon Press: New York.
Smilansky, Saul. (2002). »Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion«. V:
Kane, Robert (ur.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press: New York, 489–505.
Smilansky, Saul. (2003). »Compatibilism: The Argument from Shallowness«. Philosophical Studies 115 (3): 257–282.
Smilansky, Saul. (2005). »Free Will and Respect for Persons«. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1): 248–261.
Smilansky, Saul. (2012). »Free Will and Moral Responsibility: The Trap, the Appreciation of Agency, and the Bubble«. The Journal of Ethics 16 (2): 211–239.
Smilansky, Saul. (2019). »Free Will Denial and Deontological Constraints«. V: Shaw, Elizabeth, Pereboom, Derk in Caruso, Gregg D. (ur.). Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society. Cambridge University Press: New York, 29–42.
Sommers, Tamler. ([2003] 2016). »Galen Strawson: You Cannot Make Yourself the Way You Are«. V: Sommers, Tamler. A Very Bad Wizard: Morality Behind the Curtain. Routledge:
New York, 3–16.
Sommers, Tamler. (2007). »The Illusion of Freedom Evolves«. V: Ross, Don, Spurrett, David, Kincaid, Harold in Stephens, Lynn G. (ur.). Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context. The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 61–75.
Speak, Daniel. (2011). »Libertarianism, Luck, and Gift«. Modern Schoolman 88 (1–2): 29–49.
Spinoza, Baruch. ([1677] 1988). Etika. Slovenska matica: Ljubljana.
Steward, Helen. (2011). »Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency«. V: Swinburne, Richard (ur.). Free Will and Modern Science. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 141–157.
Steward, Helen. (2012). A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Steward, Helen. (2013). »A Dialogue on Free Will«. Methode 2 (3): 191–199.
Steward, Helen. (2015). »Do Animals Have Free Will?«. The Philosophers' Magazine 68 (1):
43–48.
Strawson, Galen. ([1986] 2008). »On the Inevitability of Freedom from the Compatibilist Point of View«. V: Strawson, Galen. Real Materialism and Other Essays. Clarendon Press: New York, 307–317.
121
Strawson, Galen. ([1986] 2010). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Strawson, Galen. (1989). »Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism«.
Inquiry 32: 3–27.
Strawson, Galen. ([1989] 2008). »Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism«. V: Strawson, Galen. Real Materialism and Other Essays. Clarendon Press:
New York, 337–358.
Strawson, Galen. ([1994] 2007). »Nemožnost moralne odgovornosti«. V: Šuster, Danilo (ur.).
O svobodni volji: od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 203–220.
Strawson, Galen. ([1994] 2008). »The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility«. V:
Strawson, Galen. Real Materialism and Other Essays. Clarendon Press: New York, 319–
331.
Strawson, Galen. ([1994] 2010). Mental Reality. The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.
Strawson, Galen. (1995). »Libertarianism, Action, and Self-Determination«. V: O'Connor, Timothy (ur.). Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press: New York, 13–31.
Strawson, Galen. (1998). »Free Will«. V: Craig, Edward (ur.). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge: London.
Strawson, Galen. (2000). »The Unhelpfulness of Indeterminism«. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 149–155.
Strawson, Galen. (2002). »The Bounds of Freedom«. V: Kane, Robert (ur.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 441–460.
Strawson, Galen. (2003). »Realistic Materialism«. V: Antony, Louise M. in Hornstein, Norbert (ur.). Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell: Oxford, 49–88.
Strawson, Galen. ([2003] 2016). »Galen Strawson: You Cannot Make Yourself the Way You Are«. V: Sommers, Tamler. A Very Bad Wizard: Morality Behind the Curtain. Routledge:
New York, 3–16.
Strawson, Galen. ([2004] 2008). »Free Agents«. V: Strawson, G. Real Materialism and Other Essays. Clarendon Press: New York, 359–386.
Strawson, Galen. (2007). »Episodic Ethics«. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60: 85–
116.
Strawson, Galen. (2008a). »Introduction«. V: Strawson, Galen. Real Materialism and Other Essays. Clarendon Press: New York, 1–18.
122
Strawson, Galen. (2008b). »On 'Freedom and Resentment'«. V: McKenna, Michael in Russell, Paul (ur.). Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P. F. Strawson's »Freedom and Resentment«. Ashgate Publishing Company: Burlington, VT, 85–113.
Strawson, Galen. (2011). »The Impossibility of Ultimate Responsibility?«. V: Swinburne, Richard (ur.). Free Will and Modern Science. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 126–140.
Strawson, Galen. (2018). Things That Bother Me: Death, Freedom, the Self, etc. New York Review Book: New York.
Strawson, Peter F. ([1962] 2007). »Svoboda in zamera«. V: Šuster, Danilo (ur.). O svobodni volji: od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 91–113.
Stump, Eleonore. (1999). »Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz«. Faith and Philosophy 16 (3): 413–422.
Svendsen, Lars. (2014). A Philosophy of Freedom. Reaktion Books: London.
Sverdlik, Steven. (2012). »Hard Luck, by Neil Levy«. Mind 121 (482): 498–501.
Swinburne, Richard. (1994). The Christian God. Clarendon Press: Oxford.
Swinburne, Richard. (2011). »Dualism and the Determination of Action«. V: Swinburne, Richard. (ur.). Free Will and Modern Science. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 63–83.
Swinburne, Richard. ([2012] 2013). Mind, Brain, and Free Will. Oxford University Press:
Oxford.
Swinburne, Richard. (2016). »A Rejoinder to Speak«. V: Crisp, Thomas M., Porter, Steven L.
in Elshof, Gregg A. Ten (ur.). Neuroscience and the Soul: The Human Person in Philosophy, Science, and Theology. Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 117–120.
Swinburne, Richard. (2021). »(Some of) Six Types of Libertarian Free Will«. Neobjavljen članek.262
Šuster, Danilo. (2000). »Možni svetovi in pojasnilo modalnosti«. Analiza 4 (2): 81–99.
Šuster, Danilo. (2005). »Internalizem in skepticizem«. Analiza 9 (4): 40–63.
Šuster, Danilo. (2006). »Svoboda, determinizem in odgovornost«. Delo 48 (178): 21.
Šuster, Danilo. (2007a). »Problem svobode«. V: Šuster, Danilo. (ur.). O svobodni volji: od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 7–14.
Šuster, Danilo. (2007b). »Programirani in kaj potem?«. V: Šuster, Danilo. (ur.). O svobodni volji: od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 87–89.
Šuster, Danilo. (2007c). »Negibni prvi gibalec«. V: Šuster, Danilo. (ur.). O svobodni volji: od Leibniza do Libeta. Aristej: Maribor, 299–301.
262 Filozofu Richardu Swinburnu se najiskreneje zahvaljujem, da je bil z menoj pripravljen deliti delovno, nedokončano in neobjavljeno različico svojega članka.
123
Timpe, Kevin. ([2008] 2013). Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives. Bloomsbury Academic: New York.
Tucker, Chris. (2007). »Agent Causation and the Alleged Impossibility of Rational Free Action«. Erkenntnis 67 (1): 17–27.
Uršič, Marko. (2014). »Prispevek k Jermanovi razpravi o Łukasiewiczevem problemu
determinizma«. Analiza 18 (4): 57–72. Dostopno na:
http://www2.arnes.si/~mursic3/Jerman_Lukasiewicz_2004.htm (pridobljeno 1. 1. 2021).
Uršič, Marko in Markič, Olga. ([2003] 2009). Osnove logike. Znanstvena založba Filozofske
Uršič, Marko in Markič, Olga. ([2003] 2009). Osnove logike. Znanstvena založba Filozofske